A reliability/availability simulation model for evaluating network systems. by Jenkins, Raymond John
A RELIABILITY/AVAILABILITY SIMULATION MODEL FOR
EVALr~TING NETWORK SY!;fEMS
Raymond John Jenkins
A project report submitted to the Faculty of Engineering, University of the
Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the
degree of Master of Science in Engineering.
Johannesburg, 1992
DECLARATION
I declare that this project report is my own, unaided work. It is being
submitted for the Master of Science in Engineering :.'/:the University of the
Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. It has not been submitted before for any degree
or examination at any other University.
day of 1992
ABSTRACT
The simulator uses the Monte Carlo technique to quickly and accurately
estimate the reliability and availability of complex network systems,
Non -exponential failure and repair distributions are included in the model,
as is standby redundancy and K out of N active redundancy. 'Ihe program is
easy to use and will work on a large variety of computers and FORTRAN
compilers. Some knowledge of FORTRAN is required to program the
simulator for each reliability network, The simulator is limited to the analysis
of network systems, i.e, those systemswhose logic can be fully represented by
a reliability block diagram. The applicability of the model was demonstrated
by the analysis of numerous systems in the aerospace and industrial
environments. Validation of the model was accomplished by comparing these
results with analytically determined values, or those from AMIR and SPAR~
where an analytic solution was impossible.
if
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1 INTRODUCTION.
Reliability and availability have become important criteria in the design and
operational phase of systems. For example, the operational defects of an
electronic warfare system are critical to a combat helicopter completing its
mission. The safety aspects of a Space Shuttle computer system are vital to the
survival of the crew in space. The unavailability of an industrial system causes
a loss in production.
Design engineers are L .iW more than ever required to perform trade-off
studies between system availability, reliability, technical performance and life
cycle cost. The engineer therefore requires an accurate, economical and easy
to use system reliability and availability estimation tool. Unfortunately, the
analytical estimation of system reliability and availability becomes difficult and
expensive even for the most simplest of svstems, In fact, the analytic approach
is often inadequate for most engineering needs.
The alternative approach is to simulate system failures and repairs using the
Monte Carlo technique. This technique entails the generation ofcoroponent
random times to fail and repair from which the system time to fail and repair
can be determined. The system failure and repair time obtained in this
manner must be viewed as the outcome of an experiment. This experiment is
then repeated many times until an adequate estimate of system reliability and
availability is obtained.
Fon;-(13) has carried out extensive work in the development of Monte Carlo
simulation models for estimating large scale system reliability and availability.
His work was primarily directed at the modelling of network systems.
Goldfeld and Dubi(14) have addressed the reliability and availability analysis
of general systems using the Monte Carlo technique. General systems are
non -network type systems, i.e. their logic cannot be fully represented by a
Reliability Block Diagram. Their work led to the development of
commercially available Monte Carlo based system engineering software. This
software is currently available in two packages, i.e. AM~R~ and SPAR*. Both
packages are suitable for reliability and availability analyses. SPARQ&can model
multiple systems at the same time as well as taking into account the effects of
spare part shortages.
The reliability/availability simulation model developed in this report (also
referred to as the simulator) is based to a large extent on the work carried out
by Forry(13)with the inclusion of the system function approach used by Dubi(9)
to find system failure times. Forry(13) used a complex PERT algorithm to
calculate system failure times from the component failure times. Dubi(9) on
the other hand found the system failure time by checking the status of the
system at each stochastic event. The system status is a function of the status
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of each component which is defined by the system function,
Using the simulator, reliability and availability estimates are easily obtained
for systems arranged in different configurations. Standby redundancy and
K out of N active redundancy are easily included in the model, as are
non -exponential failure distributions and repair distributions, The model also
allows one to change the number of repair teams and select between either
leaving components on or switching them off during &ystem repair. The
simulation model is however limited to network systems only, Le. those
systems whose logic can be fully represented by a Reliability Block Diagram.
Real life systems are complex and we will never be able to model the system
exactly as it IS in real life. Approximations can however be made which will
not affect the model results significantly. It is up to the engineer to make
these approximations and establish whether Monte Carlo simulation is in ~
required to solve the problem.
For some systems, the chances of system failures occurring during 3. certain
time interval are extremely remote. For example, the unreliability of a
quadr.rplex flight control computer system may be one catastrophic failure in
100 million flights. Millions of simulation histories are therefore required
before such an event is actually seen. Unfortunately, it is often impractical to
run millions of histories due to computer time limitations. This is a serious
disadvantage of the Monte Carlo method. Goldfeld and Dubi(14)overcame this
problem by enhancing the probability of rare events and then compensated
the final result to ensure an unbiasei ..solution, This technique, often referred
to as a biasing technique, was not included in this ntudy,
The applicability of the siruulator was demonstrated by the analysis of five
systems in the aerospace and industrial environments. The results of the
model v..ere validated by analytic means where possible and by SPARe or
j.~HRQI) where an analytic solution was not practical. Some common definitions
of reliability and availability have been discussed in this report as they have
always been a source of confusion. It is important for the user to understand
the logic of the simulator and to be able to distinguish between a network
system and a general system. A detailed discussion has therefore been
included on these two topics. A brief description can also be found of the
simulation program which consisted of a main program and several
subroutines.
11115 report presumes that the reader is familiar with basic reliability theory
and detailed explanations of underlying theory have therefore been avoided.
Some theory, applicable to the simulation code, has been included where it
was felt necessary,
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1.1 COST-EFFECTIVENESS FIGURES OF MERI1
Availability and reliability are only tW1} of the many ingredients which make
up a cost-effective system. It is therefore important to put these twa
parameters into perspective with respect to overall system cost -effectiveness,
Blanchard and Fabrycky(3)state that the basic design objective is to develop
a system that will perform its intended function in a cost-effective manner, i.e,
do the job effectively at the lowest overall life cycle cost. Some organisations
also consider revenues and profits along with cost in their design objective.
Accomplishing this cost-effective design objective requites an optimum
balance between criteria such as technical performance, availability,
dependability and life cycle cost.
Technical performance or capability relates to howwell the system 'will
perform in the mission environment, i.e. the design adequacy of the
system.
Availability or operational readiness relates to whether the systemwill
be ready to perform its mission when called to do so.
Dependability or mission reliability relates to whether the system will
continue to perform for the duration of the mission, given that it was
available to start the mission. Reliability is therefore a measure of the
dependability of a system.
The prime ingredients of cost-effectiveness are illustra.cd in Figure 1.1.1.
COST
EFFECTIVENE:SS
ru-;;-CYCLEJ
L_COST
r~~IONAL READINESS
~ AVAILABILITY
~EN~BILITY ORI MISSION RELIABILITY CAPABILITY OR ~TECHNICAL PERFORMAN~_j
Figure 1.1.] The Elements of Cost-Effectiveness
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Figures Of Merit (FUM's) usually represent a combination of the above
system parameters. One would typically employ FOM's such as:
FOM = SYSTEM EFFECTIVENESS
LIFE CYCLE COST
(L 1.1)
FOM = AVA.rLABILITY
LIFE CYCLE COST
(1.1.2)
These FOM's are often presented as delta values which allows one to compare
alternative systems on the t~r5isof the relative merits of each. Given two or
more alternative designs (, at,~din a consistent manner, one can select the
best based on these delta 'v, 1.
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~.2 RELIABILI1Y
Watras(23) defines reliability as the probability that an item will perform as
required, under stated conditions, for a stated period of time. When an item
no longer performs as required we say it has failed. Caplen(5) states that a
failure is the termination of the ability of an item to perform its required
function,
The engineer must construct an appropriate reliability model from the-physical
system to model the system reqsirement. The reliability model will change as
the system requirements change. For example, estimating the probability of an
aircraft successfully completing its mission and the probability of an aircraft
not crashing during the mission require different reliability models for the
same physical system. SOfFl'~ of the more corns m reliability definitions
encountered in the aerospace environment are- described below.
1.2.1 SAFET¥ RELIABILITY
Safety reliability is the probab~~ity of being able to perform a given mission
without any failures or defects that will have a catastrophic effect.
The system requirement would therefore be for the aircraft to survive a
mission and system failure would result in the loss of an aircraft and the
possible death of the OCCUpa;;\tS.
The chances of this occurring during a typical flight are usually of the order
of one in 10 million for military aircraft and one in 100 million for commercial
aircraft. Note, these figures include all systems on the aircraft.
1.2.2 MISSION RELIABILITY
Fielding and Meng(l2) define mission reliability as the probability that an
aircraft will be able to perform a given mission without any failures or defects
that will have an operational effect.
The system requirement would therefore be to accomplish the mission and a
system failure would result in the mission being aborted and the aircraft
returning to base. Mission reliability performance IS often difficult to predict
as it depends on what are considered to be defects which impair a mission.
Note, mission reliability and safety reliability are both point estimates of
reliability for a £Ft: .:Jic mission time however the system requirements are not
the same.
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1.2.3 OVERALL DEFECT RATE
The overall defect rate is the rate at which defects occur in the system. The
system as a whole does not necessarily fail at the same rate. Fielding and
Me.ng(12) state that the overall defect rate is the sum of an the component
failure rates of the system, i.e.
(1.2.3.1)
Engineers often invert the overall defect rate and call this the "MTBF" of the
system. Statistically speaking, the "MTBF' describes the mean of an
exponential failure distribution. Therefore, for this to be mathematically
correct all components must have exponential failure distributions and each
component failure must cause a system failure. The assumption that the
system exhibits an exponential failure distribution has some surprising
implications, i.e. the most probable time interval between failures is zero and
not the mean as one would expect, also 63 % of an failures would have
occurred before the mean life is reached. This "MTBF" is often given many
names, i.e. basic reliability, compounded reliability, maintenance reliability,
etc.
Evans(10)explains that the acronym "MTBF" is often the cause of difficulties
in contracting fur reliability. The difficulties range from not understanding the
implications of the mathematical assumptions to proving one did or did not
obtain the contracted value. For these reasons L is more meaningful for the
non-statistician to speak of the rate at which defects occur in the system,
which almost any manager or engineer can readily understand, eg, 1%
failures per month. Most non -statisticians are just using "M1BF" as the
reciprocal of the over.dl defect rate anyway,so whynot just use the defect rate
in the first place. During reliability growth, managers and engineers are
concerned with estimating the current reliability that has been achieved, not
with calculating some average reliability over the past. Evans(lO)explains
further that there is a big difference between a failure, a removal and a
corrective repair action. The data on defects probably do not, and can not,
distinguish adequately between these three concepts. A good rule of thumb
which can be applied in this situation is that the removal rate: is about twice
the failure rate.
Fielding and Meng(12)explain that the overall defect rate is also a good
measure of the maintenance effort required to keep the aircraft flying. The
reason for this is that each component failure no matter how minor will have
to be repaired at some stage. It is interesting to note that for an active
redundant system, the redundancy would have improved the mission and/or
safety reliability, but the addition of the extra components would have
6
increased the overall defect rate.
1.2.4 DISPATCH RELIABILITY
Fielding and Hussain'P! state that dispatch reliability is the probability of an
aircraft departing on time on revenue-earning flights. For large commercial
aircraft this is given by:
J)i.spatcb Rali.iL:Jili.ty (t) = 100 _ No. of delays> 1;5 min + cancel1~!=t~
100 aepartures (1.2.4.1)
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1.3 AVAILABILITY
Availability is defined as the probability that a system will be in an operable
and committable state, at the start of any prescribed mission, when the
mission is called for at a random point in time. Availability does not refer to
being able to perform satisfactorily throughout the mission. This issue is
addressed by the measures of dependability and reliability.
Bernstein(?)explains that availability uses the operational demand time as the
basis for computation, i.e. the time that the!e is a demand for the system to
actually work. This time would therefore exclude time such as weekends,
off-duty periods, free time. etc.
When non-operational times are included, e.g. standby, the basis for
computation becomes total calendar time and the concept of availability is
replaced by operational readiness. Consider a fighter aircraft, it performs
sporadic missions and spends most of its time on standby. Now according to
convention, the standby time would be excluded from the computation of
availability but included in the computation of operational readiness.
Availability can be measured as an average availability or a point availability.
Caplen(6) explains that the average availability is measured over the whole
duty period whereas the point availability is calculated at a specific point in
time. For example, an average availability f 0.8 means that the system is in
a condition to work satisfactorily for 80 % of the time. The probability that
the systemwill be available for use at say 10 a.m. today is a point availability.
The simulator calculates average availability.
Watras(23)states that the most basic description of average availability is the
ratio of system uptime over the total time for which there is a s:iemandfor the
system, i.e.
A = UPTIME
UPTIME + DOWNTINB
(1.J.l)
Depending on the type of system being analyzed and on how We wish to
measure availability, system states can be assigned to ;hher uptime or
downtime. For example, one could say that uptime for a fighter aircraft is
sortie time and standby time wherea i uptime for a production line is oper .ning
time only.
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Table 1.3.1 shows four availability measurements which are often found in the
aerospace and production environments. The applicable system states for each
availability measurement have been shaded for illustrative purposes. It should
be noted that for inherent, achieved and operational availability, standby time
has been excluded from the computation. Standby is however included in the
utilisation factor as downtime. The equipment can either be in a condition to
work or be working (internally operational), or it can be failed (internally
non -operational). Each availability measurement shown in Table 1.3.1 is
discussed further in the sections which follow,
Table 1.3.1 Availability Measurements
11 AVAILABIl.ffY MEASUREME~~[ UPTIME A~ DO';NTIME ALLOCATIONS =]~
INHERENl' AVAIlABUXrY
"
UP . ....... DOWN
ACIllEVED AVAllAB1LITY UP DOWN DOWN ~.-.-G .'~aATIONAL AVAIlABILITY UF DOWN DOWN DOWN
I COVINln1USATION FACTOR UP DOWN DOWN DOWN
SYsrEM SfA'fES OPERATION STANDBY eM PM LDT-
SYS'IEM INfER,"~ALLY SYSI'EM INfERNALLY
OPE~'l10NAL NON-OPERATIONAL
Notes:
eM
PM
LDT
Corrective Maintenance
Preventive: Maintenance
Logistic Delay Time
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1.3.1 INHEREST (INTRINSIC) AVAILABILITY
Inherent availability ~ is a conventional indicator of hardware supportability,
the measure rises as reliability or maintainability increase and the converse
also applies. The measurement covers corrective maintenance but excludes
preventive maintenance and delay times such as waiting for spares and repair
personnel. One therefore assumes a repairable system operating in an ideal
environment where support equipment, tools, skilled manpower, manuals,
spares, and repair parts are in abundance.
Watras(23)states that inherent availability is a function of system design only
and neglects the effects of supply support in describing system availability.
Inherent Availability is useful when evaluating one proposed system against
another on the basis of system design performance. Inherent availability can
be thought rf as an upper bound 'w!-.cndetermining operational availability.
The value operational availability will approach the value of inherent
availability as the supply support posture improves and the supply response
time approaches zero.
1.3.2 ACHIEVED AVAILABILITY
This measure is more appropriate for systems with significant mechanlcal
content, i.e. the system undergoes preventive maintenance. Achieved
availability Aa covers corrective and preventive maintenance but assumes a
perfect support system. By comparing ~ and ~ it is possible to see how
effective preventive maintenance is.
1.3.3 OPERATIONAL AVAILABILITY
Operational availability Ao is the practical parameter of availability. It includes
preventative and corrective maintenance and all delay times, i.e. waiting for
spares and manpower etc. It is the value which can be expected under actual
operating conditions for continuQus utilisation.
Watras(23)stresses that operational availability goals and thresholds must be
considered throughout the system life cycle.These goals are to be defined in
the systemconceptual and definition phases and used as guidelines throughout
the system design and development phase. Once a system becomes
operational, Ao based on actual field data, should be used as a basis for
ongoing logistic management review and improvement actions.
Sparrius(21)stales that if a syst-em'sinherent availability is poor, then it should
be redesigned. If a systems operational availability is poor and it~inherent
availability if, good then the support system should be redesigned.
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1.3.4 UTILIZATION FACTOR
Caplen(6)noted that availability can also be expressed as a utilization factor
by defining the time that the system is in standby as downtime.
This measurement is typically found in a continuous production environment
where one is trying to achieve the maximum utilisation from equipment. The
measurement is more general than the previous three: as it includes the time
that the equipment could have been used by the operator.
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1.4 NE'IWORK SYSTEMS
Billinton and Allan(4) explain that the reliability of a system can be frequently
represented by a network in which the system components are tied together
either in a series, parallel or meshed configuration, such as the system shown
in Figure 1.4.1.
5
3
EXIT--ENTRY [8-~- 2~J--r--t
Figure 1.:1.1A Network Type System
Dubi(9) says that if this system is a network system, then all the information
concerning the structure of the system is contained in the above figure. The
single logical rule being that the system: is up as long as their is at least one
tie from the entry point to the exit point of the system. A tie is a series of
connected active operational components. Dubi(9) explains further that any
system which does not follow the above rule is a general system.
A typical example of general system is a fly-by-wire flight control system. The
required safety target of one failure in 100 million flights requires the use of
a quadruple redundant flight control computer system which includes a voting
process. The failure of the system could be either due to failures of
components or due to a malfunction in the decision of the voting system. The
former type of failure can be easily modelled with the use of a reliability block
diagram, however the latter failure contains complex logic which cannot be
represented by a reliability block diagram. The system can therefore be
categorised as a general system.
It is vital that the relationship between the physical system and its network
model be understood before considering any techniques to evaluate these
networks. It must be appreciated that the actual system and the reliability
network used to model the system may not necessarily have the same
topological structure. The reliability network may also change when the
requirements of the physical system change. For example, the reliability
network of a system is different if the requirement is the survival of the
aircraft or the completion of a mission. The physical topology of the system
remains the same in both cases.
12
The simulator only models network type systems and would require extensive
modification to model a general system. Note, a reliability network is often
referred to as a Reliability Block Diagram (RBD).
13
2 GENERAL DESCRIPTION
2.1 SUMMARY OF THE MONTE CARLO TECHNIQUE
A simulation model seeks to "duplicate" the behaviour of the system under
investigation by studying the interactions. between its components. The output
of the simulation model is normally presented in terms of selected measures
that reflect the performanc' ~of the system. For example, one may wish to
measure the average time the system spends in the failed state or the rate at
which system failures are occurring.
A simulation experiment differs from a regular laboratory experiment in that
it can be totally conducted by the computer. By expressing the interactions
among the components of the system as mathematical relationships, we are
able to gather the necessary information in much the same way as observing
the real system (subject of course to the simplifications assumptions built into
the model). The simulation allows greater flexibility in representing complex
systems that are normally difficult to analyze by standard mathematical
models. The Monte Carlo method is based on the general idea of using
sampling to estimate a desired result. The sampling process requires the
description of the problem by appropriate probability distributions from which
samples are drawn.
Forry(13) explains that in the Monte Carlo technique as applied to the
simulator, one assumes that the time to fail and time to repair probability
distributions are known for each component of the system. It is further
assumed that the relationship between component failure and system failure
is known and can be described in the form of a Reliability Block Diagram.
Uniformly distributed random numbers are generated and used to determine
component times to fail and component times to repair. These component
times to fail or repair are then used to determine the system time to fail and
repair. The set of system times to fail or repair must be viewed as a random
sample of the distribution of system failure times or repair times. Therefore,
the data must be operated on in the same manner that real test data would
be to determine the form and parameters of the system reliability and
availability functions.
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able to gather the necessary information in much the same way as obse. ang
the real system (subject of course to the simplifications assumptions built into
the model). The simulation allows greater flexibility in representing complex
systems that are normally difficult to analyze by standard mathematical
models. The Monte Carlo method is based on the general idea of using
sampling to estimate a desired result. The sampling process requires the
description of the problem by appropriate probability distributions from which
samples are drawn.
Forry(13)explains that in the Monte Carlo technique as applied to the
simulator, one assumes that the time to fail and time to repair probability
distributions are known for each component of the system. It is further
assumed that the relationship between component failure and system failure
is known and can be described in the form of a Reliability Block Diagram.
Uniformly distributed random numbers are generated and used to determine
component times to fail and component times to repair. These component
times to fail or repair are then used to determine the system time to fail and
repair. The set of system times to fail or repair must be viewed as a random
sample of the distribution of system failure times or repair times. Therefore,
the data must be operated on in the same manner that real test data would
be to determine the form and parameters of the system reliability and
availability functions.
\\
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2.2 COMP.ONE'NT FAILURE AND REPAIR DENSITIES
The most commonly encountered component failure and repair distributions
are the negative exponential, normal, lognormal and Weibull distributions.
Lengthy statistical descriptions of each of these distributions have not been
included in this report as they can be easily found in many statistical texts.
Instead, the relevant equations have been presented together with a brief
practical discussion.
'the distribution of times to failure is of the negative exponential form if the
failure rate is constant. In other words, the probability of failure remains the
same irrespective of the age of the component. The failure probability density
function f(t) and the reliability function R(t) are defined as:
f(t) = _1_ exp(-_t_)
MTBF MTBF
(2.2.1)
and
Where t is a possible repair time and the MTBF is the life at which 63 % of
the components would have failed. The practical significance of this is that
components must have working lives much shorter than their mean life.
The exponential distribution is suitable for describing the lifetimes of
components whose failure times are not age related, i.e. most electronic
components. Nowlan and Heap(18)explain that for complex items, i.e. those
with many different failure modes, the failure ages for the component as a
whole are usually widely dispersed and are unrelatea to a specific operating
age. This is a unique characteristic of a complex item. Therefore, most
complex mechanical components will exhibit an exponential failure
distribution.
Very often in practise, the MTBF is simply estimated by dividing the total
hours of all the items by the total number of items failed during that time.
Evans(lO)gives a good rule of thumb for estimating component MTBF, i.e. the
component removal rate is approximately twice the failure rate.
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Nowlan and Heap(18)state that for a simple item, Le, those items with a single
or dominant failure mode, the failure ages tend concentrate about an
average age. These components therefore exhibit an age related type of
failure. In such cases the distribution of times ro failure is often found to
follow the normal distribution. The density function f(t) and the reliability
function R(t) are defined as:
f( t) __ 1__ exp [ __..!. (_!:-Il ) 2]
a,j2n 2 (J
(2.2.3)
and
I;
R (t) = f 1 exp [- ~ (~)2] dt
o to.;2it z 0
(2.2.4)
Where t is a possible time to fainire, f1- is the mean of the values of t and a L"
the standard deviation of t about the mean.
The mean life JJ, is the life at which 50 % of all components would have failed.
The area under the f(t) curve from -0 to +0 Includes 68 % of all failures. The
area from -20 to +2a includes 95 % of all failures and the area from -30 to
-I-3a includes 99 % of all failures. Therefore, practical speaking all failures are
included within 3 standard deviations, The smaller the standard deviation the
more the values are c1ustb.ed around the mean.
Smith and Babb(20)state that for maintenance activities, active repair times are
usually distributed according to the log normal rule. Le, the logarithms of the
times to repair are normally distributed. Maintainability is defined as the
probability that a failed item will be repaired in time t. The maintainability
function M(t) L"defined as:
t:
M( t) - J 1 exp r -1-. (ln~) 2] dt
- 0 to.j2it 2 a
(2.:'2.5)
Where t is a possible repair time, p. is the mean of the values of In(t) and o is
the standard deviation of In(t) about the mean.
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In practise it is often found that an abberation occurs in the lognormal
distribution of maintenance times, i.e. a secondary peak exists. The 1easons for
this could include false timekeeping, overmanning and unsk.Jled crews on
some jobs. If the secondary peak is vet "'iarge and approaches size of the
mode, it probably indicates that there !;dre two distinct types of Ii.: aintenance
work represented in the curve. Each of which may have a 19normal
distribution of its own.
The two parameter Weibull rli-;;i:ributiollhas the great advantage of being able
to fit many life distribu." by adjusting the distribution parameters. The
density function f(t) anti the reliability function R(t) are defined as:
(2.2.6)
and
(2.2.7)
Where t is a possible repair time, '1is the characteristic life of the values t and
f3 is the shape parameter of the distribution. The characteristic life is the life
at which 63 % of the population would have failed.
O'Connor(19) shows that when the shape pa.tameter 6 is one the exponential
ilistribution results (constant failure rate). when it is less than one a decreasing
failure rate distribution results and when it is larger than one an increasing
failure rate distribution results. At a value of 3.5 the distribution approximates
the normal distribution. Higher values also produce a distribution which does
not depart markedly from the normal distribution. The nomeuclature
describing the scaling parameter varies from text to text. The characteristic
life fj was chosen as the scaling constant for the simulator as this is the
constant used on commercially available Weibull graph paper.
Smith and Babb(2G)state that passive repair times are often described by the
Weibull distribution, where the shape and scale factors can be easily found by
a graphical analysis of repair times.
It is interesting to note that the MTBF of the exponential distribution, the
characteristic life 1] of the Weibull distribution and p, + 0.33u of the normal
distribution all represent the life at which 63 % of components would have
failed.
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2.3 SAMPLING COMPONENT FArLURE AND REPAIR DENSITIES
A combination congruential generator was used to generate a sequence of
uniformly distributed random numbers within the interval [0,1] as described
by Lewis and Orav(17). The generator is particularly applicable for small
computer word sizes and for very long cycle lengths. To Pro ..l.2ce a
uniform [0,1] variate, Uj+1, we require the output from three separate
congruenti ~1~ generators:
(2.3.1)
(2.3.2)
Zi+l :: (170 Z) mod 30323 (2..3.3)
and then define
{X. 1 Yi Z.}tt, = ( ~+ ) + ( +1) + (-~) mod 1
~~ 30269 30307 . 30323
(2.3.4)
Note that three "seeds" are required to start the generator. A seed can be any
positive odd integer whose value is less than the applicable modulus.
One of the principle advantages (If being able to generate random numbers
arithmetically is the ability to produce the same sequence of random numbers
whenever desired. Therefore, if one. is comparing two alternative designs, then
one is assured that the difference in the output measures of the experiment
are due to differences in the alternative designs, not to experimental error.
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Uniformly distributed random numbers in the interval [0,1] can be used to
generate outcomes from any probabilny distribution. Taha(22)shows that by
applying the method of inversion, where R is a (0,1] random number, the
exponential distribution may be sampled by:
t ::- MTBF' In (R) (2.3.5)
The Weibull distribution may be sampled by:
t;:::1] (-In{R))l/1l (;1.3.6)
Unfortunately, the inversion method cannot be used with continuous
distributions whose cumulative density function cannot be determined
analytically. Typical examples are the normal, gamma and poisson
distributions. Taha(22) states that for a pair of [0,1] random numbers R,
and R2, the random variable x defined as:
(2.3.7)
is standard normal with mean 0 and variance 1. Therefore, the normal
distribution may be sampled by:
t = jJ. + ox (2.3.8)
Note, if the value sampled from the normal distribution is negative then the
simulator automatically sets the value to zero.
2.4 CAT COMPONENTS
The preceding discussion concerned the means of generating random failure
times for single components. Often, one finds components which consist of
subcomponents arranged in parallel. A failed subcomponent may not
necessarily cause the component to fail, i.e. the component may have more
than one life, hence "he term cat component. This section discusses two
cornmon configurations which have been included in the simulator.
2.4.1 STANDBY CONFIGURATION
When N subcomponents are arranged in standby configuration, only one
subcomponent can be active at a time, The cat component will therefore only
fail once all the subcomponents have failed.
If the subcomponents are ordered in the sense that when the first one fails,
the second one is switched into operation and when the second one fails the
third nne is switched Into operation and so on, until the last subcomponent
(Nth subcomponent) has failed. Then the time to fail for the cat component
is simply the sum of each subcomponent lifetime ti, i.e. ' .
(2.4.1.1)
Note, each subcomponent lifetime is measured from the instant it is activated.
For the simulator it was assumed that the components do not fail in the
standby mode and that the switching mechanism is failure free.
The standby cat component is one of the more interesting to study by the
simulation approach because of its great simplicity over the analytical method
which can become quite difficult if the subcomponent failure densities are
different from one another.
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2.4.2 K OUT OF N CONFIGURATION
All subcomponents in this configuration are initially active and they remain
so until they fail. The cat component requires a minimum number of
subcomponents to be active in order to survive, e.g. 3 out of 5 (K out of N)
subcomponents must be active.
If the subcomponent times to fail are ordered so that tl s t2 s .... tn' then the
time to failure ts for a K out of N cat component is:
(2.4..2.1)
Note, for the K out of N configuration all subcomponents are initially active
whereas for the standby configuration only one subcomponent can be active
at a time.
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2.S SYSTEM FAiLURE TIME
The previous twosections discussed means of generating random failure times
for components and cat components from their respective probability
distributions. In this section we examine how to determine the system failure
time given the component failure times.
Forry(13)used a methodology (the search techzdque) of working from left to
right through the system network, determining the minimum time to failure
at each node of the reliability network. The minimum time to failure at a
node would be determined by examining the time to failure of each input path
into the node. The minimum time would then be the value of the input path
with the smallest time to failure. 'The value at the final node would then be
the system time to failure. The procedure was developed from the well known
PERT method (Program Evaluation Review Technique).
Dubi(9) explained that the state of the system depends on its structure (the
Reliability Block Diagram) and on the status of the components comprising
the system. The function which determines the state of the system from the
status of the components is called the system function (lSYSUP). The system
function can only be one (operational) or zero (failed) and for the purposes
of the simulator, the component status K can also only be one (operational)
or zero (failed). The system will be up (ISYSUP= 1) as long as their is a tie
of operational components (K= 1) from the entry point to the exit point of the
system.
Consider the network system shown previously in Figure 1.4.1. There are four
tie sets which may be listed as (1,3,5), (1,3,6), (2,4,6) and (2,4,7), The system
function ISYSUP can therefore be constructed as:
IS = K{l) xK(3) xK(5i "K{l) x}:(3) xK{6} +K(2) xK(4) xK(6) +K(2) xK(4) xK(7) (2.5.1)
where
{I If IS > 0ISYSUP = 0 Otherwise (2.5.2)
The simulator generates a list of candidate system failure times by checking
the value of ISYSUP at each stochastic event. The smallest value on this list
will then be the system failure time.
The method used by Forry(13)requires the user to input a matrix of zeros and
ones for each system.This is tedious and leads to many user input errors. The
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approach used by Dubi(9) requires the entering an equation into the program
rather than a matrix. The only disadvantage of this is that the pro~ram
requires compiling and linking for each system function. It was decided for
practical reasons to adopt the approach used by Dubi(9) for the simulator.
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2.6 SYSTEM AVAIlABIlITY
The determination of system availability is considerably more difficult than the
determination of system reliability.
If the failure and repair times are exponentially distributed, application of
Markov theory can produce solutions for a few systems. Dhillon(7) used
Markov theory to derive the availability for a single component, i.e.
(2.6.1)
Where J. and f.l are the failure and repair rates respectively.
The time dependent term in the above equation decreases rapidly with time t
and within a few cycles of operation, the system approaches the steady state
availability which is independent of time, i.e.
(2.6.2)
The Markov solution for a single component required the solving of two
simultaneous differential equations. The same procedure could be used to
find the availability of systems with large numbers of components.
Unfortunately, the solution becomes impractical due to the large number of
differential equations. If the component failure and repair densities are
non-exponential then even Markov theory is no longer applicable. This results
in an almost impossible situation to resolve in the analytic form. Fortunately,
the Monte Carlo approach is quite simple with the accuracy of results being
controlled by the cost of computer time.
It is important to note, before describing the manner in which the simulation
model calculates availability, that at least two basic repair policies could be
adopted. We could repair all failed components when the system fails, or we
could repair components as they fail individually. The latter policy is rarely
found in practice, although intuitively it may yield a higher system availability
than the former policy. The simulator only repairs components foil owing a
system failure.
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The manner in which the simulator calculates system availability is best
described by considering the ith and (i+ 1)th cycle of the program.
For the illl cycle:
The system failure time ts is determined from the component failure times.
The component failure times are then searched to find those failure times
which are equal to or less than ts' This identifies which components have
failed. Times to repair the failed components are then generated. The system
repair time t, is then calculated from the component repair times. The system
failure time t, and system repair time t, are added to accumulators for system
uptimes and downtimes.
For the (i+ l)th cycle:
Those components which had not failed by the end of system repair
have an adjusted time to failure of ti+l = tj-(ts+tr). Note. in this case
the components were left on during system repair.
If the components were switched off during system repair then they
have an adjusted time to failure of ti+l = ti-ts'
Those components which failed at or before system failure have a
completely new time to failure tj+l generated.
Those components which were left on during system repair and failed
during system repair have their time to failure t,+1 set to zero.
The system failure time ts and system repair time tr are then calculated and
added to the accumulators in the same way as for the ith cycle.
At the end of the nth system repair cycle an estimate of system
availability "'(tn) is made by:
, j::.:.l,2 .•• ,n cycles (2.6.3)
n nL tl+L tl
j=l i=:
Where t, is the sum of the system failure and repair times at the end of the
n'" system repair cycle.
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2.7 DATA ANALYSIS
The final step in the Monte Carlo reliability and availability estimation
process is the analysis of the simulator output. One must remember that the
primary output data from the simulator is merely a sample of system times to
failure and a sample of system times to repair.
A nonparametric or parametric approach can be taken to process the raw data
from the simulator into reliability and availability estimates.
2.7.1 NONPARAMETRIC APPROACH
If the program user has no information regarding the underlying system time
to failure distribution, he can make use of a nonparametric or distribution free
method to obtain a point and confidence interval estimate of the system
reliability and availability. This apprc rch was programmed into the simulator.
2.7.1.1 RELIABILITY ESTIMATE
One can consider the sample of n system failure times generated by the model
to be a random sample of the underlying distribution function F(t). The
empirical cumulative time to failure distribution function Fit) can then be
defined as:
= j , tj ~ t < tj+l I j = 1s 2, ... I n-ln (2.7.1.1.1)
As the sample size increases, the deviation between Fn{t) and F(t) tends
toward zero and since reliability is defined as:
R(t) = i-F(t) (2.7.1.1.2)
then the empirical reliability function can be defined as:
R (t) = 1-F (t)n n (2.7.1.1.3)
A simulation is a statistical experiment whose results are subject to
experimental error. Hence, the setting of confidence intervals for point
reliability estimates is important.
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Forcy(13)states that if one considers Fit) to be the ratio of total failures to the
tots, number of n trials at time t, then F(t) is the parameter q of the binomial
distribution:
Where j is the number of failures and Fn(t) is the maximum likelihood,
minimum variance and unbiased estimate of q.
Likewise, R(t) is the parameter p of the binomial distribution:
(2.7.1.1..5)
'Where k is the number of survivors at time t l~nd,\Rn(t) is the maximum
likelihood, minimum variance and unbiased estimate of p.
Using this expression, a (1-a)100 percent lower one sided confidence
limit p' can be determlned by solving:
(2.7.1.1.6)
for p, where
(2.7.1.1.7)
Hines and Montgomery'l'" state that the lower confidence limit for a one sided
interval is chosen so that
p {L ~ e} = 1'-« (2 7.1.1.8)
The interpretation of this is that there is a 100(1-a) percent probability that
the true 6 is greater than L. '
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Note, the longer the confidence interval, the more confident we are that the
interval actually contains the true value of B. On the other hand, the longer
the interval, the less information we have about the true value of B. Ideally,
one should obtain a relatively short interval with high cocfidence.
Unfortunately for large n, the computations required to find p from the
binomial distribution become lengthy. Hines and Montgome:vO~ state that for
large n and binomial parameter p or q < 0.1, the binon, distribution is
approximated by the poisson distribution with parameter np or nq. They also
state that for np or nq > 5 the normal distribution with mean e = np,
variance cr = np(l-p), and random variable nRit), gives a good
approximation to the binomial distribution. Therefore, for np or nq > ~ the
normal approximation can be used to determine the (1-a) lOOper cent' )wer
confidence limit. For the region outside these limits, the poisson
approximation can be used as long as n > 50 which is usually the case for the
simulator.
The use of these two approximations simplifies the computations required to
set the desired confidence levels for point estimates of reliability.
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2.7.1.2 AVAILABILITY ESTIMATE
Point estimates ,,(til) for system availability As(tn) can be made from the
sequence of n simulated system failure times (tt) and repair times (t,'). This
estimate was given in equation 2.6.3 as:
Forry(13) explains that the sample variance an2 can be determined from the
variances of the failure times Vs and repair times Vr by:
( Vs + VI)-2 -2
,!i: _T-=I_......
i6n
(2.7.1.2.1)
:>
Where 1's and Tr are the sample means of the system failure and repair times
respectively. Forry(13) also shows that the lower one sided confidence limit for
availability is:
(2.7.1.2.2)
where
(2.7.1.2.3)
and ~:-a) is the (l-a) level of the standard normal distribution with mean of
zero and variance of one.
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2.7.2 PARAMETRIC APPROACH
This approach may give a more satisfactory reliability or maintainability
estimate, if the engineer has some prior knowledge regarding the form of the
system time to failure and repair distributions.
In this approach, estimates are made of the distribution parameters from the
sample of n system failure and repair times. From these, point estimates of
system reliability and maintainability can be made. The chi -square statistic
can be used to test the hypothesis that the observed failure or repair times are
from the assumed density.
The chi -square statistic is calculated from the sample by:
k (O.-E.) 2
x,2 = L ~ 1.
i=l Ei
Where K is the number of class intervals. The quantity O, is the observed
frequency in the ilh class interval.. The expected frequency in the ith class
interval from the hypothesized probability distribution is denoted by Ej• The
test is made by comparing X2 (chi-square) computed from the sample, with
all a sized critical value of the chi-square distribution with k-m-l degrees of
freedom. Where the quantity k is the number of class intervals and m is the
number of parameters estimated from the sample, Hines and Montp;omery(*)
state that the hypothesis would be rejected if:
(2.7.2.2)
where
X2 = C0:, k-m-l (2.7.2.3)
is the solution to
..J f(x} dx = 1-«
c
(2.7.2.4)
and f(x) is the chi-square density with k-m-L degrees of freedom.
30
Commercially available statistical packages such as STATGRAPHICS,z offer
extensive distribution fitting facilities which include the chi -square test.
Therefore, it was decided not to program distribution fitting facilities into the
simulator. Rather, files containing the sample failure and repair times are
made available for exporting into any statistical package.
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2.8 EMBEDDED LOGIC
It is imperative ~Ol'the user to understand the embedded logic of the code,
This will help witt. the interpretation of the modelling results and also in
determining the applicability of the simulator to solving the problem.
The system function is limited to network systems only, Network
systems are those systems whose logic can be fully represented by a
reliability block diagram.
All component failures are repaired following a system failure.
The system repair time is based on the repair times of all the
components which have failed. The system repair time may be the
average component repair time, the worst component repair time or
the svm of each component repair thne,
If a component fails before or at the system failure time, then the
. .nulator generates a completely new time to failure for the
.';.'omponent.
If a component has not failed by the system failure time and remains
active during system repair, and has still not failed by the end of system
repair, then the time to failure of the component is reduced by the
system failure time and the system repair time.
If a component remained active during system repair and failed while
the system was being repaired or immediately when the system was
repaired, then the time to failure of the component is set to zero,
Therefore, it is possible that the system could fail immediately when
activated again.
If a component has not failed before or at the system failure time and
was switched off during system repair. then the time to failure of the
component is reduced by the system failure time.
The simulator calculates the average availability over the whole time
interval starting from time zero until the required number of histories
have been completed.
The time to repair density for a cat component applies to the
component a~ a whole and not to the individual subcomponents,
whereas the failure density applies to individual subcomponents.
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If a reliability/availability run is selected, the empirical reliability
distribution is based upon system times to fail from the last repair. This
data therefore estimates reliability as a function of the maintenance
option and is not necessarily representative of the non -rnaintained
system reliability. Of course, the non -maintained system reliability is
estimated by running the pure reliability option.
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3 PROGRAM DESCRIPTION
Microsoft FORTRAN 4.1~was used to program the simulator. In order to use
the simulator, a FORTRAN compiler must be available to program the system
function. The simulator should work with most FORTRAN compilers and will
run on most computers, even small personal computers where the computer
word size is small.
The program consists of a main program and several subroutines. The main
program reads in general run control data and component information. The
main program then calls into operation the necessary subroutines for
processing the input data.
Using the above information, the program generates a listing of the system
times to fail, a table containing the failure time histogram, and the estimated
point reliability. If the user specifies that a reliability/availability simulation
is to be performed then an estimate of the average avaHat;~~1ty1:;~iven ~Il
addition to the empirical reliability distribution. A listing 0' t~~~t-Jy::it~~htir:j'~\s
to repair is also generated. It should be emphasized that the simulator
determines an average steady state availability and not the avaihthi!hi at
specific points in time.
The user can specify whether components are switched off or left 6TI during
system repair. The user can also select between different options for
determining system repair time, i.e. the maximum component repair time, the
sum of the component repair times or the average component repair time.
I;
If the user has some knowledge of the underlying reliability or maintainability
distributions, then the listing of system failure or repair times can be exported
to a statistical package where the distribution parameters can be determined.
TIle chi -square goodness of fit test may be used to test the assumed
distribution. Reliability or maintainability predictions can then he made using
the hypothesized distribution.
The program listing for the simulation model can be found in Appendix A.
The reader is advised to refer to the relevant program listing while reading
the sections which follow.
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3.1 INPUT DESCRIPTION
The data input for the simulator consists of a data file called RAMIN and the
system function which is programmed into subroutine SYST. The data file
contains general run control data and component information. TIle system
function contains the reliability network information.
The variables in RAMIN which contain the general run control data are:
NTYPE An integer indicating the desired run type.
NTYPE = 0, Reliability simulation only
NTYPE = 1, Reliability j Availability simulation with
components switched off during repair
NTYPE == 2, Same as 1 but with components left on
during repair
NTIME An integer indicating the number of failure and/ or
repair cycles to go through (sample size), limited to 5000.
N An integer indicating the number of components in the
system, limited to 20.
KFIX An integer indicating the type of repair time to be used.
KFIX = 1, Sum of component repair times
KFIX = 2, Maximum component repair time
KFIX = 3, Average component repair time
IPROB An integer for the user's run number identification
ISZE An integer indicating the number of class intervals to be
used in the simulated time distribution table.
FI A real number indicating the class interval width for the
simulated time distribution table.
The variables in ~IIN which contain component data are
ICODE An integer indicating whether a component is a
subsystem of N parallel (K out of N) or N standby
identical components, i.e. a cat component.
ICODE = 0, Normal component
leODE = N~ N identical components in parallel with
K out of N required for success.
ICODE = -N. N identical components in standby
configuration
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KFDN(I)
KRDN(I)
FPTR(J,l)
RPTR(J,l)
FPTR(I,2)
RPTR(I,2)
An integer indicating the type of component failure
density for component I.
KFDN(I) ::1! 1, Exponential
KFDN(I) = 2, Normal
KFDN(I) = 3, Weibull
KFDN(I) = 4, Lognormal
The same as above except that the integer indicates the
component repair density.
A real number indicating one parameter of the failure
density for component I.
Exponential
Normal
Lognormal
Weibull
mean
mean
mean
characteristic life
Same as above except that the real number indicates one
parameter of the repair density.
A real number indicating the second parameter of the
failure density, if required, for component I.
Normal standard deviation
Lognormal standard deviation
Weibull shape factor
Same as above except that the real number indicates the
second parameter of the repair density, if required.
The system function ISYSUP is entered by th~ user into subroutine SYST
below the block entitled:
**¥****************************************
* ENTER THE SYSTEM FUNCTION HERE *
*******************************************
Subroutine SYST must then be compiled and linked with the all the other
program object files to obtain the executable file. Examples of RAMIN and
system functions can be found in the examples which were prepared for this
report.
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3.2 PROGRAM: MAIN
Program execution begins with reading data from KAMIN and writing this
data to the main output file RAMOUT. The program then goes on to
complete NTI:ME histories.
For each history of a pIlre )"e1iabili~ simulation, the program calls subroutine
Ii'AILT which in tum calls subroutines ETIME, RAND, PARL and STBYas
required. Subroutine FAIL'l' returns a random time to fail for each component
of the system. The program then calls subroutine SYST which returns a system
time to fail, using the previously generated component failure times. In this
mode, the program skips over the code which is used to determine the system
repair times and availability. Each system failure time is stored in the vector
TSYSF which is written to a file caned TrFLIST. A pure reliability simulation
is specified by setting NTYPE to zero. MSW is a program control variable
which controls the call to subroutine FAILT which depends on whether a pure
reliability or a reliability /avai1ahility simulation is required.
For each history of a reliabilityjavailability; simulation the program calls
subroutine SYST which returns a system time to failure. The program then
checks which components have failed at or before the system failure time. The
program then calls subroutine ETIME which in turn calls subroutine RAND
and returns a random time to repair for each failed component. 'The program
then determines a system time to repair from the individual component repair
times. The system repair times are stored in the vector TSYSR and are
written to a file called Tl'RLIS1'. The system repair time is "..calculated
according to the KFIX specification, The NTYPE specification/determines
whether components are switched off or left on during system repair. The
program then proceeds to accumulate infurmatlon such as the sum of system
repair and failure times for each history.
After 11the histories have been completed, the program calls subroutine 'r~~
NTIMES which calculates and prints the empirical reliability and availability
statistics.
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3.3 SUBROUTINE SYST
The purpose of this subroutine is to determine a system time to failure SYSF
from previously determined component failure times. The subroutine is called
by program MAIN to which it returns the parameter SYSF.
'The component failure times are stored in vector T. KST is a vector
containing the status of each component. TEMP2 is a temporary storage
vector which facilitates the determination of the system failure time. A record
of the number of failures per component NF is also kepr ~- \ I simulation
proceeds. ---._,
'The system function ISYSUP is entered into the subroutine below the block
entitled:
*¥*****************************************
:I< ENTER THE SYSTEM FUNCfION HERE *
*******************************************
The user is then required to compile the subroutine after entering the system
function. This object file must then be linked together with all the other object
files to obtain tn.> executable file.
This subroutine must return a system failure time to program MAIN each time
it is called. A check was therefore built in which aborts program execution if
subroutine SYST is unable to return a system failure time. One should not
encounter this problem with network type systems.
3.4 SUBROUTINE FAILT
The purpose of this subroutine is to determine the time to fail 11 for a cat
component. A cat component consists of a subsystem of components either in
an active parallel or standby configuration.
This subroutine is called by program MAIN to which it returns the parameter
TI for a single component or a cat component. The subroutine calls
subroutine ETKME once for a single component and a number of times for a
cat component. Function STBY and function PARL are also used to determine
the random time to fail for cat components.
KF is the Identificauon code for the component failure density. PI represents
the mean for the exponential, normal and log normal distributions and the
characteristic life for the Weibull distribution. FJ represents the standard
deviation for the normal and log normal distribution s and the shape
parameter for the Weibull density. Ie allows one to distinguish whether the
item is a single component, a K out of N subsystem or a standby subsystem.
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3.5 FUNCfION STBY
This function computes a random nme to fail for a subsystem of NEL
components in a standby configuration. The component times to fail are
determined previously and stored in the vector T prior to entering the
subprogram. The function is called by subroutine FAILT.
3.6 FUNCTION PARL
This function finds the time to fail for an NSUS out of NEL components (i.e.
a K out of N arrangement) in active parallel redundancy whose random times
to fail have been previously determined and stored in the vector PT. The
function is called by subroutine FAlLT.
3.7 SUBROUTINE ETIIt £
This subroutine allows one to sample a random time to fail or repair from the
negative exponential distribution with MTBF PI, the normal and lognormal
distributions with mean PI and standard deviation P2, and the Weibull
distribution with characteristic life PI and shape parameter .P2.
This program is called by subroutine FAILT to which it returns a random time
to fail. The program is also called by program I\tIAIN to which it returns a
random time to repair. Random numbers to facilitate the sampling from. each
distribution are returned to this program by subroutine RAND.
3.8 SUBROUTINE RAND
The function of the subroutine is to generate uniformly distributed random
numbers in the interval [0,1]. The program is called by subroutine ETIME.
A combination congruential generator was used to generate random numbers.
This particular generator requires the output from three separate congruential
generators. This subroutine therefore calls subroutines RANDl, RA..~D2 and
RAND3 for these outputs.
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3.9 SUBROUTINE TAB
The purpose of this subroutine is to produce the empirical reliability and
availability output blocks, The availability output block is only produced for
a reliability Iavailability simulation. This program is called by program l\IAIN.
As the previously determined variable A is passed to subroutine TAB, the
count of entries in the interval of KFREQ is augmented by one. The number
of intervals ISZE and the width of the intervals PI are specified by the user.
Information to subsequently compute the mean and variance of the sample of
NT system failure times is updated, MS controls whether or not the present
call of subroutine TAB is the first or a later call. On the first call. certain
accumulators and .her variables are initialised.
When NT calls of TAB have been executed, the mean and variance ~e
sample system failure and repair times are determined. The average
availability with standard deviation and estimates of the lower 90 % and 95 %
confidence levels are then computed. Finally, the empirical reliability function
is computed along with lower 95 % confidence level estimates.
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3.10 OIJTPUT DESCRIPTION
Three reports are generated by the model, i.e. a general output file called
RAMOUT, a file 'ITFLIST which contains the list of system fail times and a
file 'ITRLIST which contains the list of system repair times.
RAMOUT comprises of an input data block, an availability block, a reliability
block and a failure block.
The input block displays the data which was input by the user. It is always
good practice to check the input data which has been read by the program.
The availability block is only generated when the simulator operates under the
reliability/availability option. The average; system uptime and the average
system downtime are displayed together with standard deviations for each
value. The average steady state availability is then displayed together with
lower 90 % and 95 % confidence level estimates.
The reliability block 15 generated for all runs. If the reliability/availability
option is used, then the empirical reliability distribution is based upon system
times to fail the last repair. This data estimates reliability as a function
of the maintenance option and is not necessarily representative of the
non -maintained system reliability.
The reliability block displays the average system time to fail and the standard
deviation. Thereafter, the system tiixe to failure distribution table is shown.
Column 1 is the time at the end of each class interval. Column 2 is the
number of failures occurring in the interval. Column 3 is the lower 95 %
confidence level estimate of system reliability (R95L). Column 4 is the
maximum likelihood estimate of system reliability (RMLE). At the end of the
table an indication is given 01 the outliers which occurred because of the
chosen number of class intervals and the width of L. .'5S intervals. Finally the
number of class intervals, the class interval width, the maximum system failure
time and the minimum system failure time are displayed.
The failure block is generated for all runs. This block lists the cumulative
number of component failures per component for all histories.
The file Tf1t'LIST is generated for all runs and it contains a list of simulated
system failure times. The file TIRLIST is generated only for the
reliability/availability run and it contains a list of simulated system repair
times. If the user has some knowledge of the form of the distributions then
these files may be exported to a statistical analysis package such as
STATGRAPHICSil>where the distribution parameters can be determined.
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4 MODEL VALIDATION AND APPLICATION
Examples of several systems were processed by the simulator to validate the
model and demonstrate various applications of the model. Model validation
consisted of comparing the reliability and availability estimates produced by
the simulator with analytically determined values where feasible. SPARe and
AMIR~ were used to validate the simulator 6 nates where this was net
feasible. \
Ii
The examples were extracted from various references the aerospace and
industrial environments. Empirical reliability and /:.sr average availability
predictions were accomplished for each system. Various simulator options
were demonstrated, i.e. the different ways of calculating the system repair time
as well as leaving components on or switching tL:,;;m off during system repair.
Histograms of =stem times to fail or repair were also displayed for some
systems.
One is usually i;~terested in the reliability of a system at a certain time.
However, for some systems the chances of system failures occurring during this
time are extremely remote. For example, one may wish to estimate the
reliability of a Boeing 747 electrical system for a typical flight time of 3 hol_;'fs.
But the chances of a catastrophic failure during this time are extremely
remote. In order for the simulator to see such an event during this time
requires millions of histories whichbecomes impractical due to computer time
limitations. This problem can be overcome by using biasing techniques such
as those used by Goldfeld and Dubi(14). These biasing techniques were not
included in this study. Therefore. ~Jl tl-e reliability results computed by the
simulator are grouped at reasonable time intervals' :ound the mean life.
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4,,1 HELICOPTER ELEC''@.ONIC WARFARE SYSTEM
This example illustrate .use of the simulator in predicting the mission
reliability of an Electr ~farfareSystem (EWS) for a combat helicopter,
The system configuration consists of a series-parallel arrangement of
components with a region of K out of N active redundancy. As the system
comprises of electronic components, negative exponential failure densities
were selected throughout, Itwas also possible to validate the simulator results
analytically, !
The main function of the EWS is to make the aircrew aware of the existence,
position and direction of any hostile radar during a mission. The mission
reliability model (refer Figure 4.1.1) is based on the assumption that the
warning against the existence of threats is mission critical but not the position
or direction thereof.
2 4 6
11
Figure 4.1.1 Electronic Warfare System - RBD
The logic used to con•struct the RBD from the physical system according to
the mission reliability requirement can be described as follows:
The EW controllervv is the crux of the EW system, When this
component fails all the EW functions are lost which makes the
controller a mission critical item.
The two dual front end recorders'P' are each connected to two radar
Naming antennas'P, The assumption here is that in the case of one
dual front end recorder failing, two of the four sensing functions are
lost, one on each side of the helicopter. In this case the threat direction
indication will he degraded. Detection will however still be possible
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and the mission will not be aborted. If both dual front end recorders
fail all the laser sensing functions are lost which will cause a mission
abort. Two radar warning antennas may fail as long as they are not
situated on the same side of the helicopter.
The laser warning analyzer(D) receives the signals from the laser
detectors and calculates the direction of the source. In the case of a
failure of the laser warning analyzer, the function of detection is lost
which results iu a mission abort. The failure of two laser detectors(E)
will not create a mission abort situation as long as they are not situated
on the same side of the helicopter. The hostile fire sensor units(F) may
be considered as a 2 out of 3 system for mission purposes,
The failure properties of the above components are listed in Table 4.1.1.
Table 4.1.1 E'WS Component Failure Data
I~Component _l Description ~~.. IMTBF (hrS)]
A Electronic Warfare Controller 800-~
B Dual Front End Recorder 2500
I
C Radar Warning Antenna 10000
D Laser ,Warning Antenna 1000-
E Laser Detector 344-
F Hostile Fire Sensor Unit 619_.
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The system function ISYSITP is easily deduced from the tie sets contained in
.....igure 4.1~1and is:
:tS1:~SUP = Kl, + K2
where
1Ci. ~ XST(llx KST('3) .e KS~'(5) x KST(7) )( X5T(S) x XS'T(9) x XSTel!)} )( KST(ll)
\
(4.1.2)
Xl = KST(l) x KS:l"(2) x KS,'({) x KST(6) x KST(a) )( XST(!I) x KST(lO) "KST(ll) (4.1.3)
Note, components 9, 10 and 11 each consist of more than one subcomponent,
i.e. thev'are cat components, This considerably simplified the programming of
the sy::;~elnfunction.
The system function ISYSUP was entered into subroutine SYST (refer
Appendix B) which was then compiled and linked to the other program files
to form the executable simulator file. The component and general program
control data were then entered into the input file RAMIN (refer Appendix B).
A pure reliability simulation was selected (i\TTYPE = 0) with a sample size
of 5000 (NTIME = 50(10). The empirical reliability distribution was defined
as having 12 class intervals (ISZE = 12) each of width 50 hours (FI = 50).
Components 9 and 10 were entered as lout of 2 cat components in active
redundancy (ICODE = 21). Component 11 was entered as a 2 out of 3 cat
component in active redundancy (ICODE = 32). AU other components were
entered as single components (ICODR = 0). Negative exponential failure
distributions weie assigned to all components (KFDN(I) = 1).
The simulator output RAMOUT can be found in Appendix B. The results
indicated a mean life of 169.05 hours and? standard deviation of 127.20
hours. The empirical reliability results have' ueen redisplayed in Table 4.1.2.
The column R95L indicates the lower 95 % confidence limit of reliability and
the column RMLE the maximum likelihood estimate. For example, one can
say with 95 % confidence that the mission reliability is greater than 0.835 at
50 hours while the most likely reliability is 0.843. In other words, the
probability of the system surviving 50 hours is 0.843 and the probability of the
system failing within 50 hours is 0.157.
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The list of system times to fail 'ITFLIST was used to generate a histogram of
system failure times (refer Figure 4.1.2). The histogram indicates a skewed
distribution.
50 100 )00 200 250 :,00 3&\ 400 450 500 660 000
nne, hoLrs
Figure 4.1.2 Histogram of System Failure Times - EWS
The true reliability function was derived to validate the simulator output and
is given as:
(4.1.4)
where
(4.1.5)
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(4.1.6)
The individual component reliabilities at time tare easily determined from
Equation 2.2.2.
The results of computing the true reliability at times of~) through to
600 hours are shown in Table 4.1.2 along with the corresponding reliability
est. sate produced by the simulator. The simulator results compared
favourably with the true results.
Table 4.1.2 Simulated vs True Reliability - r:,WS
L Hours I R95L I ~LEJ R True I
50 0.835 0.843 0.846
100 0.640 0.651 0.656
150 0.464 0.476 0.478
200 0.311 0.322 0.332-
250 ().204 0.214 0.223-
300 0.136 0.144 1),]45--
350 0.086 0.093 0.093
4,00 0.053 0.058 0,058
450 0.033 0.038 0/)36
500 0.019 0.022 I
O'O;l1-- --550 0.011 0.013 0.013
600 0.007 0.009 0.008;====
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4.2 SPACE SHUTTLE COMPUTER SYSTEM
This example illustrates the use of the simulator in selecting a computer
system from seven alternative designs. The selection criteria were defined-in
terms of mission reliability and mean life. The example was extracted from
Forry(13).
The different designs under consideration included series-parallel
arrangements of components with regions of standby redundancy and
K out of N active redundancy.
The alternative configurations were as follows;
(1) Central Simplex Computer System
(2) Central Dual Computer System
(3) Triple Processor Computer SystemA
(4) Triple Processor Computer System B
(5) Multi Processor Computer SystemA
(6) Multi Processor Computer System B
(7) Multi Processor Computer System C
The simulation results for the first three configurations were validated
analytically.
The components making up the different designs were power supplies,
input/output units, memory units, and central processor units. The failure
properties of each component are shown in Table 4.2.1. Component failure
distributions included exponential and normal dist :·ibutions.
'fable 4.2.1 Space Shuttle Computer System Component Data
Component Description Time ~oFailure (months) 1
L Distr Param 1 Param_2 II
-"A Power Supply Exp 7.5 N/A
I B Input/Output Unit Normal 6.0 1.5
C Central Processor Unit Exp 10.0 N/A
'_'-'
D Memory Unit Exp 8.4 N/A
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For each configuration, the system function ISYSUP was programmed ~nto
subroutine SYST and the component and general program control data were
entered into llAMIN. k sample size of 5000 was selected for all
configurations. Subroutine SYST, RAMIN and RAMOUT for each
configuration can be found in Appendix C.
The design requirements were that the computer system must have a mean
lifetime of at least 2.5 months, at least an 85 percent chance of surviving a one
month operation, and at least a 25 percent chance of surviving a four month
operation. The system reliability at one and four months and the mean life
estimate for each configuration as obtained by the simulator are shown in
Table 4.2.2.
Table 4.202Estimated System Reliability and Mean Life - Alternative Shuttle
Computer Systems=>
~Onfig I ';:=(1 m~nth) I~(4 months) IMeanL~fe T~i~a ]
1 0.699 0.226 244 1.94
2 0.949 0.534 4.25 2.12 ,,-
3 0.762 0.258 (,; 2.65 1.90- -
4 0.784 0.356 3.83 3.60--
5 0.626 0.137 I 1.95 1.66 /
6 0.626 0.141 1.98 1.72
7 0.766 0.310 2.95 2.13 ='1-- -
These results indicated that the Central Dual Computer System is the only
configuration which could not be rejected as a candidate to meet the system
mean lifetime and reliability specifications. All of the other systems would be
rejected since at least one of their mean lifetime or reliabilities is below tbe
requirement. Each configuration is discussed ~n greater detail in the pages
Which follow.
CONFIGURATION 1 - CENTRAL SIMPLEX COMPUTER SYSTEM
Tl?;eCentral Simplex Computer System is a simple series combination of one
of each component. The failure of anyone or more components results in the
system being down. This logic can be represented by a simple series network
(refer Figure 4.2.1). This design would not be expected to meet the reliability
requirements but is useful for comparative purposes.
2 3 4
Figure 4.2.1 Central Simplex Compute, tern - Riw
The system function ISYSUP is defined as:
.rSYS[TP ::::KST(l) x KST(2) x KST(3) x KST(4} (4.2.1)
The simulator results indicated a me- . ctime of 2.44 months and an
estimated reliability of 0.699 at one montn and 0.226 at 4 months. None of
these values meet the specification.
The true reliability function is:
(4.2.2)
The results of this computation for times of one through eight months are
shown in Table 4.2.3 along with the estimates produced by the simulator. The
reliability simulator produced estimates very close to the analytically derived
values.
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Table 4.2.3 Simulated vs True Reliability - Configuration 1
IMonths IR95L IRMLE I R True=J
1 0.689 0.699 0.703
2 0.485 0.497 0.49.3
3 tl.331 0.342 0.340
4 0.216 0.226 0.222-
5 0.122 0.130 0.129-
6 0.052 0.057 0.060
7 0.015 0.018 0.021
8 0.003 0.004 0.005
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CONFIGURATION 2 - CENTRAL DUAL COMPUTER SYSTEM
The Central Dual Computer System consists of a series arrangement of two
parallel combinations of a memory unit in series with a central processor, two
parallel input/output units, and two parallel power supplies. The reliability
network is shown in Figure 4.2.2. The mean lifetime of this system should be
greater than for the Central Simplex Computer System because of the
increased (redundancy.
\'
3 5 6
Figure 4.2.2 Central Dual Computer System - RBD
The system function ISYSUP is:
ISYSUIi .= 1W~'{1)xKST(3) xx..QT(5) xKST(6) +KST{2) xKST(4) xKST(5) xKST(6) (4.2.3)
Note, components 5 and 6 are cat components.
The simulator results indicated a mean lifetime of 4.25 months and an
estimated reliability of 0.949 at one month and 0.534 at 4 months. The
estimated mean lifetime is 1.74 times greater than the mean lifetime. of the
Central Simplex Computer System. The reliability estimates are also greater
than those for the Central Simplex Computer System. In addition, all the
reliability and mean lifetime specifications are exceeded.
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The true reliability function is:
where
(4.2.5)
(4.2.6)
(4.2.7)
The results of computing the true reliability at times of one. through ten
months are shown in Table 4.2.4 along with the estimates produced by the
simulator. The reliability simulator produced estimates very close to the
analytically derived values.
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Table 4.2.4 Simulated vs True Reliability - Configuration 2.
[Months ! R95L IRMLE I RTrW'; J
1 0.944 0.949 0,946
2 0.:)13 0.822 0.855
3 0.662 0.673 0.682
4 0.523 0.534 0.548...
5 0.380 0.391 0.399
6 0.228 0.237 0.244
7 ',\ 0.098 0.106 0.107
8 0.029 0.034 0.032
f---<. II 9 0.004 0.006 0.0051.......,,1,"- IL···· 10 0.000 0.001 0.001. I
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CONFIGlJRATION 3 - TRIPLE PROCESSOR COMPUTER SYSTEM A
The reliability block diagram of the Triple Processor Computer System A is
shown in Figure 4.2.3. In this design, two out of three central processor units
and input! output units are required for successfuloperation. This redundancy
in both the central processor and input/output unit ..should provide a higher
system reliability than that of the Central Simplex Computer System, but a
lower system reliability than that of the Central Dual Computer System.
3
r~. ';1
~- r~~ 4
~I A f-
L.~ .•:
~, .L:
2/3 Required
Figure 4.2..3 Triple Processor Computer System A - RED
The system function ISYSUP is:
ISYSrJP"" KST(l) xKST(2) xKST(3) xKST(4) (4.2.8)
Note, components 2 and 3 are cat components.
The simulator results indicated a mean lifetime of 2.65 months and an
estimated reliability of 0.762 at one month and 0.258 at 4 months. This shows
some improvement in mean lifetime and reliability over the Central Simplex
Computer System, but The reliability at one month still does not mee , r'.
specification.
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(.-'J
The true reliability function is:
where
(4.2.9)
(4.2.10)
(4.2..11)
\1
The results of computing the true reliability at times or one through eight
months are shown in Table 4.2.4 along with the corresponding reliability
estimate produced by the simulator. The simulator results compare favourably
with the true results.
Table 4.2.4 Simulated Vii True Reliability - Configuration 3
I Months I i
-~
RMLE L!TrueaR95L
1 0.752 ~7J
2 0.542 0.552 Ir---
3 0.370 0.382 0.390
1----, I
4 0.248 0.258 0.266
5 0.140 0.148 0.155 I
6 0.055 0.060 0.063 II
7 0.010 0.012 0.(l13 I._ '1
8 ooot 0.002 0.005
.~
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CONFIGURATION 4 - TRIPLE PROCESSOR COMPUTER SYSTEM B
The Triple Processor Computer System B is identical to System A
configuration except the central processor units and input/output units are
changed to a passive standby configuration of three units. This was
accomplished by changing the input variable leODE from 32 to ~3.
The replacement of standby redundant units for active redundant units should
increase the mean lifetime and reliability over those of the Triple Processor
CU-'lputer System A. The results from the simulator confirmed this. The
estimated mean lifetime of 3.83 months meets the requirement, but the
estimated reliability of 0.784 at one month still does not meet the design
requirement.
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CONFIGURATION 5 - MULTI PROCESSOR COMPUTER SYSTEM A
This configuration consists of a Central Simplex '::;omRuteTSy~temcombined
in series with a Triple Processor Computer System A In,wl.ktl ie 2 out of 3
active redundant central processor units and inpctj.output unil~ are changed
to a lout of 3 active redundant configuration (leODE 0;: 3Jj. The reliability
networ K is ShO'Wl1 in Figure 4.2.4.
2
Figure 4.2.4 Multi Processor Computer System A - RBD
The system function ISYSUP is defined as:
ISYSUP z llST(l) xXST(31 ~KST(5i :<1(;'1T(6)...XST(2) xKST(4)xKST(sl "KST(6) "KST(7) (4.2.12 )
Note, components 1 and are cat components.
Even though the mean lifetime and reliability of the Triple Processor
Computer SystemA would have been increased by the change in redundancy,
the series arrangement should cause the reliability and mean lifetime of this
configuration to be less than that of the Central Simplex Computer System.
The results from the simulator confirmed this, i.e, a wean lifetime of
1.95 months and estimated reliabilities of 0.626 and 0.137 at one and four
months respectively.
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CONFIGURATION 6 - MUL11PROCESSOR COMI'UTER SYSTEM B
The Multiprocessor Computer System B is the same as the Multiprocessor
Computer System A except the active redundant central processor units and
input/output units are changed to standby redundant configuration, i.e.
leODE for components 1 and 2 were changed from 31 to -3.
The results showa very slight improvement over the Multiprocessor Computer
System A, i.e. a mean lifetime of 1.98months and estimated reliabilities of
0.(i26 and 0.141 at one and four months respectively. The reliability at one
month remained the same.
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CONFIGURATION 7 - MULTI PROCESSOR COMPUTER SYSTEM C
This configuration consists of a serial arrangement of 2 out 4 active redundant
configurations of central processor units and input/output units, a power
supply, and a memory unit. The reliability network is shown in Figure 4.2.5.
2
2/4 Ret,A red 2/4 Required
Figure 4.2.5 Multi Processor Computer System B - RBD
The n function ISYSUP' is defined as:
ISYSUP = KST(l) xKST(2) xKs?'T(3) xKST(4) (4.2.13)
Note, components 1 and 2 are cat components.
As expected the simulator results indicated that the greater redundancy results
in a longer mean lifetime and estimated reliability than those of the previous
two multiprocessors. The estimated mean lifetime was 2.95 months with
estimated reliabilities of 0.766 and 0.310 at one and four months respectively.
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4.3 BOEING 747 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM
This example uses the simulator to estimate the reliability of a
115V AC power bus which forms part of the Boeing 747 electrical power
system. This example was extracted from a Boeing reliability engineering
report compiled by Barry(l) in 1969. As the report is relatively old, the
configuration of the current electrical power system may be cors,idernbly
different to that presented in this analysis. Barry(l)also noted that tit; : tudy
was preliminary and would be revised upon receipt of more de mHe:,,"
information. Exponential failure distributions were assumed for ~};_
components.
The reliability logic of the electrical power system is not easily solved by
analytic means. One therefore had to resort to a computer model such as the
simulator to solve the problem. The results obtained by the simulator were
validated using AMIRil'.
Aircraft are often dispatched with systems which are not 100 % operational.
In this example, the 115V AC system was analyzed ror the case where it is
100 % operational at dispatch. The reliability block diagram for the system is
shewn in Figure 4.3.1.
The physical power system consists of a large number of components.
Fortunately, the reliability logic of the system allows one to lump together
many components in series. This-simplifies the simulation model and reduces
computation time.
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Figure 4.3.1 Boeing 747 115"'1AC Bus - RBD
I
Table 4.3.1 shows the physical hems which make up a component and the
overall MTBF of the component.
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Table 4.3.1 Boeing 747 115V AC Bus Component Data
- IM1B~ (hrs)Comp Description -
A Engfne, 1920
Constant speed drive,
Load controller,
Generator diffC Atial protection control
transformer,
Generator,
Generator control unit,
Generator control current transformer
B Generator circuit breaker, 200 000
Synchronous bus differential protection control
transformer,
Bus tw breaker
C Bus power control unit, 111 111
L 2 x synchronous bus differential protection "~control transformers,Split system breaker
D Synchronous bus differential protection control 125000
transformer,
Bus tie breaker.
Bus power control unit
I E 2 x generator differential protection control 250000
transformers,
Circuit breaker"
~
Relay
Switch unit 500 000-
The system function ISYSUP is easily deduced from the tie sets contained in
Figure 4.3.1 and can be found in Appendix D. It is not presented here as it is
quite lengthy. The analysis of the electrical power system is also subject to the
following assumptions:
All failures are independent of one another, e.g. a failure in one
generator channel will not effect the other generator channels.
Failures downstream of the buses do not effect the system.
A bus is considered operable provided that at least one power source
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is available to it.
The split system breaker is closed. I )
The system function ISv,sUP was programmed into subroutine SYST and the
component and general program control data were entered into RAMIN. The
output UAMOVT and all the above files can be found in Appendix D. The
results indicated a mean life of 3959.30 hours and a standard deviation of
2254.38 hours. The reliability at 1000 hours was estim.aed at 0.973. The
empirical reliability distribution is shown in Table 4.3,Z.
TIle file TIFLIST was used to generate a histogram of simulated system
failure times (refer Figure 4.3.2). The histogram shows a skewed distribution.
1000 0000 3C00 4000 MOl) cooo 1000 8000 0000 10000 11000 12000
Tine. I1ot.zs
Figure 4.3.2 Histogram of System Failure Times - B747 115V AC BU1, \
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The empirical point estlma.es of reliability were also computed using Al\fIR<4.
The subroutine LBOUT as well as the input and output files, Le. IRBI and
OU'rRf can all be found in Appendix E. The subroutine LBOUT contained
the system function, A sample size of 5000 was chosen together with 20 class
intervals each of width 1000 hours.
The results indicated a mean life of 3934.62 hours which was dose to that
estimated by the simulator. Note, an empirical unreliability distribution was
generated by AMIR~ while the simulator generated a reliability distribution.
For example, the unreliabi. y at 1000 hours was estimated by AMIR" at 0.03,
therefore the reliability at this time would be 0.97. The Percentage Relative
Standard Deviation (PRSD) associated with this value was given as
8.097 percent. This can be interpreted in the sense that with probability 0.95,
the exact unreliability lies in the interval:
(O.03-0.03x2xO.0809 I 0.03+0.03x2xO.0809) = (0.025 I 0.035)., (4.3.1)
,-
The reliability results obtained from the simulator were all wbtract~~! from
one to obtain unreliability, Le. l-RMLE. These results were then compared
to the unreliabilitv results obtained from Al\HRe in Table 4.3.2. The simulator =
results compared Wfavourably with the AMIR~ values.
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Table 4~3.2Comparison of Simulator and AMIR'" Results - ij747 llSV AC
Bus .
WT' Simulation Model results AMIR~ Resultslme
R95L RMLE l-RMLE F(t) PRSD
I 1000 ~.969 0.973 0.027 O.V30 8.097 I2000 0.814 0.823 0.177 , 0.185 2.964I
3000 0.594 ··0.605 0.395 0.404 1.718
4000 03,4 0.405 0.595 0.604 1.145
5000 0.241 0.251 0.749 0.754 0.808
6000 0.150 0.159 0.841 0.845 0.605
7000 0.090 0.097 0.903 0.903 0.463
8000 0.054 0.059 0.941 0.941 0.353
9000 0.032 0.036 0.964 0.961 0.286
10000 0.017 0.020 0.980 0.976 0.224-
11000 0.010 0.012 0.988 0.985 0.177
12000 0.005 0.006 0.~(}4 0.990 0.139
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4.4 SINGLE COMPONEl'.'T SYSTEM
This is a classic example which concerns t1~ availability estimation of a single
component. Dhillion(7) shows how a Markovian model can be developed to
predict the steady state availability of a single component with constant failure
and repair rates. He applied the model to various components in the powe:
generation field such as condensers, generator units, etc.
This example allowed one to compare the availability estimate obtained by the
simulator with the true value. It also allowed one to check the sampling
functions of the simulator. The results of sac piing from the exponential,
normal and Weibull distributions were therefore compared with true values.
The system consists of only one component and the system function ISYSUP
is simply:
ISYSUP = KST(l}
The estimation of availability and the checking of the sampling functions are
described in the next two sections.
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4.4.1 AVAUABILI1.:V ESTiMATE
It will be assumed that the component availability is being measured as a
two-state repairable system. In other words, the component can only be in an
operational or failed state. This is an example of Inherent Availability where
uptime consists of actual working time and downtime consists of unscheduled
repair time (refer Table 1.3.1). It was also assumed, for the availability
simulation, that all failure and repair rates are constant and that the repaired
system is as good as new. The failure and repair rates were taken as 0.01 and
0.1 respectively, Le, an exponential failure distribution with a MTBF of
100 hours and an exponential repair distribution with a M'ITR of 10 hours.
Subroutine SYST,RAMINand Rlli~)1JTfvf the estimation of availabU(y can
all be found in Appendix F. As the system consists of only one component, it
makes no difference whether t~.e,componenr is left on or switched off during
system repair or whether the, "~mrepair .sime is the average, minimum or
maximum of the component t't.£ ..... '·.imes.Tne steady state availability estim~~,.
obtained from :5000histories was v~91and the standard deviation approached
zero. The average uptime. and downtime were 98.70 and 9.78 hours
respectively.
Dhillon(7)used the Markov technique to calculate the steady state availability
of a single generator. The formulae was presented in Equation 2.6·2 as:
A. (t) ". _H._
.:t, Jl+i..
Subs.ltuting :l"ne failure and repair rates into the above formulae yields an
avai1ability','j}fO,~Hwhich is the estimate obtained by the simulator.
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4A~ CHECKING THE SA..\1~LING FUNCfIONS
The case of a single component allows one to check the results of sampling
from various distribution functions. Samples from the exponential, normal and.
Weibull distributions were therefore compared with true values. Note, two
cases were checked for the Weibull distribution, i.e. a decreasing: and an
increasing failure rate.
The variables in RA.MiN were changed from a reliability/availability
simulation to a pure reliability simulation. Tile probability distributions and
associated parameters were, also changed as required. Subroutine SYST
remained the same as before. The output files for each distribution can be
found in Appendix F.
The simulator results and the true values for each case were compared in
Tar,les 4.4.2.1 through 4.4.2.4. The; simulator results were close to the true
values.
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Table 4.4.2.1 Normal Distribution (p ::: 100, a :::30)
LHour~ L R95L I RMLE I R True
10 0.998 0.999 0.998,_
t 20 0.996 0.997 0.99630 0.992 0.994 0.990
I 40 0.973 0.977 0.977
50 0.946 0.951 0.951
1--'
60 0.893 0.900 0.908
70 0.821 0.830 L'.8Al
'_" ~-
80 0.728 0.739 0.745
90 0.601 0.612 0.629
.:' 100 0.473 OA84 0.500
110 0.344 0.355 0.371
, 120 0.230 0.240 0.255
130 0.141 0.150 0.159
140 0.078 0.084 0.092
H--
150 0.038 0.043 0.049
160 0.017 0.020 0.023
170 0.007 0.009 0.010
180 I . 0.002 0.003 0.004
190 0.000 0.001 0.002
']0
Table 4.4.2.2 Exponential Distribution (MTBF = 100)
~
.-
10 0.904 0.910 0.905
20 0.80.8 0.817 0..819
!--
30 0..733 0..743 0.741
40. 0.660 0.671 0..670
50 0.594 0.605 0.607
60 0.531 0..542 0..549 I
70 0..479 0.490 0.497
80 0..431 0.442 0.449
< •.• -0 ____
90 0.389 0.401 0.407
100 0.351 0.363 0.368
110 0.320 ..0.331 0.333
120 0.287 0.297 0.301
130 0.255 0.265 0.273
140 0.229 0.239 0.247
r-
150 0.206 0.216 0.223
160. 0.185 0.194 0.202
170 0.168 0.176 0.183
I
I 180 0.153 0.161 0.165..190 0.136 0.144 O.l50
200 0.124 0.132 0.135
210 0..112 0.120 0.122
220 0.103 0.110 0.111
i
,_ --
230 0.092 0.099 0.10.0
240 0.083 0.089 0.091
M
250 0.073 0..079 0,082 J
R95L RMLE 1 R T~e ~
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Table 4.4.2.3 Weibull Distribution (1'/ = 100, 6 = 0.5)
~iours I = R95L I RMLE I R True ~
10 0.719 0.729 0.729 I
r--'--
20 0.626 0.637 0.639
f--'_'-'
30 0.561 0<573 0.578
l""'""-
i 40 0.516 0.528 0.531
50 0.474 0.486 0.493
60 0.442 0.454 0.461
70 0.415 0.426 0.433
I •80 0.390 0.402 0.409
90 0.371 0.382 0.387 II
100 0.351 0,,363 0.368
110 0.333 0.344 0.350-
120 0.322 0.333 0.334 I
130 0.309 ,,>.320 0.320 I
140 0.293 0.304 0.30'0
150 0.278 0.288 0.294~ , .
160 0.264 0.274 0.282
1--' -
1'70 0.253 0.264 0.271
180 0.243 0.253 0.261
190 0.235 0.245 0.252
200 0.224 0.234 0.243
210 0.217 0.227 0.235
220 0.211 0.221 0'}Z7,___
230 0.203 0.213 0.219
I
~. -
840 0.196 0.205 0.212 j250 0.189 0.199 0.206
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Table 4.4.2.4 Weibull Distribution (t] = 100,6 = 2)
I Hours I ~R95L I RMLE J R True ].___
L 10 0.989 0.991 0.990L__20 0.959 0.963 0.961
~O 0.913 0.919 0.914
40 0.846 0.854 0.852
; -
50 0.768 0.778 0.77'-'
60 0.687 0.698 0.698
70 0.599 0.610 0.613
I 80 0.513 0.524 0.527 I.'
90 0.427 0.438 0.445
100 0.351 0.363 0.368
110 0.283 0.294 0.298
120 0.219 0.228 0.237
130 Q.170 0.179 0.185
140 0.128 0.136 0.141
150 0.098 0.105 0.105
160 0.067 0.073 0.077-
170 0.047 0.052 0.056
180 0.033 0.037 0.039
190 0.022 0.026 0.027
I
200 0.015 0.018 0.018
210 0.009 0.012 0,012,_
220 0.006 0.008 0.C08
230 0.004 0.005 0.005
240 0.002 0.003 0.003
250 0.001 0.002 0.002
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4.5 PROl)UC'flON LINE SYSTEM
This example concerns the estimation of the steady state availability of a
typical production line. The example was extracted from a set of examples
compiled by Dubi(lt)and modified to include non-exponential failure and
repair distributions.
The example demonstrates various functions of the simulation model. i.e.
estimating the availability of systemswith non -exponential failure and repair
densities, leaving components on or switching them off during system repair,
as well as different ways of calculating systemrepair time. The following types
of simulation runs were completed for the production line:
(1) Components were switched off during system repair and the system
.epair time was equal tt} the sum of component repair times. For this
case, a number of different sample sizes were also selected for
illustrative purposes.
(2) Components were switched off during ~'y~te.~ repair and the system
repair time was equal to the maximum component repair time.
(3) 'Components were left on during system repair and the system repair
time was equal to the sum of component repair times.
(4) Components were lett on during system repair and the system repair
. time was equal to the maximum component repair time. Thi simulator
results for this run were validated using SPAR~.
(5) Pure reliability simulation. This was done in order to compare the
estimates of maintained and non-maintained system reliability,
The production line contains redundancies and will continue to operate when
some of its components have failed. The line contains three processes in active
redundancy. In other words, only one process needs to be operating for the
line to be operational. The availability of the line is further enhanced by
3 components in parallel, any of which can be used by anyone process. The
reliability network of the production line is shown in Figure 4.5.1.
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26
Figure 4.5.1 Production Line System - RBD
Nowlan and Heap(18) explain that it is usually only items with one failure
mode or a dominant failure mode that benefit from preventive maintenance.
Most complex components (those with many failure modes) exhibit non-age
related failure times, i.e, they have negative exponential failure densities and
should not be subject to preventive maintenance (refer Section 2.2).
Most items on the production line are complex without a dominant failure
mode and are therefore not subject to preventive maintenance. The
maintenance policy for the production line is therefore to repair the system
when it breaks, i.e. components are only repaired following a system failure.
TIle production line operates continuously, i.e. 24 hours per day and 7 days
per week. The line therefore does not have a standby state because when it
is operational it is always working (refer Table 1.3.1). Production line
downtime therefore consists only of corrective maintenance time as no
preventive maintenance is carried eut, It will also be assumed that there is no
delay in repair due to a shortage of manpower, spares, etc. The above
situation exactly describes that of Inherent Availability which was discussed in
Section 1.3.1,
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Production line components exhibited negative exponential and Weibull
failure densities and normal repair time densities. The properties of each
component are shown in Table 4.5.1.
Table 4.5.1 Production Line Component Data
Comp Time to Failure (Days) Time to Repair (Days)
Distr Param 1 Param 2 Distr Param 1 Param 2
A V/eib 1140.63 0.9 Nrml 2.92 0.50
-
B Expn 1520.96 N/A Nrml 2.92 0.50
C Expn 152.21 N/A Nrml 12.05 2.00
D Rxpn 45.55 N/A Nrml 24.09 4.00
,
Nrml 12.05 2.00E Weib 101.47 1.1
F Expn 202.58 N/A Nrml 12.05 2.00
G Expu 182.50 N/A Nrml 4.02 0.67
The system function ISYSUP is very large, i.e, 36 tie sets in all, and is
therefore not displayed here. The reader is referred to Appendix G for the
system function. Note, it is possible to reduce the number of tie sets to 3 by
defining groups of components as cat components. This was not done because
it was not possible to define cat components like this in ~pAR".
Subroutine SYST and RAMiN for run number 1 can be found in Appendix G.
A sample size of 5000 was selected for all simulations runs and additional
sample sizes of 10, 50 and 100 were also selected for run number 1. The
empirical reliability distribution was defined as having 15 class intervals each
of width 10 days, RAMOUT for each simulation can also be found in
Appendix G.
Sample sizes for run number 1 of 10, 50 and 100 show that the availability
value converges rapidly to that of steady state. The average availability is 0.22
for a sample size of 10, 0.27 for a sample size of SO and 0.27 for a sample size
of 100. The standard deviation is 0.04 for 10 histories which reduces to 0.02
at 50 histories and 0.01 at 100 histories. The 95 % confidence levels for
availability at the above histories are 0.18, 0.25 and 0.25. At a sample size of
5000 the steady state availability value is 0.28 as is the 95 % confidence limit.
For this sample size, the standard deviation is very small.
For run numbers 2, 3 and 4 (sample sizes of 5000 ill all cases) the steady state
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availabilities were found to be 0.66, 0.10 and 0.60. The values differed
significantly due to the specification of system repair time and whether
components were left on or switched off during system repair.
For each run number (excluding run number 5) the lists of system repair times
TTRLIST were used to generate histograms. A comparison of these
histograms are shown in Figure 4.5.3. Note, sample sizes of 5000 were used
in all cases.
® ~ ~ 00 ~ ~ m _ 00 ~ m ~
Time, days
Figure 4.5,3 Histograms of System Repair Times - Production tine System
For run numbers 1 and 3 the mean repair time was 135.40 and 123.92
respectively with standard deviations of 39.97 and 38.43.Whereas, for runs 2
and 4 the mean repair time was 27.68 and 27.05 respectively with standard
deviations of 4.01 and 4.71.
Run numbers 1 and 3 show a much wider dispersion than 2 and 4. The system
repair times for runs 2 and 4 are dominated by a particular repair mode as the
system repair time is equal to the maximum component repair time. On the
other hand, the system repair times for runs 2 and 4 are more spread out as
the system repair time is equal to the sum of component repair times.
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Note, selecting the system repair time equal to the sum of component repair
times means having components repaired one after the other following a
system failure. Selecting the system repair time equal to the maximum
component repair time means having all components repaired simultaneously
following a system failure.
For run numbers 1,3, 4, and 5 the lists of system failure times TfFLIST were
used to generate histof rams (refer Figure 4.5.4). Note, the histograms for run
numbers 1 and 2 are the same. Sample sizes of 5000were used in all cases.
Figure 4.5.4 Histograms of System Failure Times - Production Line System
For run numbers i, 3, 4 and 5 the mean failure time was 53.67, 13.86, 40.12
and 54.38 respectively with standard deviations of 28.87, 22.52, 30.07 and
29.74. Note, the values for run 2 are the same as those of run 1.
There are differences when comparing the histograms of run numbers 1,3 and
4 with run number 5. These differences are to be expected as the histograms
of runs 1, 3 and 4 are based on the system times to fail from the last repair,
whereas run number 5 is not Differences also occur between runs 1, 3 and 4
themselves which can be attributed to the repair specification and whether
components are switched off or left on during system repair. Note, although
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the repair specification of runs 1 and 2 are different, the components are
switched off during system repair, hence the histograms are the same.
SPARe was used to validate the availability estimate for run number 4. In
order for the two models to be comparable certain options had to be selected
in srARe, i.e.
The system checkup level was selected. If the checked system is foucd
operational, then no further checking is.done. Only when the system is
found failed will components be check-d and repaired.
The continuous mode was selected for the systemcheckup level. In this
mode the system is checked at each stochastic event.
All components were defined a<s being repairable at Iev., .A. 'This
means that we are not taking into account the effects of spare parts
and turn around times for off equipment repair.
The default settings, r,e. components remain active during system repair
and the system repair time is equal to the maximum component repair
time were left unchanged.
All components with exponential distributions were specified as having
Weibull distributions with 6=1. This was done to ensure that
component times to failure were based on the system repair times.
The same system function that was entered into the simulator was
entered into SPARe. It would have been possible to simplify the system
function entered into the simulator by defining groups of components
as cat components. The reason why this was not done 1.1' that the repair
time would then be defined for the cat component as a whole, whereas
in SPAR<I> it would be defined per subcomponent.
The SPAR" input and output files, i.e, STIN and STOUT, as well as the
subroutine LBOUT can all be found in Appendix H. This subroutine contains
the system function. A sample size of 500 was chosen and each sample
consisted of 10000days of utilisation. An average availability of 0.61 and a
Percent Relative Standard Deviation of 3.49 % (PRSD) was obtained by
SPAR". The PRSD is the statistical error in the sense that with probability
0.95, the exact answer lies in the interval:
'\
(O.6151-0.6151x2xl).O:!i49 I O.6151+0.6151x2xO.0349) = (0.5722 I 0.6580) (4.5.1)
The average availability of 0.60obtained by the simulator compares favourably
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with the above values obtained by SPARe.
(j
II
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5 CONCLUSIONS
Engineers require an economical, accurate and easy to use system reliability
and availability tool. The simulator developed in this report is one such tool.
Analytical methods for the reliability and availability estimation of large
systemsoften become impractical. The Markov method for system availability
estimation leads to large numbers of simultaneous differential equations. The
situation is further complicated with the inclusion of non -exponential failure
and repair densities. Fortunately, the Monte Carlo simulation approach allows
one to easily solve such problems.
The simulator is based to a large extent on the work conducted by Forry(13)
with the inclusion of the system fuilction concept pioneered by Dubi(9).The
simulator is limited to the analysis of those systems whose logic can be fully
represented by a Reliability Block Diagram.
The Monte Ca.. j methodology was applied to simulate the failure and repair
times of system compc; ents from their applicable probability distributions.
From this, one could compute the time to failure and repair of systemswhich
are made up of components. The systems analyzed included active redundant
systems, standby systems, parallel and serial systems, as well as combinations
of all of these, The simulator also gave one the option of leaving components
on or switching them off during system repair. DIfferent options were also
available for calculating the system repair time.
The simulator generates an empirical reliability distribution as well as an
estimate of average availability if required. Confidence levels and measures
of dispersion are attached to each value. Raw data files containing system
repair and failure times are made available for exporting to statistical software
such as STATGRAPHICS~. The raw data can be manipulated in these
packages and a distribution can be fitted.
'The program was written in Microsoft :FORTRAN4.1~but should work with
most FORT.RAr'\j"compilers. This allows one to run the simulator on a large
variety of computers. The random number generator was purposely chosen to
work with a very small computer word size which also allows one to run the
simulator on a large variety of computers. An engineer with a basic knowledge
of FORTRAN could easily use the simulator.
The simulator can accommodate 25 components or cat components. The cat
components can ccntain a maximum of 5 subcomponents each. A maximum
of 5000 histories are permitted as well ~1S a maximum of 25 entries for the
empirical reliability distribution table. 'These limits can be easily changed by
modifying the appropriate dimension statements.
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Based on the results of the simulation examples, it can be concluded that the
simulator correctly determines the empirical reliability d: tribntion as well as
tbe average availability, All the validations completed ir. [his study checked
I)out. ; ;
" .r'1/_,1
!I
The model does have limited applicability in terms of mG 'elling general
systems. To include general systems would require extensive ri~,lifications to
the simulator. For the modelling of general systems it is best to resort to
AMIR~ or SFAR~. ...
It can 'be concluded- that the simulator offers an economical, practical and
accurate.',..manner of estimating the reliability and, availability of complex
network systems. It can save the engineer many hours of tedious work by
providing quick estimates of system reliability and availability.
Ii
/)
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PROGRAM SOURCE CODE LISTING
PROGRAM :MAIN
PROGRAM MAIN
c
c ************,,*****,,'.*"'''********************'''*,,*******C '"GENERAL RELIABILl'l'Y/AVAILABILITt SYSTEM SIMULATOR *
C *********',,*******************************************
C
COMMON ICRES! RES,~ESQ,NTYPE
COMMO~ RMAXTM,RMINTM
C
C ***********************"'************\~****************)1*"'*****
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
'"COMMON BlOCKS OEFINED FOR SUBROUrHi!: TAB
'"RES - SUM OF SYSTE.~R TIK);S
* RESQ - SUM OF THE SQUARES OF SY~ITEM REPAIR THIES
'"NTYPE=O - ONLY RELIABILITY CALCULATION
* NTYPE=1 - A\fAIl.'BILITYCALC, COMPOflEllTSSWITCHED OFF
'" DURING REPAIR
'"NTYPE;? - AVAILABILITY CALC, COMPONENTS L~FT ON
'" DURING REPAIR
6 ,************************************111************************
C
DIMENSION H20). KFDN(20), FPTR(20,2) t I.COOE(20),PT(10)
DIHENSION TSYSF(5000),RPTR(20,2),REPt3)
DIMENSION KFREQ(2~/,KST(20),NF'20),TSYSR(5000)
C ·1"."~********************************"'******'1<"'***"'**"''''*'''**'''*****C * MAXIMUM NUMBER OF COMPONENTS IS 20 *
C * MAXIMUM NUMBER OF HISTORIES IS 5000 *
C '"MAXIMUM NUMBER OF CLASS INTERVALS FUR EMPIRICAL RELIABILITY*
C * TABLE IS ~5 *
C * MAXIMUM NU~BER OF SUBCOMPONENTS FOR CAT COMPONENT IS 5 *
C * *C * T - TIME TO FAIL FOR COMPONENT OR CAT COMPONENT '"
C * RETURNED BY FAILT AND/OR MODIFIED IN PROGRAM MAIN '"
C * IF COMPONEN! IS LEFT ON DURING SYSTEM REPAIR ETC *
C * KFDN - FAILURE DISTRIBUTION iDENTITY (ONE NUMBER) *
C * FPTR - FAILURE DISTRIBUTION PROPERTY (TWO NUMBERS) *
C '" ICOOE - SINGLE CeMP (O),ACTIVE STANDBY eg 2 out 5 (52) *
C * NON-hCTIVE STANDBY eg (-2) *
C * PI - ARRAY PHi() USED' IN SUBROUTlNE FAILT *
C * FOR CAT COMPONENTS *
C '" INCLUDED IN PROGi~AM MAtN FOR DIMENSIONING PURPOSES *
C * TSYSF - SYSTEM FAlURE TIME *
C * TSYSR - SYSTEM REPAIR TIME *
C * KRDN - RE~'IR DISTRIBUTION iDENTITY (ONE NUMBER) *
C * RPTP - REPAIR DISTRIBUTION PROPERTY (TWO NUMBERS) *
C * REP - REP(KFIX) SYSTEM REPAIR TIME *
C * KFREQ - THE NUHBER OF SYSTEM FAILURES WITHIN EACH CLASS *
C '" 1~;ERV~l (EMPIRICAL RELIABILiTY TA~lE) *
C * KST - COMPfI!!FNTSTATUS USED W SUBROUTINE SYST *
C * TEMP2 - VECTC'll,OF POTENTIAL SYSTEM FAILURE THIES US~D IN '"
C * SUBR(.1UTINESYST II
C '"NF - NUMBER OF FAILURES PER COMPONENT ,CALCULJITED 'IN *
C * SUBROUTINE SYST *
C * *C * RAMIN - INPUT DATA FILE (UNIT 9) *
C * RAHOUT - OUtPUT DATA FILE (UNIT 3) *
C * TTFLIST - OUTPUT DATA FILE (UNIT 4) *
C * TTRLlST - OUtPUT DATA FILE (liNn 8) *
C * AVALIST - OUTPUT DATA FILE (UNIT 7) IF REQUIRED REMOVE ...
C * COMMENT CHARACTERS *
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APPENDIX A
*
*
*
'"
*
c ********"***"'********~'******"'********"'**********')*************
C
OPEN (UNlT=9,FIlE='RAMIN' ,STI\rUS='OlD',Access:'!.,I;QlJENT1AL'
*,FORH~'FORMATTED')
c
READ (UNIT=9,FMT=117) NTYPE,NTIME,N,KFIX,IPROB,XSZE,FI
117 FORMAT (8X.11,~X,I4,4X,I2,7X,I2,8X#I2,7X,I2,5X,f10.2)
C
C *********************************+.**"'***"'''''''****'''*'''***~**k*",
C * HTIHE • SAMPLE SiZE (NUMBER OF HISTORIES) *
C ~ N - NO. OF COMPONENTS *
C * H;:" - IlUMBER OF CLASS IN'fERVAlS (EMPIRICAl. *
C '" RELIABILITY DISTRiBUTION) *
C * AS INrUT BY THE USER +.
C * KFIX • REPAIR S~EC '"
C * KFIX=1 • SYSTEM REPAIR TIME eGUAl TO SUM OF COMPONENT *
r. * REPAIR TIMES *
C * KFIX~2 - SYSTEM REPAIR TIME EQUAL TO LARGEST COMPONENT '"
C * REPAIR TIME *
C '"KFIX=3 • SYSTEM REPAIR TIME EQUAL TO AVERAGE COMPONENT *
C * REPAIR TIME *
C * Fl - CLASS INTERVAL WIuTH AS INPUT BY USER '"
C * IPROB - RUN IDENTIfICATION NUM8E~ *
C *********"'************************************w*****~***"'**
C
00 20 1=1,N
READ (UNrr~9,FMT=205) ICooF.CI),KFDN{I)«FPTR(I,1),FPTR(I,2)
*.KRD~(1).RPTR(I,1),RPTR(1,2)
20 COIiTINUE
205 FORMAT (SX,I2,I,7X,12,10X,E14.7,10X,E14.7,1,
*?X,I2,10X,E14.7,10X,E14.7)
c
c ***************************************************************
C
OPEN (U~IT=3,FIlE='RAM~JT' ,STATUS~'OLD',ACCESS='SEQUENrIALt
* ,FORM=' FORMATTED' )
C
WRITE (UNIT=3,F~r=118) IPROB
118 FORMAT (J,26X,'RUH NO. ',12,11,26X,'IN~UT BLOCK',/)
C
WRITE (UNIT=3,FMT=120) NTYPE,NTIME,N,KFIX,ISlE,FI
120 FORMAT (2X,'i'iPE OF RUN (O,l,OR 2) ••.•••••••••••••••••••••••••• '*,17,1,
"2X,'REQUIRED NUMB!:q OF S!MUlA'iED SYSTEM FAIlURES ••••••• ',17,/,
*ZX,'kUHBER OF COMPONENTS IN THE SYSTEM ••••••••••••••••• ',17,/,
*2X,'REPAIR SPEC1FICATION (1,2 OR 3)••••••••••••••••••••',17,1,
*2X,'NUMBER OF CLASS INTERVALS FOR REL1ABILITY CAlC ••••• ',I7,I,
*2X,'ClASS INTERVAL WIDTH ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• '.F10.2,/)
DQ 123 1;1,N
WRITE (UNIT=3,FMT=119j I,ICooe(l>,KFDIt(I),FPTR(I,1i
*,FPTR(I,2),KRDN(I"RPTR(I,'),RPTR(~,2)
123 CONTINUE
119 FoRMAT (2X,'COMP NO.' ,12,1)(,/ICoo::••',12,1., 13X,'KFDN ••'I2
*,2X,'FPTR(1) ••',E14.7,2X,'FPTR(2) ••',E14.7,/,13X,'KRDN ••',I2
*,~X,'RPTR(1) ••',E14.7,2X.tRPTR(2) ••1I,E14.T,2X/)
C
c
WRITE (UNIT~3.FMT=122)
122 FORMAT (/,27X,'OUTPUT BLOCK',/)
C
C ******************************************************'"********x**
C
OPEN (UNIT=4, FILE='TTFLIST' ,STATlJS,,'OLD',ACCESS::'SEQUENTIAL'
*,FORH='fCRK~TTED')
C
OPEN (UNIT=8,FIlE='TTRLIST',STATUS='OL~',ACCESS='SEQUE~TIAL'
*,FORM='FORMATTED')
C
COPEN CUNIT=7,FILE='AVALlST' ,STATUS='OLD' tACCESS='SEQUENTIAV
C *.FORM='FORMATTED')
C
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WRITE <6,127)
127 FORMAT (11111,5X,/RAM SIMULATION MODel fOR NET~K SYSTEMS',I,
*SX,' PREPARED BY RAY JENKIHS',IIIIIIIIIIII)
c
c ********************************C * INITIALIZATION OF PARAMETERS *
C *********************'''**********
C
MS=1
RES=O
"':1101=1
ClOCK=O
UPT=O
RMAXTM=O
RMINTM=. 11;+9
DO 64 1=1,11
NF(I)=O
64 CONTINUE
C *****************************************************************C * MS - PROGRAM CONTROL VARIABLE USED IN SUBROImNE TAB, ser *
C * TO 1 IN MAIN AND SET AGAIN TO ZERO IN SUBROUTINE TAB .,.
C .,. MSW - PROGRAM CONTROL VAR!ABlE, BEST EXPLAI~EO FURTHER ON *
C .,. WHERE !T IS USED .,.
C .,.CLOCK - SUMMATION OF SYSTEM TIMES TO fAILURE AND REPAIR *
C .. UPT - SUMMATION OF SYSTEM UPTlMES *
C .,. RMAXTM - MAXIMUM OF SYSTEM FA?LURc T1M~S *
C * RMINTM - MINIMUM OF SYSTEM FAILURE TIMES .,.
C * NF - I!llMBER OF FAILURES PER COMPONEIIT *
C *************T***k******~*********~***********II******************
C
C *******1<*************************************C * OBTAIN SAMPLE (HTIMES) FOR SYSTEM FAILURE *
C .. k*****************************"'*********** ',*
C
00 50 1=1,NTIME
WRITE (6,*) 1
c
C ***********************"'**********************************'*1:*C 1< MSW • PROGRAM CONTROL VARIABLE: *
C * II'AVAILABILITY CAlCULATlPN IS SPECIFIED, THEN THE *
C .. PROGRAM SHALL CALL FAILT ONCE IMMEOIATELY BELOij *
C Il' WHILST ALL OTHER CALLS SHAll TAKE P~4CE *
C ~ WHERE S~BROUrINE FAILT IS SPECIFIED ~ SECOND TIME '"
C ************~.***1t************"'**"*************************.,**
C
C ******It*****1i********************Jt****************C '"OBTAIN RAlmOM TIMES TO FAtL FOR fACH COMPOIiENT *
C ************~**********************t:**************
C
CALL FAILT (T(J) ,KFDN(J), FI'TR(J,~) I FPTR(J ,2) I ICODE(J), PT)
C
C ************~.***il'**************"'******'it*********"'*********i'*C * SUBRO\.ITIilEFAILT RETURNS nilE TO fAll T *
C 11 *
C * T - TIME TO fAlL FOR ORDI~ARY COMPO~ENT OR *
C * CAT COMPONENT (ACTIVE OR NOliACTIVE STANDBY) *
C * ALWAYS GREATER THAll ZERO *
C'" PT - ARRAY useD IN SUbROUTINe FAILT, STBY AND PARL TO 1<
C * CALGULATE T FOR CAT COMPONENTS *
C ***"'******"'*"'''''''****************~I********'!!******************1.'
C
15 CONTINUE
C
C **k'lr***************************t.,**c *' COMPUTE SYSTEM TIME TO FAILURE *
C ********f'****'k**************"'k****
C
60 CALL SYS'i (S\'SF,T ,N,~sr, TEHP2,NF)
c
C *",***********j,****************************"**********.'****
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c * FU~jCTION RETURNS SYSTEM FAILURE TIME (SYSF) *
C * *C * T,N • ARE SUPPLIED BY PROGRAM MA!N *
C * T • COMPONENT TIME TO FAIL *
C * N - NUMijER OF COMPONENTS *
C * KST - COMPONeNT STATUS, USED IN FUNCTION SYS *
C * TEMP2 - VECTOR QF POTENTIAL SYSTEM FAILURE TIMES USED *
C * IN SUBR~JTINE SYST •
C * !IF - TOTAL NUMBER OF FAILURES PER COMPONENT *
C **********************************************************
C
IF {SYSF.GT.RHAXTM) RMAXTM=SYSF
IF (SYSF.LT.RMINTM) ~MI~TM=SYSF
C
c *************************************************************
C * FOR NTIME IIISTORIES THE MAXIMUM SYSTEM FAILURE TIME SHALL *
C * BE STORED fIol RMAlITM AND THE MINIMUM IN RMlNTM *
C *************************************************************
c
TSYSF(l )=SYSF
IF (SYSF.EQ.O.) TSYSFCI)=.1E-7
IF (NTYpc.EQ.O) GOTO 45
C
C ************************************************************~*******
C *****************+***********+***~**********************************
C *"'******************k***********************************************
C .**************************************************~*****~**********
C * AVAILABILITY CALCULATION *e* *C * FOR THR REUABILlTY CALCULATION, GOTO 45 *
C * *C * REPAiR FAILED SYSTEM AND ESTIMATE AVAIlISILITY •
c: * *C * UPON CALL BY USER IN NTYPE SPEC, AND UPON SYSTEM FAILURF. *
C * THIS PROGRAM DETERMINES A RANDOM TIME TO REPAIR EQUAl. TO ;HE *
c * SUM OF THE TIMES TO REPAIR, THE MAX OF REPAIR TIMES OR r~E MEAN *
C * REPAIR rIME OF COMPONENTS FAILED AT OR BEFORE TilE SYSTEM FAILURE *
C * TIME, r.EPENDING ON USERS SPEC IU KFIX, USER MAY ALSO SPECIFY ~
C * WHETHER THE CLOCK SHGULD RUN OR STOP DURING REPAIR. SYSTEM *
C * AVAILABILITY IS ESTIMATED AND PRINTED OUT WITH CLOCK TI~E, *
C * SVSTEM FAIL TIME AND REPAIR TIME *
C * 'I<
C * COMPONENT FAILURES ARE REPAIRED WHEN A SYSTEM FA~LURE OCCURS *
c· *
e * LOGIC: II:
C * 1. IF A COMPONENT HAS FAlLED BEFORE OR AT SYSTEM FAILURE TIME *
C * 1.1 GENEF WE A flEW 'tIME TO FAILURE FOR THE COMPONENT *
C * 1.2 GENERATE A TIM~ TO REPAI~ FOR THE COMPONENT *
C * 1.3 FIND THE SYSTEM REPAIR TIME BASED ON REPAIR TIME OF *
C * COMPONENTS *
C II: *
C * 2. IF A COMPONEI.JTHAS NOT FAILED BY SYSTEM Fl\ILURE TIME *
C * 2.1 COMPONENTS lEFT SWITCHED ON DURING SYSTEM REPAIR •
C * 2.1.1 COMPONENT HAS STILL NOT FAILED BY THE EN~ OF SYSTEM *
C * REPAIR TiME, CARRY THE REMAINING TIME LEFT ON THE *
C * COMPONENT T~ NEXT ITERATION *
c * 2.1.2 COMPONENT rAILED WHILE THE SYSTEM WAS BEING REPAIRED *
C * OR "'HEN IT WAS REPAIRED, C<»IPONEIlTTWE TO FAILURE .,.
C * SET TO ZERO FOR NEXT ITERATION *
C * WHEN WE ,RY TO SWITCH THE SYSTEk ON IT MAY *
C * IMMEDIATELY FAIL DEPEMDING ON ISYSUP *
C * 2.2 COMPONENTS SWITCHED OFF DURING SYST~M REPAiR *
C * 2.2.1 TilE REMAINING TIME LEFT ON THE COMPONENT IS CARRIED *
C * FORWARD TO NEXT ITERATION *
C * *
C * NjTI:: , *
C * IF TIlE COM/lONENTS ARE SW!TCHED OFF OR LEFT ON OURUIG SYSTEM *
C * REPAIR, TH~ AGE OF THE COMPONENT IS NOT LOST. *
C * rr IS THER.~FORE Q:JITE LOGICAL TO USE THE HUN EXPONENTIAL *
C * FAILURE OI~rRIBunONS SUCH AS WEJBULL AND NORMAL *
C *************'~**II:*******************************************~******
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C
REP(1)=O
REP(2)=O
REP(3)=O
NREP=O
c
c *************"'********************************************************
C '"REP(KF!X) ~ SYSTEM REPAIR TIME WHiCH DePEUDS ON KFIl( *
C * REPAiR SPEC ~ KFIX *
C * NREP • NUMBER OF COMPONENTS REPAIRED AT EACH SYSTEM FAILURE *
C .. USED TO CALCULATE AVERAGE REPJiIR TIME ..
C *y*******************************************,.************************
C
MI=NTYPE·1
c
c *******************************y*************,,***************"'*******
C * IITYP!:= 1 AVAIL CALC COMPONENTS SWITCHED OFI~DURING REPAIR (M1=0) '"
C .. ~ 2 AVAIL CALC COMPONENTS SWITCHED ON DURING REPAIR (MI=l)"
C '" = 0 ONLY FO~ RELIABILITY NOT APPLICABI.E HERE ...
C '" HI IS A PROGRAM CONTROL VAlUABLE, RELATES TO WHETHER *
C * COMPONENTS ARe SWITCHED ON OR OFF DURlNG REI>AIR AND *
C * CAN BE EITHER 0 OR 1 '"
C '"UPT - SYSTEM UPTIME '"
C * CLOCK ~ SYSTEM UPTIME + DOWNT!ME ..
C *********************************************1.*********w*************
C
CLOCK=CLOCK+SYSF
UPT=Uf'T+SYSF
C
DO 317 K=1,N
1(IG=T(K)-SYSF
C
C *******************************f<*******"'*****11***-t'l:***********"',,*
C * THIS lOOP IS ACCOMPLISHED FOR EACH CtXoIPCNEN'tFOR EACH HISTORY *
C * SUBTRACT SYSTEM FAILURE TIME FROM CQMPONEIH FAILURE *
C * TIMES *
c *****************'h***************************'~********.!t**********
C
IF (,(K» 305,305,303
c
C ************i<********************************lk
C " FOR EACH COMPON.ENT I.
C * T(K) < 0 I =0 GOTO 305 (COMPONENT FAILED) I~
C * T(K) » 0 , GOTO 303 (COMFONENT 1i0T FAILED) Ik
C *********************************************.k
C
303 IF (MI) 315,315,304
C
C ***********"'*********************************'t***************
C * PRCGR/IM PASSES THROUGH HERE Il' COMPONEIHS AI~E lEFT ON *
C * DURING REPAIR, NTYPE=2, HI=1, GOTO 304 *
C '* IF COMPONENTS SWITCHED OFF DUR!NG REPAIR GO'rO315 *
C *********************************************,t***************
C
GOTO 317
c
*
CALL FAIlT (l(K),KFDN(K),FPTR(K,1),FPTR(K,2),
ICOOE(K' ,PT)
C
317
c
REP(1)=REP(1)+RDUM
NREP=NREP+1
REP(2)~AHAX1(REPC2),RDUM)
CONTINUE
REP(3)=REP(1)lNREP
RES=RES+REP(KFIX)
RESQ=RESQ+REP(KF1X)*REP(KFlX)
c
c *-~***************************************************
C * T '. TIME TO FAIl,AtWAYS GREATER THAN ZERO *
C * RDUM • TIME TO R~PAIR ALWAYS GREATER THAN ZERO k
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C * RES & RESQ - PARAMATERS IN THE COMMON BLOCK tCRESt ...
C ...US~D IN SUBR~ITINE TAB *
C *********~*p************************** ...***************
C
CLOCK=CLOCK+REP(KFIX)
AVAL=UPT/CLOCK
C
C WRITE (UNIT:::",FMT=348) CLOCK,SYSF ,P.EP(KFlX),AVAL
C348 FORMAl (2X,F10.2,SX,F10.2,5X,F10.2,5X,F5.3)
C
c ****************~************************************************
C * AVAL - CUMULATIVE AVAILABILiTY THROUGHOOr THE 'illMUI..ATION *
C* *
C * THE FINAL VALUE OF AVAL IS ALSC CALCULA1'ED IN SUBROUTINE TAB *
C * USING AVERAGE SYSTEM FAILURE AND REPAIR TU1ES *
C * THIS IS THE AVERAGE AVAILABILITY VALUE IN RAMOUT *
C *****************************************************************
C
311 IF (MI)320,320,307
c
c ***********************************************1:***************
C PROGRAM DOES TillS LOOP IF COHPONENTS ARE LEFT ON DUR'NG ...
C REPAIR, N1YPE=2, MI=1 *
C ***************************************************************
C
307 DO 312 ~=1,N
C
c *******************************************************************
C * T(K) < 0 *
C * PROGRA~ PASSES THROUGH HERE IF COMPONENT FAILURE TIME IS LARGER ...
C ...THEN SYSTEM FA~LURE TIME ...
C * REP(KFIX) - SYSTEM REPAIR TIME ...
C 1< FAILURES ARE REPAIRED WHEN A SYSTEM FAILUR~ OCCURS *
C.. *
C * IF THE TIME LEFT ON A COMPONENT: ...
C * IS LARGER THAtl lHIi:SYSTEk REPAIR TIME - CARRY fORWARD *
C * REMAINING TIME *
C * IS EQUAL TO SYSTEM REPAIR TIME - REMAINING TIME IS ZERO *
C * ANYWAY *
C * IS LESS THAN SYSTEM REPAIR TIME - RF.!(,ININGTlfolEIS SET '1"Ij *
C'lt ZERO 1<
C *******************************************~***********************
C
303 T(K)::Y(K)+REP(KF IX)
IF (T(K» 309,312,310
GOTO 312
TCK)::O
CONTINUE
310
312
C
45 CONTINU!:
C
50 coart NUE
C
C ***********************k********************************** ...
C *******"'***************************"***********************
C ***********************************************************
C 'I< TABULAtE RESULTS *
C ***"'**************************************Il****************
c
DO 51 1=1,NTIME
CAtL TAB HS't'SF(i),FI,NTIME,KFREQ,ISZE,MS)
C
C ********************i'************************"**"'*********
C * EMPIRICAL STATS CALCUlATE~ AND PRINTED BY T~IS *
C 1< SUBROUTINE *
C ...NTIME - NUMBER OF HISTORIES *
C ***,t****************************************************'1<*
C
C
C *******************************k* ...*******
C 1< NF - NUMBER OF FAILURES PER COMPO!lE:.n1<
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c * *CALCULATED BY SllBROOTINE SYSTC ********~***************************~****
C
WRITE (UNIT=3,nll;::126)
126 FORMAT (1/,2X,13HFAILURE BLOCK,II,
*2X,13HCOMPONE'NT NO. ,SX, i8HNUHSER OF FAILURES,/)
DO S4 I=1,N
WRITE (UNIT=3,FMT=12S) I,NF(I)
125 FORMAT(SX,13,1SX,IS)
54 CONTINUE
C
DO 971 t~1.NrrMe
WRITE (UNIT=8,FMT=301) TSYSR{I)
301 fORMAT (SX,f10.2)
~ITE (UNIT=4,FMT=341) TSYSF'l)
341 FORMAT (5X,F10.2)
971 CONTINUE
c
WRITE(6,3i'1)
371 I'ORMAT (IIIII.SX,'SIMULATION IS HOW COMPLETE' ,11111)
C
END
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il
SUBROU'nNE SYST
SUBROUTlNE SYST (SYSF,T,N,KST,TEHP2,NF)
c
c ****~~******************************* ..****~************************
C ..CALLED BY PROGRAM MAIN *
C * RETURNS THE SYSTEM FAILURE TIME (SYSF) AND NUMBER OF *
C ..F~llURES PER COMPONENT ..
C"" '"
C ,.. N - NUHeER OF COMPONENTS HI TIlE SYSTEM ..
C * T - VECTOR OF COMPONENT FAILURE TIMES (FROM PROGRAM MAIN) *
C" ISYSUP -.SYSTEM FUNCTION, HAY BE LARGER THAN ONE *
C .. KST - COMPONENT STATUS, '0' IS DM, (1' IS UP *
C * TEMPi? - TEMPORARY STORAGE VECTOR TO FINO TiiE SYSTEM *
C * FAILURE TIME *
C * TEMP1 - TIME AT WHICH THE INTERNAL STATUS OF EACH COMPONENT IS '"
C * CHECKED *
C .. NP ~ NUMBER OF fAILURES PER COMPONENT *
C ******""*******************************************************",****
C
DIMENSION KST(20),TEMP2C20),T'20),NF(20)
J :::0
C
DO 20 I = 1,N
TEMP1 = T(I)
c
C **************-***************************q*****C '"CHECK STATUS OF EACH COMPONENT AT TiME tEMP1 *
C ..CALCULATE SYSTEM STATUS AT TIME TEMP1 *
C * iF SYSTEM STATUS IS 0, STORE TIME IN TEHPZ *
C ************************************************
C
0030 L = 1,N
IF (T(L).LT.TEMP1.0R.T(I.).EQ.,TeMP1) THEN
KST(L) = 0
ELSE
KST(L) :::1
ENorF
30 CONT!NUE
C
C *******************************~********"'********************
C * ENTER THE SYSTEM FUNCTION HERE '"
C '"C " iSYSUP - SYSTEM STAWS, MAY BE LARGER THAN OIlE '"
C '"KST(I) - COMPONENT SIATUS, 0 OR 1 *
C *******,,****************************************·k************
C
c
ISYSlJP= KST( 1)*KST{2)*KST(3)*KST(4)
IF (ISYSUP.EQ.O) THEN
J=J+1
TEMP2(J) = TEMP1
ENDIF
CONTINUE
C
20
C
c *********************************************
C * FIND SMALLEST SYSTEM TIME TO FAILURE SYSF *
r. *****************************************"'***
c
70
IF CJ.GT.O) THEN
TEHP3::; TEHP2(1)
no 70 I :::1,J
TEMP4 = TEMP20)
IF (TEMP4.LT.TEMPl) TEMP3 = TEMP4
CCNTINUE
SYSF = TEMP3
ELSE
wRITE (UNIT=6,FMT=90)
FORMAT (tUNABLE TO RETURN SYSTEM FAILllRE TIME TO PROGRAM MAiN')
STOPI, 90
90
EIIOIF
c
c **************************************************
C * CALCUlAT~ NUMBER OF FAILURES PE~ COMPONENT !IF W
C *****k*~******************************************
C
DO 200 I = 1,11
IF (T(I).LT.SYSF.OR.T(I).E~.SYSF) NF(I) ~ MF(I)+1
200 CONTINUE
C
RETURII
EIID
91
SUBROUTINE FAILT
SUBROUTINE FAILT (TJ,KF,Fl,rJ,IC,PT)
c
C '*'*'*'***************************************************C \\'C4L(€O BY PROGRAM R~lN *
C * CALLS FUNCTION STBY '"
C * CAllS FUNCTION PARL '"
C * CALLS SUBRaJTINE ETIME *
C * '"C * SUBROUTINE CALLED FOR EACH COMPONENT '"
C * SUBROUTINE RETURNS (TI) FOR EACH COMPONENi *
C '"nli; CfloIPOHF.NTCOULD BE A CAT COMPONENT (ACTIVE OR 1t
C * NON ACTIVE STA~DBY) *
C ***********",,*'1<*****************************',*********
C
C **************"' ..*************\~**********************
C * TI ::T(J) IN PROGRAM MAIN *C * Kf ::KFD~(J' IN PROGRAM MAIN '*
r. * FI :: FPTR(J,1) IN PROGRAM MAIN *C '" FJ ::FPTR(J.2) IN PROGRA~ MAIN '*C * *
C * Ie :: ICODE(J) IN PROGRAM MAIN *
C * IC ::0 SINGLE COOPONENT "C '* IC ::52 ACTIVE STANDBY 2 OUT OF 5 *
C * IC :::-2 NON ACTIVE STANDBY OF 2 COM~ONENTS *
C '* *c '"PT ::PT IN PROGRAM MAIN '*
C '* ONLY FOR DIMENSION PURPOSES IN PROGRAM MAIN *C '* USED FOR CAT COMPONENTS '"C * THE ARRAY PT(K) IS tlSED IN THIS SUBROUHNE *
C * *C ****************************.*********"**************c
DIMENstON PH5)
IF nc) 20,22,24
C
c ********'***************************************C '* ;,. Ie =0 GOTO 22 '*
C * IV XC <0 GOTO 20 *
\C*lFIC>OGOT024 ,.
*
l'. IC::o: 0 SINGLE COMPONENT *
C * IC = 52 ACTiVE STANDBY 2 OUT OF 5 *
C * Ie = -2 NON ACTIVE STANDBY O~ 2 COMPONENTS *
C ~ MAXIMUM OF 5 LRU'S ALL~JED IN CAT COMPONENT *
C 11**********************************************
C
C
C ~,*************It******************************('J;**************
C * ICJ - NUMBER OF COMPONENTS REQUIRED FOR SUBSYSTEM SUCCt~S *
C *•.******** ..,.**********************.*************************,.
C
25 DO 73 K=1,ICI
CALL ETIME (TI,KF,Fl,FJ)
C
C ****,.*******************************'*****
C "" ETn~E RETURNS TI *
C * CALLED ONLY ONCE FOR SINGLE COMPONENT ...
C * CALLtD MANY TIMES FOR A CAT COMPONENT *
C *******t*********************************
C
!3 PT(K}::Tl
C
C **********'~******************1;*******C * PTCK) AN .~R~Y FOR CAT COMPONENTS *
C ************'*************************
C
C
30 TI=STBY(ICl,PT)
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C
C **********","11*,,**********************1<**
C * SUGSYSTEH iM STANDBY CONFIGURAtION ..
C ", CAllS FUNCTION SHU' *
C ***"*****Ic***'~**"*'i""******"*******"***
C
34 TI=PARl{!CI,ICJ,PT)
C
C ",**,t****k**********************"'*"*"
C * SUaS't'STcMIN ACliVE P1.R"LlEL ,.
C .. CALLS r'JNCTION PARl ..
C *********************'k*********"'*****
C
79 RETURN
END
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FUNCfION STBY
c
c ~******.*******************~******~****~**************
C * CALLED BY SUBROUTINE FAILT *
C* *
C It RETURNS CAT COHPOHENf TIME TO F~fl. (STaY) FOR ...
C * C~PONEHrs IN NeN ACTIVE STANDBY *
C * NEl ~ ICI IN SUBROUTINE FAILT *
C * ieI = -IC = ICODE IN PROGRAM MAIN) *
c'" ic = -2 !ION ACTIVE STAND3Y (.If TWO COHPOHEICTS ETC ...
C * T = PT IN SUBROUTINE FAIlY *
C * MAXIMUM OF 5 C()!h;tIENTS IN CAT Ct;loIPOHENT *
C *****************.************************************
C
DIMEN~ION 1(5)
DO 1 !=l,IlEL
, STdY=STBY+T(t}
C
C *******"********11***************~*********t;************
C ;,ARRAY FOR TCI~ is KEPT IN SUBROUTINE FAILT AS PT(K) *
C * STBY IS A ~MATI~ OF EACH SUBCOMPONENTS LIFE *
C **************'k***********"****************************
C
RETURN
END
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FUNCTION PARL
fUNCTION PARL (NEL,NSUS,PT)
c
c **********************************~************************.**
C • CA-~1.EOBY SUBROUTINE FAtlT •C··C * l'.lf.'ERMINESTHE lIME TO FAIt FOR A SUBSYSTEM OF UP TO FIVE ."
G ." COMPONENTS IN ACTIVE PARALLEL REDUNDANCY GIVEN RANDOM TIME *
C • TO FAll VECTOR PT(K) IN SUBROUTINE FAIL! •
C * Wl;l =ICI IN SUBI':OOTlNEfAIlT • IS THE NUMBER '.::IFCf~PONEUTS*
C'" NSUS =ICJ IN ,SUBROUTINE FAilT •
C ." IS THE NUMBER REQUIRED FOR SUBSYSTEM SUCCESS •
C .************************** ••***********~****~****************
C
DIMENSIClk PT (5)
c
t .~*********************
C ." SORT PT LOU TO HIGH ."
C ********.,,~*************
C
J
10
DO 15 I=2,NEL
IF (PT(I)-PT(I-1»
TEMP:PT(I)
1101=1-1
0020 J=1,IH
L=I-J
PT(L+1 )=PT(L)
CONTINUE
PT(1)=TEMP
core 15
PI(l +1)=TEMP
f,OOHNUJ:
10,15,15
13
20
14
~~
c
c *****************.*.*.**********.*******************
C
C
• TIMES TO FAIL ARE OOERED fROM LOWEST TO HiGHEST *
• EG FOR 2 OUT OF 5 YE SELECT THE TIME TO FAIL OF •
C ."THE 5 " 2 + 1 = 4TH COMPONENT ."
C
C
*********************************************~******
PARL=PT(MO}
C
RETURN
E;{O
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SUBROUTINE ETIME
SUBROUTINE ETIME (TI,ID,P1,P2)
C
C *********,,************ ..·It******_*****t;It*****"'*************,,**
C * CALLED BY SUBROOTINE FAllT FOR 'lIME TO FA1Ltl~E *
C .,. CALLED BY P!lOGRAMMA!N toR RF:PAIRS *
C * CALLS SUBROUTINE RAND *
C * R IS BeTYEEN 0 AND 1 *
C 'I< SUBROUr"E DETERMINES A RANDOMTIME FROMDiSTRJBUTICN 10 *
C 'I< TO FAIL OR R~PA!R DEPENDING ON P1 AND P2 *
C .~ 'I<
C 'I< TI • ~ANDOMnr: TO FAIL RETURNED TO FAILT AND *
C 'I< CAT COMPotl""j'i' lIME TO FAIL CALCULATEDBY FAILT ..
C * RDUM,RANDOMREPAIR TIME RETWINEv TO MAIN .1
C'l< 10 ~ KF,KfDH 1,2,3 OR 4 'I<
C * KRDN *C * P1 • FI,FPTR(1) COMPULSORYFOR ALL O[STRIBUT!ONS '"
C 'I< RPl'Il(1) *
C * P2 • f'J,FPTR(2) OPTlON"lfDEPF.NDI~G 0; THE 1:
C * RPTR(2) D1TRIBUTION '*
C **********************************~·*******,t****************,
K=ID
c
C ********************1'***********************
C * EXPONENTIAL DISTRIBUTION, WHE~E P1=HT6F ..
C * iI IS ALWAYSPOSITIVE *
C ***'If*************"'*****t,**************** ..",**
.C
1 CALL RAND (R)
TI=-P1*(ALOG(R»
RETU~~1
C
C *****************"'*******"'********"'''*******'''*'I***W~********
C * NORMALDISTRIBlJTltlN \.lITH MEANPf, STANDARDDEVIA,'IC~ P2 *
C * TI IS ALWAYSPO;ITIVE *
C ****************\'~***********************************",*****
C
2 CALL RAND (RA)
CALL RAND (RB)
V=C-2.*ALOG(RA»**.5"'COS(6.2834*RB)
TI:::V*P2+P1
IF (TI) 19,20,20
TI=O
Tl=E)(P(TI)
RETURN
19
21
22
C
r. **************,***************,*******",********1<****************
C * WEIBULL DI<;TRIBlITION, R(T)::EXP(-(T/A)**B) WHERE P1=A, P2=B *
C * A - SCALE PARAMETERA=CHARACTERISTIC LIFE *
C * THE CHARACTERI(;TlC LI FE IS THE TIME AT WHICH 63.2 x OF *
C 'I< ITEMS ~AVE FAILED *
C * B - SHAre PARAMF.TER 'I<
C * B < 1 DECREASING HAZARDRATE *
C * B=1 SA~!E AS EXPONENTlAL,fOIolSTANf HAZARDRATE *
C 'I< B > 1 INCREASING HAZARDRAT~ *
C * B=3.5 OR HIGHER APPROXIMATES II~RMAL DlSTRIBUTIOIl *
C 'I< TI IS ALYAYS POSIT!VE *
C ****************'I<1t****************it***'~1:**********************
C
3 C~LL RAND (R)
lI=P1*(-ALOG(R»**?
RmlRN
C
J,
C ************************1..**)(****11*****************************
C; * lOGNORMAl. DISTRIBUTlf'~ mnt MEAN P1, STANDARDDEVIATION p2 *
C '" A VARIP.BlE WHOSE lOCA;:IHIM rcuoes THE NORMAL PRoaA.arLITY *
C 'I< LAW 'I<
C * VARIABLE X, '( = U! x is NORI<1ALLYDf,>TRJ ~UTED, MEAN *
C * AND VARIANCE RELATE 10 Y *
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II
C '* P1 • MEAN WHICH RELATES TO THE NA1URAl 1.0G OF TilE VARIABLE *
C * P2 - STD DEVIATION WllIeH RELATES TO THE NATURAL LOG OF THE *
C * VARIABLE *
C" *
C ***;,**********"'****************'k*********,~,~k********..*********
C
C
RETURW
END
;
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C 'it P1 • fotEANWHICH RELATES TO Tim NATURAL LOG OF THE VARIABLE 'it
C 'it 1'2 • ST[; DEVIATION WHICH RElATES TO THE NATURAl. lOG OF THE 'it
C 'it V~R!ABLE 'it
C'" '"
C ***************"'*****"·**·i<***********·It*"'****.'*********, '********
C
C
RETURN
END
J
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SUBROUTINE RAND
SUBROUTINE RANt' (Z)
c
C **"',.***:!!******************"'*****"'*,~******"'*"''''''''''''''''C '"COMBINED CONGRUENTIAL RANDOM NUMBER GENERATOR '"
C '" FOR SMALL WORD SIZE AND LONG CYCLE LENGTH '"
C *************************iI'*****It***************"'*c
CALL RANl)T (W)
CALL RAH02 (X)
CALL RAN03 (Y)
c
Z = AHOO (W+X+Y,~)
C
RETURN
END
SUBROUTINE RANDl
SUBROUTINE RAWD1 (Z)
C
DOUBLE PRECISION DM,DSEED
DATA DM /30269/
OATA DSEED /5/
OSEED ~ DHOD (171*DSEED,DM)
RETURN
END
SUBROUTINE RAND2
SUBROUTINE RAND2 (Z)
C
c
DOUBLE PRECISION OM,DSEED
DATA OH/303G7/
DATA DSEEO /11/
PSEEO = DMOO (172*DSEEO.DM~
RETURK
EKO
SUBROUTINE RAND3
SUBROUTINE RAN03 (Z)
c
DOUBLE PRECISION OM,DSEEO
DATA PM /30323/
PATA OSEE!) rt/
c
D~~ED = DMOO (170"'DSEED,OM)
REWRIi
END
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SUBROUTINE TAB
SUBR~JTINE TAB(A,Fl.NT,KFREQ,lS2E,MS)
C
c ******************************~**************~***************
C * CALLED BY PROGRAM MAIN *
C * A _ TSYSF(l) IN MAIN *
C * NT • SAMPLE SIZE (NTIKE IN MAIN) *
C * SORTS DATA INTO FREQUENCY CLACSES OF SIZE FI, DETERMINES *
C * AND PRINTS RESULTING FREQUENCY AND EMPIRICAL *
C * PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTIONS *
C * E$Tr~~TES MEAN AND VARlANCE OF SAMPLES *
C *****u**************************~****************************
C
COMMON RMAXTH,RHINTM
COMMON JeRES! RES,RESQ,HTYPE
DIMENSION KFREQ(2),PN(5),ZN(5)
C
C ******************************************************
C * SORT DATA [NTO CLASSES, COMPuTE MEAN AND VARIANCE *
C ***********************************"'******************
C
IF (MS) 2,4,2
C
C ~***************************************************************
c * M~ _ CONTROL VARIABLE, ORIGINALLY SET TU 1 IN PROGRAM MAI~ *
C * AND SET AGAIN TO ZERO IN su~nOUTINE TAB *
C * THE PROGRAM ONLY PASSES THROUGH HERE ONCE THEN *
C * TO LINE 4 *
C * I S:Z.E- NUMBER OF fREQUENCY CLASSES *
C * KI _ SAMPLE SIZE 'I<
C ****k***********'1<******";******\~*************************,,*******
C
1 KFREQ(I)=O
KI=NT
c
C *******************
C * POISSON )'ABLE It'
C *********f<}:********
C
P"I(1)=2. 996
PN(2)=4_744
PN(3)=6.296
PiH4)=7.655
PN(5)=9.155
ZN(1)=.0516
ZN(2)=.3530
2N(3)"'.8168
ZN(4)=1.3651
2N(5)=1.9686
c
KOVR=O
SUH=O.
SUMSQ=O.
c
C
C *********1<***********"************************"'*********'!!******
C * A • SYSTEM FAiLURE TIME, TSYSF(I) IN PFOGRAM MAIN *
C .. Fl _ SIZE OF l~E CLASSES, FROM PROGRAM MAIN *
C * J - FREQUENCY CLASS IN WHICH THE SYSTEM FMLURE TIME FALLS *
C ***************************************************************
c
IF(J-I~~c\ 87,87,86
C
C *********>.vn".********************************"'********\~***
C 'I< Ir J IS LARGER THEN ISZE THEN GOTO 86 OTHERWISE GOTO 87 *
C 'I< CALCULATE NUMBER OF OUTLIE~S *
C ***,,*****************t-********************************,t****
C
86 KOVR~KOVR+1
99
GOTO 88
87 KfREQ(J)=KFREQ(J)+1
C
C ***************~*******************************w****************
C ....KFREQ - FREQUENCY COUNTER, EXCLUOES OVERfUll-!NUMBERS *
C * KFREQ IS RETURNED TO PROGRAM MAIN *
C * KOVR - OVERFLOW COUNT *
C * ALL SYSTEM FAILURE TIMES ARE USED TO CALCULATE SUM Alto SUMSQ 'I<
C ****************************************************************
C
88 SU~~SUM+A
SUMSQ=SUMSQfoA*A
C
C
C *******************************************************
C * KI - SAMPLE SIZE AND 1 IS SUBTRACTED EVERY TIME THE *
C * PROGRAM PASSES THROUGH HERE *
C * THE PROGRAM ONLY PASSES THROUGH HERE FOR THE LAST *
C * HISTORY (KFREQ,SUM,SUMSQ HAVE BEEN CALCULATED) •
C ****************************************************~**
C
IF(KI) 15,5,15
5 ANT=NT
C
VAR=(SUMSQ-ANT*TMEAN*TMEAN)!(ANT-1.)
51 GMA"SQRT(VAR)
C
C *******************~************************
C * TMEAN - MEAN OF SYSTEM FAX LURE TIMES *
C * VAR • VARIANCE OF SYSTEM FAILURE TIMES *
C ***************************************"''t***
C
IF(NTYPE.EQ.O) GOTO 200
C
C *******************************************'11***********
C "'****1'**,',********************************"'*******,,!Ir*~*:!r
C *******\~**************-.II~***************,,,****,,,****~,*****
C * ONLY I'lRAVAILABILITY CALCULATION *
C ***t,************J<***************************1.**********
96 I{knE(lJNIT"'3,FMT=96)!,ORMAT(/,2X, 1811AVAILAB! LITY BLOCK)
RBAR=RES/AN
RVAR=(RESQ-AN*RBAR*RBAR)/(AN-1.)
SIGM"'SQRT(RVAR) "
c
C ************'it**********t~******************
C 11 RBAR = MEAN Of SYSTEM REPAiR TIMES *
C * RVAR = VARIANCE OF SYSTEM REPAIR TIMES *
C ********************:!r*********************
C
VARN=(VAR/(TMEAN*TMEAN)+RVAR/(RBAR*RBAR»/(16.*AN)
IN=90
IT=95
SIG=SQRHVflRN)
AV1=1.284*SIG+.5
CON1=(1.-AV1)*AVAL/(AV1-2.*AV1*AVAL+AVAL)
AV2=1.645*SIG+.5
toN2=(1.-AV2)*AVAL/(AV2-2.*AV2*AVAL+AVAL)
C
WRITE(UNIT=3,FMT=97) TMEAN,SIGMA
97 FORMAT(/,2X,17HAVERAGE UPTIME •••,f10.2,
*16H SIGMA •••••• ,F1a.2)
c
WRITE(UNIT=3~FMT=98) RBAR,SIUM
98 FORMAT(2X,17HAVERAGE DNTIME •••,F10.2,
*16H ~IGMA •••••• ,F10.2,/)
C
WRITE(UNIT=3,FMT=348) AVAL,SIG
348 FORMAT(2X,22HAVERAGE AVAILABILITY ••,FS,,2,
*16H SIGMA •••••• ,F1C.2,/)
100
c
"RITE(UNIT=3,~MT~~) IN,CON1
WIUT!;(UNIT=3,FMT=99) IT,CON2
99 fORHAT(2X,3HTHE,I3,
*2811PERCl:lltr;ONFIDENCE LEVEL ••••F6.2)
C
200 CC+lTINUE
C
C ,******~'lII*oI<******":***'ir*************************"*******"'******"'**
C ******it***k***********************************'" "****************
C **************************~*************************************
C '* FIND EMPIRICAL ReLIABILITY PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION *
C ****"1,*******************************":.***",**,,,******'10"'**********
r.
5IM2::1.
c
WRITE(UNIT=3,FMT=106)
106 FORMAT(/,2X,'RELIABILITY BLOCK')
C
WRITE(UNIT=3,FMT=103) THEAII,SIGMA
103 FORMAT(/,2X,26HMEAN LIFE ••••••••••••••••• ,F10.2,/,2K,
*26HS1GMA ••••••••••••••••••••• ,F10.2)
C
WR!lE(UNIT=3,FMT=104)
104· FORMAT(/,2X,24I1RELIABILITY D!STRIBUTION,I/, 7'1.,
*4HTIME,5X,9HFREQUENCY,3X,4I1R95l,6X,4HRMLE,/)
c
eo 3 I::1,IS2E
FREQ:::KFREQ(1)
PROB=FREQ/ANi
SUH2=ABS(SUM2-PROD)
t:
C ************************************************************
C * KFREQ - NUMBER OF FAILURES IN EACH INTERVAL *
C * 50M2 - Cl~UtATIVE PROBABILITY AT THE END OF EACH *
c * INTERVAL AFtER SUBTRACTING THE PROBABLHIES *
C * FOR EACH INTERVAL *
C ************************************************************
C
ICUM=ANT*SUM2
C ************xk*************~k******************************
C * leUM • CUMULATIVE NUMBER OF SURVIVALS UP TO THIS POINT *
C * IN TIME GIVEN BY SCALE=SCALE+FI *
C ***********************************************************
C
C ****************************************
C * 95 % l.OWER CONFIDENce lHHT (NORMAL) *
c *************************** ..************
c
RL~SUH2·1.645*SQRT<SUM2*(1.·SUM2)/ANT)
c
c ************************************************************
c * 95 % LOWER CONfIDENCE LIMIT (POISSON) *
C * USED FOR THE EXTREMES, FIRST 5 AND LAST 5 FAILURES *
C ************************************************************
c
Z=.05**(1./ANT)
IF (ICUH.EQ.NT) RL=Z
IF (ICUM.EQ.O) RL=O
IF(ICUM.GT.O.AND.ICUM.LT.6) Rl.=ZN(ICUM)/ANT
11l=NT-ICUM
IF(IN.GT.0.AND.IN.LT.6) RL~1.-PN(IN)!ANT
IF (Rl.LT.D.) RL=O.
c
C
WRITE(UNIT=3, FMT=101) SCALE,KFREQ( I),RL,SUM2
101 FORMAT(2X,F10.2,6X,I4,3X,F6.3,5X,F6.3)
c
C
3 CONTINUE
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C
FOVR=KOVR
C
C **************~******.*******************k*************
C * FOVR • OVE~FLOY (ISZE AND fI ARE SELECTED BY USER) *
C *******************************************************
C
PROO=FO'JR/ANT
SIJtoI2"SUM2-PROB
c
c ***********************************************************
C * THIS IS A CHECK, SUM2 BEING THE CUMULATIVE PROBABILITY *
C * AT THE·END OF THE lAST INTERVAL WHILE PROB IS tHE *
C * 'PROBABILITY OF THE OVERFL~, SUBTRACT THE TWO *
C * AND WE SHOULD HAVE ZERO *
C ************************~******~***************************
WRITE(UNIT=3,fMT=105) KOVR,SUM2
105 FORMAT(/,2X,8HOVfRFLOW,6X,I4,16X,F6.3)
c
C
WRITE (UNlt=3,FMT=522) lSZE,FI,RMAXTM,P~iNTM
522 FORMAT (/,2X,30HNUMBER OF CLASS INTEllilAi.S••••• ,17,1,
*2X,30HCLASS INTERVAL WIDTH ••• ,••••v.,F1U.2,1.
*2X,30HMAXlMUM SYSTEM fAll.URE ":"II1E•••,F10.2,I,
*2X,30HMINlMUM SYSTEM FAILURE TIHE •••,F10.2)
RETURN
END
c
15 II
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EWS RELIABILITY SIMULATION
RAMIN - EWS
APPENDIX B
HTYPE •••OHTIME •••Sr.OON•••11KfIX ••• 1IPROB ••• 1ISZE •••12F!••• 50.0 END
ICOOE •••O LRU 110.1
KFDN ••• 1FPTR(1) •••• 8000000E+03FP'TR(2) .... OOOOOOOE+OOEIID
KRON ••• ORPTR(1)... .oaoooOO£+OORPTR{2i... .OOCOOOOE+OOEND
ICODE •••D LRU NO.2
KfDH ••• 1fPTR(1)... .2500000E+04FPTR(2)... .OOOOOOOE+OOENO
KRON ••• ORPTR(1)... .OOOOOOOE+OORPTR(2)... .OOOOOOOE+QOeND
ICODE •••O LRU NO.3
KFDH ••• 1FFTR(1)... .2500000E+04FPTR(2)... .OOOOOOOE+OOENO
KRON ••• OR?TR(1)... .0000000E+OORPTR(2)... .OOOOOOOE+OOENO
ICODE •••t U::J 110.4
KFON, •• 1fPTR(1) •••• 10000QOE+05FPTR(2) •••• 000000 ,~OOEND
KRON. •• IJRPTR(1)... •0000000E+OORPTR(2).. • .ooooooue+OOEND
leOOE •••O LkU NO.5
KfCH. •• 1fPTR (1) ••• .1 000000E+05 FPTR(2) ••• .OOOOOQOE+OOEND
KROll••• ORPTR(1).... .OOOOCOOE+OORPTR(2)... .OOOOOOOE+OOENO
ICODE •••n LRU NO.6
KfON ••• 1fPTR(1) •••• laOOOOOE+05FPTR(2) •••• OOOOOOOE+OOEND
KROll.•• CRPTR (1) ".. •OOOOOOOE-l-ODRP'rR(2)••• .0000000E+00EIi0
ICODE •••O LRU NO.7
KFON ••• 1FPTP.(1)•••• 1000000E+05FPTR(2) •••• OOOOOOOE+OOENO
KRON... ORPTR(1)... •OOOOOOOE+OORPTlH2). •• .0000000E+00EIi0
ICODE •••O LRlj110.8
KFON ••• 1FPTR(1)... .10000®E+04fPTR(2)... .tlOOOIJOOE+OOENO
KROll••• ORPTR(1)... .0000000E+OORPTR(2)... .OOOOOOOE+OOENO
ICODE •••21 LRU NO.9
KFON • •• 1fPTR(1 ) • • • •3440000E+03 FPTR I~2) • • • .00000001;+OOENO
KRDf.l...ORPTR(1}... .00000OOE+00R9fR(2)... .ilOOOOOOE+OOENO
iCOOE •••21 L~U NO.10
KFDN... 1FPTR(1).. • .3440000E+03i'PTR(,'~).•• .OOOOOOOE+OOEND
KROH... OR?T!!(1 ) • • • •OO()OOOOE+OORPTR(j~)..• .OOOOOOOE+OOEND
ICODE •••32 LRU NO."
KFDN ••• 1FPTR(1)... .6190000E+03FPTR(2).o. .OOOOOOCE+OOEND
KRON. •• ORPTR(1)... •OOOOOOOE+OORPTR (2) • • • .OOOOOOOE+OOEND
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I')
SUBROUTINE SYST - EV1S
SUBROUTINE SYST (SYSF,T,N,KST,TEMP2,NF)
c
c ******************~************************************************
C * CALLEP BY PROGR~~ MAIN
C * RETURNS THE SYSTEM fAllURE TIME (SYSF) AND NUMBER OF
C * FAiLURES PER COMPONEtlT
C *C 1< N - NUMBER OF COMPONENTS IN THE SYSTEM *
C * T - VECTOR Of COMPONENT fAILURE TIMES (FROM PROGRAM MAIN) *
C * ISYSUP - SYSTeM rUNcnON. MAY BE LARGER THAN ONE
C 1< KST - COMPONENT STATUS, '0' IS DOUN, '11 IS UP
C * TEMP2, TEMPORARY STORAGE VECTOR TO fI~~THE SYSTEM
C 1< ., FAILURE TIME
r. * TEMP1 TIME Ai WHICH THE INTERNAL STATUS OF EACH COMPONENT IS *
C * CHECKED
C * liP NUMBER OF FAILURES PER COMPQII!Eti
*.,
*
*
*
*
*
*
C ***.***********':'************************:'J; ..::************************
C
DIMENSION KST(20),TEMP2(20),T(20),NF{20)
J = 0
c
0020 I = 1,N
TEMP1 = T(I)
C
C ************************************************
C * CHECK STATUS Of EACH COMPONENT AT TIME TEMP1 *
c 1< CALCULATE SYSTEM STATUS AT TIME TEMP1 *
C * IF SYSTEM STATUS IS 0, ~rORE TIME XN TEMP2 *
C ************************************************
C
DO 30 L = 1,1«
IF (T(l).lT.TEMP1.0R.T(L).EQ.TEMP1) THEN
KST(L) = 0
ELSE
KST(L) = 1
EHDIF
30 CONTINUE
C
C *********,~***************************************************
C * ENTER THE SYSTEM FUNCTION HERE *
C 1: *
C * ISYSUP - SYSTEM STATUS. MAY BE LARGER THAN ONE *
c 1: KST(!) - COMPONENT STATUS, 0 OR 1 *
C ***********'1<*************************************"'*********1:*
C
K1=KSI(1)*KST(2)*KST(4)*KST(6)*KST(8)*KsT(9)*KST(1G)*K5T(11)
K2=KST(~)*KST(3)*KST(5)*KST(7)*KST(8)*KST(~)*KST(10}*KST(11)
ISYSUP:::K1+K2
C
IF (ISY5UP.EQ.0) THEN
J=J+1
lEMP2(J) = TEMP1
ENDIF
c
20
C
CONTINUE
c *********************************************
C * FIND SMALLEST SYSTEM TIME TO FAII.URE SYSF *
C ******1>**************************************
C
IF (J,GT.O) THEN
TEMP3 = TEMP2(1)
DO 70 I = 1,J
TEMP4 ;::TEMP2(t)
iF (TE~P4.LT.TEMP3) TEMP3;:: TEMP4
70 CONTINUE
SYSr '"TEMP3
ELSE
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WRITE (UNIT=6,FMT=90)
90 FORMAT ('UkABLE TO RETURN SYSTEM FAILURE TIME TO PROGRAM MAIN')
STOP
ENOl!'
c
C ***"*********************.,,"***"'**********'~**"'*****C '"CALCULATE NUMBER OF FAILURES PER COHPON~NT NF '"
C *************************************************'"
C
DO 200 I = 1,11
IF (T(I).LT.SYSF.OR.T(I).EQ.SYSf) NF(I) ~ NF(I)+1
200 CONTINUE
C
RETURN
EIIO
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R.Al\10UT - EWS
RU~ NO. 1
\ INPUT BtOCK
TYPE OF RUM (O.1.OR 2).0 •••••••••••••••••••••••••••
REQUIRED HUMBER Or SIMULATED SYSTEM FAIlURES •••••• o
NUMBER OF COMPONENTS IN THE SYSTEM •••••••••.•••••••
REPAIR SPECIFICATION (1,2 OR 3) ••••••••••••••••••••
NUM8ER OF CLASS INTERVALS FOR RELiABILITY CAlC •••••
CL~SS INTERVAL WIDTH ••••••••• , .
o
5000
11
1
12
50.00
COM? NO. 1 ICODE •• 0
KFi>N •• 1 FPTR(n •• •80CQOOOE+03, FPTR(2) •• .OOOOOUOE+OO
KRDN •• 0 RPTR(1) •• .OOOOOOOE+OO RPTR(2) •• " .OOOOOOOE+OO
COMP~O. 2 ICODE •• 0
KFDN •• 1 FPTR(1) •• .2SIJOl)(JtIE+C4FPTR(2) •• .OOOOOOOE+OO
KRON •• a RPTR(1) •• .00000001:+00 RPTR(Z) •• .OOOOOOOE+I)O
COM? NO.3 ICOOE •• 0
"FON •• 1 FPTR(1} •• .2S\)000O~+04 FPrR(2) •• .OOOOOOOE+OO
KRON ••r !) RPTR(1) •• .00000001.,,00 RPTR(2) •• .OOOOOOOE+OO
COMP NO.4 ICOOE •• 0
KFON •• 1 FPTR(1) •• .100000tit+OS FPTrI.;:2)•• .OOOOOOOE+OO
KRDN •• 0 RPTR(1) •• .0000OO(!F+l.)dRFTR(2) •• .OOOOOO!)E+OO
CCi!~PNO.5 ICOOE •• 0
KFDll•• 1 FPTR(1) •• •1000000E+05 FPTR(2) •• .OOOOOOOE+OO
KROll•• 0 RPTR(1) •• •OQO(!OOOE+OO R?TRC?) •• .OOOOOOOE+QO
COMP NO.6 [CODE •• 0
KFON •• 1 fPTR(1 j •• •1~00OOE+05 FPTR(2) •• .OOOOOOOE+OO
KROll•• 0 RPTR(1) •• .OOOOOOOE+OO RPTR(2) •• .OOOCtOOOE+OO
COMP NO.7 ICODE •• 0
KFDN •• 1 FPTR(1) ,. •,OOOQPOE+05 FPtR(2) •• .000Oi)OOc+OO
K~DN •• 0 RPTR(1) •• .0000000£':+00 RPTR(2} •• .00O(,!'lnnFoIo"ll
COMP NO. a ICODE •• 0
KFDN •• 1 FPTR(1) •• .1000000E+04 FPTR(2) •• .OOOOOOOE+OO
KRDN •• 0 RPTR(1) •• •OOOOOOOE+OO RPTR(2) •• .OOOOOOOE+OO
COMP NO.9 ICOOE ••21
KFDN •• 1 FPTR(1) •• .3440000E+03 FPTR(2) •• .OOOOOOOE+OO
KRDN •• 0 RPTR(1) •• .(lOOOOOOE+OO kPTR(2) •• .OOOOOOOE+OO
COMP NO.10 ICODE ••21
KfON •• 1 FPTR(1).. .3440000E+03 fPTR(2).. .OOOOOOOE+OO
KRON •. 0 RPTR(1).. .OOOOOOOE+OO RPTR(2).. .OOOOOOOE+OO
COM? NO.11 ICOOE•• 32 ,
KFON •• 1 FPTR(1)., .6190000E+03 FPTR(2) ••• OOOOOOOE+OO
KRON •• 0 RPTR(1).. .OOOOOOQE+OO ~PTR(2).. .OI)OOOGOE+OO
OUTPUT BLOCK
RELIABItIT'{ BLOCK
MEAN LIFE •••••••••••••••• ,
SIGMA •••••••••••••••••••••
RELIABilITY DISTRIBUTION
169.05
127.20
TIME FREQUENCY R95L
7435 .835
RMlE
.843
106
100.00 959 .640 .651
150.00 877 .464 .476
200.00 769 .311 .322
250.00 541 .20~. .214
300.00 347 .1S~i .1.44
35C.00 259 .086 ,·ll93
400.00 171 .OS~ .ese
450.00 103, .033 .038
500.00 77 .019 .022
550.00 46 .011 .013
600.00 22 .007 .009
OVERfLOIJ 44 ,(lOO
HUM!lER Of CL~SS INTERVAlS ..... 12
CLASS INTERVAL WIDTH •••••••••• 50.00
MAXIMUM SYSTEM FAILURE TIME ••• 921.03
MINIMUM SYST~M FAILURe T!ME ••• .07
FAILURE BLOCK
':;OOPONE!H NO. NlJIiIBF.ROF FAILURES
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
1G
11
1050
331
31,)
73
89
91
70
881
1000
1033
986
i
J
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APPENDIX C
SHUTTLE COMPUTER SY~~TEMRELIABILITY SIMULATION
RAMIN - CONFIG 1
HTYPE •••ONTIME •••5000H ••• 4KFI~ ••• 1IPR08••• 1ISZE ••• 8FI... 1.0 EHO
It;OOF. ... O lRlJ NO.1
~·1 KFl1N.... 1 FPTR( 1)... • 1500000e"'01fPi~(2) II.. ..OOOOOOOE+OOENO
KReN ••• ORPTR(1)... .OOOOOOOE+OORPTR(2}... .OOOOOOOE+OOEUD
ICOl)E ... O lRIJ NO.2
KFDN ••• 2FPTR(1) •••• 6000000E+01FPTR(2) •••• 1500000E+01ENO
KRON... ()RPiR(1) •• • •OOOOOOOE+O 1RPTl1(2)• • • •(lOOO(JOOE+OOENT>
ICODE •••O lRU NO.3
KFON ••• 1fPTR(1)... .1COOOOOE+02FPlk(2)... .OOOOOOOE+COEND
KRDN... ORPTR( 1).•• •OOOOO(lOE+OORPTP(2). •• .OOOOOOOE+OOEtlO
ICOO~•••O lRU NO.4
KFON ••• 1FPTR(1)... .8400000E+01FPTR(2)... •DOOOOOOE+OOENO
~RDN ••• ORPiR(1)... .OOOOOOOE+OORPTR(2)... .OOOOOOOE+OOENO
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SUBROUTINE SYST - CONFIG J.
SUBROUTINE SYST (SYSF,T,N,KST,TEMP2,NF)
C "C ************************~'~***********'~********w*****"'*************
C * CALL-T:DBY PROGRAM MAIN \
C * RETURI.S THE SYSTEM FAILURE TIME (SYSF) AND NUMBeR OF
C * FAILURES PER COMPONENT \
C '"C * N - NUMBER OF COMPONENTS IN THE SYS1EM
C * T • VECTOR Of COMpe~ENT FAILURE TIMES (FROM PROGRAM MAIN) *
C * lSYSUP - SYSTEM fUNCTION, MAY BE LAP.GER THAN ONE '"
C * KST - COHPONENi SYATUS, '0' IS OOWN, '1' IS UP
C * lEMP2 • TEMPORARY StORAGE VECTOR TO FIND THE SYSTEM
C 'to FAILURE !fME *
C '" TEMP1 - TIME AT WHICH THE INTERNAL STATUS OF EACH COMPONENT IS *
C * CHECKED
C * NF - NUMBER or FAILURES PER COMPCHENT
*
*..
'"*
*
"
*
'*c "'***************************"'**************************************
C
DIMENlION K~T(20),TEMP2(20),T(20),Nr(20)
J :::0
c
DO 20 I '" 1,N
TEMP1 = T(I)"
C
C *************,,,"->.,,,*,,******************,,,******..,***
C * CHECK STATUS OF EACH co, :F-ONENT AT TIME TEMP1 *
C '"CALCULATE SYSTEM STATUS AT TIME TEMP1 *
C * IF SY$TEM STATUS IS 0, ~TORE TIME IN TEMP2 *
C *****It******************'''***********************
C
DO 30 L '" 1,N
IF (T(L).LT.TEMP1.0R.T(l).EQ.TEMP1) THEN
KSHL} e 0
ELSE
KST(L) '"1
ENDIF
30 CONTINUE
C
C **********k**********************************************,~***
C * ENTER T~E SYSTEM FUNCTION HERE *
C * *C * lSYSUP - SYSTEM STATUS, MAY BF LARGER THAN CNi *
C * KST(l) - COMPONENT STATUS, 0 OR 1 *
C *************~***********************************************
c
c
ISYSUP = KST(1)*KST(2~*KST(=)*KST(4)
IF (ISYSUP.EQ.O) THEN
J=J+1
TEMP2( J) = TEI~P1
ENDlF
C
20 CONTINUE
C
C ************w*************~******************
C * FIND SMALLEST SYSTEM TIME TO FAILURE SYSf *
C *****************w***************************
C
,
j
IF (J.GT.O) THEN
TEMP3 = TEMP2(1)
DO 70 1 = 1,J
TEMP4 :::TEMP2{I)
IF (TEMP4.LT.TEMP3) TcMP3 '"TEMP4
70 CONT!NUE
SYSF :::TEMP3
ELSE
WRITE (UNIT~6,FMr=90)
90 fORHAT ('UNABLE TO RETURN SYSTEM FAILlJRE TIME TO PROGRAM MAIN')
STOP
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ENDlF
C
C ******'~******il'*k"'******.***********"**************
C '" CALCULATE NUMBER OF FAILURES PER COMP0!4EIIT NF *
C ******0\*******,,*****************************11<*****
C
DO 200 r ;: 1,11
IF (T(I).LT.SYSF.O~:"(I).EQ.SYSf) IIf(l) ;: NFCI)+1
200 CONrINUE
C
RETURN
END
1
j
I
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RAMOUT - CON FIG 1
RUN NO.
lNPUT BLOCK
TYPE OF RUN (0,1,OR 2) •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
REQUl~ED NUMBER OF SIMULATED SYSTEM FAILURES •••••••
NUMBER OF CQilIPONENTSIII THE ~YSn:M .
REPAIR SPECIFICATION <1,2 OR 3) •••••••••••••• ~ .
NUMBER O.F CLASS INTERVALS FOR RELIAI.IILlTVCALC ..
CLASS INTf.RVALWIDTH •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
o
5000
4
1
8
1.00
COMP NO. 1 ICooE•• 0
KFDN •• 1 rPTR(1) •• •7500000E+01 FP1'R(2)•• .ODOQOOOE+OO
KRDIl•• I) RPTR(1) •• •COOOOOOE+OO RPTR(2) •• .OOOOOOOE+O()
COMP NO.2 ICOOE•• 0
_/c
, KFDN •• 2 FPTR(1) •• .60001100E+01 FPTR(2) .. .1500000 ·;11
KRDN •• 0 RP'fR(1).. .OOOODOOE',OC RPTR(l) •• .0000000.' 'I}
COHP NO.3 ICOOE•• 0
KFON •• 1 FPTR(1) •• •1000000E+02 FPTR(2) •• .OOOOOOOE+OO
KROll•• 0 RPTR(1) •• •OOOOOOOE+O:J RPTR(2) •• .OOQOOOOE+OO
COMP NO.4 If-ODE•• 0
KFDN •• 1 FPTR(1} •• •8400000E+01 FPTR(2) •• .OOOOOOOE+OO
KRD14 .. 0 RPTR(1) .. •OOOOOOOE+OO RPTR(2) •• .OOOOOOOE+OO
OUTPUT BLOCK
RELIABILITY BLOCK
MEAN LIFE................. 2.44
SIGMA..................... 1.94
RELIABILITY DISTRIBUTION
TIME FREQUENCY ~95L
1.00 1504 .689
2.00 1013 .4~5
3.00 771 ~331
4.00 582 .216
5.00 482 .122
6.00 361 .052
7.00 196 .015
8.00 71 .003
OVERFLOW 20
RMLE
.699
,497
.342
.226
.130
.057
.018
.004
.000
Ii
!lUMBEROF CLASS iNTERVALS..... 8
CLASS INTERVAL ~IIDTH.......... 1.00
MAXIMUM SYSTEH FAILURE TIME... 10.28
MINIMUM SYSTEM FAILURE TIME... .00
FAILURE BLOCK
COMPONENT NO. NUMBER OF FAILtJRES
1
2
3
4
1659
676
1189
1476
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RAMIN - CONFIG 2
NTYFE •••QNTIME •••5000N ••• 6KFIX ••• 1IPROB ••~ 2ISZE •••10FI... 1.0 END
lCOOE ... O lRU NO.1
KFDN ••• 1FPTR(1)... .8400000E+Q1FPTR(2)... .OOOOOOOE+OGEND
KRO~ ••• OkPTR(1)... .OOOOOOOE+OORPTR(2)... .OOOOOOOE+OOEND
ICOOE ...O lRU NO,2
KfON ••• 1FPTR(1) •••• 8400000E+01f?TR(Z) •••• OOOOOOOE+OOENO
KROll••• ORPTR(1)... .OOOOOOOE+OORPTR(Z}... .OOOOOOOE+OOEND
ICODE •••O lRU NO.3
KFDN ••• 1FPTR(1}... .1000000E+02FPTR(2)... .OOOOOODE+OOEND
KRON ••, ORPTR(1)... .OOOOOOOE+OORPTR(2)... .oOOOOnOE+OOEND
ICOOE •••O lRU NO.4
KFDlI.,. 1FPTR(1).. • •100000UE+02FPTR(2)... .ODOOOOOE+OOEND
KROH •••,ORPiR(1)... .OOOOOOOE+OORPTR(2)... .OOOOOOOE+OOEND
ICOOE •••21 LRU NO.5
KFOM ••• 2FPTR(1)... .6000000E+01fPTR(2)... •1500000E+O'ENO
KROll••• ORPTR(1)... .OOOOOOOE+OORPTR(2)... .OOOCOOOE+OOENO
ICODE •••Z1 lRU NO.6
KFDN ••• 1~PTR(1)... .7S00000E+01FPTR(2)... .OOOOOOOE+OOEND
KRDN ••• ORPTR(1)... .OOOOOOOE+OORPTR(2)... .OOOOOOOE+OOEND
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J()
SUBROUTINE SYST - CONFIG 2
(ONLY THE RELEVANT SECTION OF THE PROGRAM IS SHOWN)
c
C ******~********************************.*******7******k*****
C * ENTER THE SYSTEM FUNCTION l~ERE ~
C* *C 'It ISYSUP - SYST~M STATUS. MAY BE LARGER THAN ONe *
c 'It KST{l) - COMPONENT STATUS, 0 OR 1 *
C *******lrlr**'Il,~*...*,,*******It****"********iI******'Il*******'k******
C
C
ISYSUP = KST(1)*KST(3)*KST(5)*KST(6)+
QKST(2}*KST(4)*KST(5)*KST(6)
IF (ISYSUP.EQ.O) TH~N
J=J+1
TEMP2(J) = TEMPl
EIiDIF
20 CONTINUE
CC *****11*'1<+,,***************************,~*******
C " FINLI Sf.IIAlLESl' SYSTEM TIM~ TO FAILURE SYSf 1<
C ******"'****"'*"*""**************>'i*************
C
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RAMODT - CONFIG 2
RUN NO. 2
IIIPUT B!'.OC:C;:
TYPE OF RUN (O,1.OR 2)•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
REQUIRED NUMBER OF SIMULATED SYSTEM l'tllWRES .
NUMBER OF COMPOHEHTS IN THE SYSTEM •••••••••••••••••
REPMR SPFCHICATIOH (1,2 OR 3) ••••••••••••••••••••
HUMBER Or CLASS INTERVALS FOR RELIABILITY CALC •••••
Cl.ASS INTERVAL WIDTH ,
o
5000
6
1
10
1.00
COMP NO. 1 IC~)E •• 0
KFON •• 1 FPTR(1 l.. •8400000E+01 FPTR(2) •• .OOCOOOOE+OO
KRON •• 0 RPTR(1) •• •OOOOOOOE+OO RPTR(2~ • .0OOOOOOE+0l)
CDHP NO.2 lCODE.,. 0
KFDN •• 1 FPTR(1) •• .8400000E+01 FPTR(2) •• .OOOOOOOE+OO
KRDM •• 0 RPTR(1) •• .OOOOOOOE+OO RPrR(2) •• .OOOOOOOE+OO
COMP NO.3 ICODE •• 0 (
KFDN •• 1 FPTR(1) •• •1000000E+02 l't- •.• (2) •• .OOOOOOOE+OO
KREUl•• (} RPTR(1) •• .OOOOOOO!O+OO RPfR(2) •• .OOOOOOOE+OO
COM? NO.4 ICODE •• 0
((FON.. 1 FPTR(l) •• .10GO(1)OE+02 FPTR(2) •• .OOOOOOOE+OO
KRON. Q RPTR(1) •• .OOOOOOOE+QO RP1R(2) •• •QOQOOOOE+OO
COMP NO.5 ICOOE ••21 i;'::'--::':"'.",.;_,._
KFDN •• 2 FPTR(1) •• .600GOOOE+1)1 FPTR(2) •• .1500000~t01
KR!'JN •• 0 RPTR(1) •• .O()OOOOOE+OO RPTR(2) •• .OOOOOOOEi\1°
"
COMP NO.6 ICOOE ••21
KFliN•• 1 FPTR(1) •• .7500000::+01 .OOOQOOOE+OO
KI(ON •• 0 RPTR(1) •• .OOOOOOOE+OO P' .OOOOOOOE+OO
CllTPUT qLOCK
RELIABILITY BLOCK
H~AN LIFE................. 4.25
stGMA ...... , ••••••••••• ••• 2.1?
RELIABILITY DISTRIBUnON
OM!: fREQUENCY P.9!rl
1.00 254 .944
2.00 638 .813
3.00 745 .662
4.00 692 .523
5.0Ci 716 .360
6.00 763 .228
7.00 659 .098
B.OO l60 .029
9.013 138 .004
10.QO 26 .000
OVERFlO!I I;
RHI.E
.949
.822
.613
.534
.391
.237
.106
.034
.006
.001
.000
NUMBE:K 'JFCLASS 1;'::r.RVAlS.•••• 10
CLASS iNTERVAL WIDTH.......... 1.00
MAXIMUM SYSTEM FAIl.URE TIME... 10.6'2
MINIMUM SYSTEM FAILURE TII"E... .08
FAILURE 8LOCK
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CO/oIPONENT NO.
1
2
3
4
5
6
Q
~Uf.1BER OF FAILURES
2127
2133
1856
1816
1307
1152
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RAMIN - CONFIG 3
NTYPE •••ONTIME •••~OOON ••• 4KFIX ••• 1IPROB ••• 3ISZE ••• BFr... 1.0 END
ICOOE ...O LRU NO.1
KfON ••• 1FPTR(t) ••• ' .8400000E+01FPTR(2)... .OOOOOOOE+OOENO
KRON ••• ORPTR(1)... .GOOOOOOEtOORPTR(2)... .OOOOOOOE+OOEND
!CClDE•••32 LRU NO.2
KfDH... 1FPTR(1)... •1000000E+02FPTR(2)... .OOOOOOOE+GOEND
KRON ••• ORP!R(1) •••• OOOOOOOE+01RPTR(2) •••• OOOOOOOE+OOEND
lCODE •••32 LRU NO.3
KFDN ••• 2FPTR~i~, ••• 6000000E+G1FPTR(?) •••• 1500000E+01ENO
KROll.•• ORP«R (1) : __ ..' OOOOOOOi:+OORPTR(2). •• .OOOCOOOE+OOENO
JCOOE •••O ~ lRU NO.~
KFDM... 1FPTR( 1). •• •7500()QOE+O'l!:P7iH2)..• .OOOOOOOE+OOEWO
KROll... ORPTR(1)... .OOOO::JOOE+fJOPPTR(2)... .OOOOOOOEiOOENl.l
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SUBROUTINE SYS:T- CONFIG 3
(ONLY THE RELEVANT SECTION OF TIIEPROGRAM IS SHO\VN)
c
c ***********************~*************************************
C * ENTER THE SYSTEM FUNCTION HERE *
C'* '"C * ISYSUP - SYSTEM STATUS, MAY BE' LARGER THAN ONE '*
r. * KST(I) - CoMPONENT STATUS, 0 OR ~ *
C *************************************************************
C
c
ISYSUP = KST(1)*KST(2)*KST{3)*KST(4)
IF (ISYSUP.EQ.O} THEN
J=J+1
TEMP2(J) = TEHP1
END IF
C
20 CONTINUE
C
C ********±****************~*******************
C * FIND SHALlES-', SYSTEM TIME TO FAILURE SYSF *
C ******,,*******'I't*****************************
C
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RMJOUT - CONFIG 3
RUN flO. 3
INPUT BLOCK ( 1
TYPE OF RUN (O,1,OR 2) •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
REQUIRED NUMBER OF SIMULATED SYSTEM FAILURES•••••••
NUMBER OF COMPONENTS IN THE SYSTEH •••••••••••••••••
REPAIR SPECIfICATiON (1,2 ~x 3)•••••••••••..•••.•••
NIl4BEROF CL.ASS INTeRVALS FOR RELIABILITY CAlC••".
CLASS iNiERVAl ~IDTH •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
o
5COO
4
1
a
1.00
COMP NO. 1 ICooE •• 0
KFON .. 1; , FPTR(1) •• .84001)00E+01 FPTR(2),. .OOOOOOOE+OO
KRDN" ,,?' RPTR(1) •• .0000000£+00 RPTR(2) .. .0000000£+00
COMP NO.2 lCooE ••32
KFON •• 1 F?TR(1) •• .10oo000E+02 FPTR(2) •• .OO()OOOOE+OO
KROll•• 0 RPTR(1) •• •00OOOOOE+0l} RPTR(2) •• .0000000E+00
COMP NO.3 ICooE••32 (,'\
KFON •• 2 Fir'I'R(1)•• .6000000E+01 FPTR(2) •• •1500000E+01
KRON •• 0 RPTR(1) •• .OOOOOOOE+OO RPTR(2) •• .OOOOOOOE+OO
COMP NO.4 lCooE•• 0
KFON •• 1 FPTR(1) •• •7500000E~01 FPTR(2) •• .OOOOOOOE+(;.)
KRDN .. 0 RPTR(1).~ .0(,00000£+00 RPTR(2) •• .OOOOOOOE+OO
OUTPU r BLOCK
~ElIABIlITY BLOCK
MEAN LIFE................. 2.65
SIGM~..................... 1.90
RELIAB1lITY DrSTRIBUTION
TIME FREQUENCY RgSL
1.00 1191 .752
2.00 1042 .542
3.00 859 .370
4.00 617 .248
5.00 552 .140
6.00 437 .055
7.00 240 .010
8.00 52 .001
OVERFLOW 10
NUMBER OF CLASS INTERVALS •••••
CLASS I~TERVAL WIDTH ••••••••••
MAXIMUM SYSTEM FAIWRE TIMF.•••
MINIMUM SYSTEM FAIUJRE TIME •••
FAILURE BLOCK
COMPONENT NO. NUMBER OF FAILURES
1
2
3
4
1593
954
675
1nf.s
RMlE
.762
.553
.382
.258
.148
.060
.012
.002
.OGO
8
1.00
9.00
.00
'I
'II
11S
RAMIN - CONFIG 4
NTVPE •••ONTIME •••5000H ••• 4KFIX ••• 1IPRoe ••• 4ISZE •••15FI.,.
lCOCE •••O lRU NO.1
KFDN. •• 1FPTR (1) ., - .8400tlOOE+01FPTr(Z) • • • .OOOOOOOE+OOENi)
KRD~••• ORPTR(1)... .COOOOOOE+OORPTk(2)... .OOOOOOOE+OOCHD
ICOOE •••·3 LRU NO.2
KFDH••• lFPTR(1)... .10~~OOOE402FPTR(2)... .OOOOOOOE+OOEND
KROlL". ORPTR( 1)... .COOOOOOE+OMPTR(2).. • .OOOOOOOE+OOEND
ICcPe •••-3 LRU NO.3 -
KFDN ••• 2FPTR(1) •••• 6000000E+01FPTR(2) •••• 1500000E+01E~~
KRDN ••• ORPT~(1)._~ .OOOOOOOE+OORPTR(2)... .OOOOOOOE+OOEND
IC(fjE ••• O LRU NO ...
KFON... , FPTR (1) • •• •7500000E+01 FP'l"R(2)••• .OOOOOOOE+OOEND
KlJbN.•• ORflTR(1)... •OOOOOOOE+QORPTR (2~. .. .OOOOOOOE+OOEND
i'':'
\\
l.r: 2ND
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SUBROUTINE SYST - CONFIG 4
(ONLY THE ~ELEVANT SECTION OF 1T~\:IEPROGRAM rs SHOWN)
II "II '
C
C *************************",**.,***,,***ft+>******~******"'****",.,,,,**C 1< eUTER THE SYSTEM FUNCTION HERt:' '"
C '" '"C * ISYSUP - SYSTEM STATUS, MAY BE LARGER THAN ONE '"
C * 1(5TO) - COMPCNENi STATUS, 0 OR 'I *
C *********'.,,*********************"'************************** ....
C
C
ISYSlJP = l{SH 1)"KST(2}"J(ST(3)*KST(~)
IF ('SYSUP.fQ.O) THEN
J=J+1
TEMP2(J) ,;6 TEM!'1
ENDH
C
20 COIITI NUE;
C
c *******************************~*************
C * FIND SMALLEST SYSTEMTIME TO FAILURE SYSF *
C *********************************************
C
, ', I
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RAMour - CONFIG4
RUN NO. 4
INPUT BWCK
qYPE OF RUN {O,1,OR 2) •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
REQUIRED !'UMBER OF SIMULATED SYSTEM FAILURES •••••••
HUMBER Of COMPONENTS I~ THE SYSTEH •••••••••••••••••
RE~AIR SPEC'FICATION (1,2 OR 3)••••••••.•••••••••••
NL~BER OF CLASS INTERVALS FOR RELIABILITY CtlC •••••
CLASS INTERVAL WIOTH •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
o
5000
4
1
15
1.00
COMP NO.1 ICOOE •• 0
f:FDN•• 1 FPTR(1).. .8400000E+D1 FPTR(?).. .OOODO(lOE+OO
KRON .. 0 RPTR(1).. .OOOOOOOE+CO RPTR(2).. .OOOO(}!)OE+OO
COMP 11(1. ;: [CCOE. 0-3
KFDII .. 1 FPTR(1} •• .1000000f'+02 fPl'R(2)•• .OOOO;)OOE+OO
KRON •• 0 RPTP.(1)•• .OOOOOOOE+OO RPTR(2) •• .OOOCOOOE+OO
COMP 110. 3 rCOOE ••-;)
KFDN •• 2 FPTI«1) •• .6000COCE+01 FPTR(2) •• •1500000E+01
KROll•• 0 RPTR(1) •• •OOOOOOOE+OO RPTR(2) •• .00nOOOOE+00
COMP NO.4 ICOOE•• 0
:<1'014 •• 1 FPTR(1) •• •75000I)OE+01 FPTR(2) •• .DOOOOOOE+OO
~:i?DN•• 0 RPTR(1) •• •OOOOOOOE+OO RP1R(2) •• .OOO()OOOE+OO
OUTPUT BLOCK
RELIABILITY BLOCK
MEAN lIFE ••••••••••••••••• 3.83
SIGMA •••••••••••••••••• .. 3.60
RELIABILITY DISTRI13UTIOII
1.:<!E !'REtlUEIlC'fR95L RHLE
1.00 1082 .774 .784
2.00 875 .597 .6093.M 734 .450 .462
...00 531 .3/.4 .356
5..00 400 .265 .276
6.00 316 .203 .212
7.00 239 .156 .165
H.OO 195 .118 .126
9.00 136 .091 .098
10.00 112 .070 .076
11.00 87 .053 .059
1l.00 82 .038 .042
13.00 48 .028 .033
14.f.O 42 .021 .024
15.00 39 .013 .016
Ol/ERFLQI.I 82 .000
NUMBER OF CLASS INTERVAlS ••••• 15
CLASS INTERVAL YIDTH •••••••••• 1.00
HAXI~UM SY~)EMFA1LURE TIME ••• 21.'73
MiNIMUM SYSTEM FAILURE TIME ••• .CO
FAILURE IJLOCK
COMPONdH NO. NUMB~R 0: FAILURES
2293
121
2
3
113
47
2547
1\
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RAMIN - CONFIG 5
HTYPE •••ONTIME •••5000N ••• 7KFiX ••• 1IPROB ••• 515ZE ••• 7FI •••
lCQOE •••31 lRU NO.1
KFDN ••• 2FPTR(1) •••• 6000000E+01FPTR(2) •••• 1500000E+01END
~DN ••• OR?TR(1)... .OOOOOOOE+OORPTR(2)... .OOOOOOOE+OOEND
ICOOE •••31 lRU NO.2
KFDN ••• 1FPTR(1)... .100000GE+02fPTR(2)... .OOOOOOO~+OOENa
KRDN ••• ORPfR(1)... .OOOOOOOE+OORPTR(2)... .oooooodE~OOEND
IC~E •••O LRU NO.3
KFDN ••• 1FPTR(1)... .8400000E+01FPTR(2)... .OOOOOOOE+OOEND
KRDN... ORPTR('I)... .GOOOOOOE+OORPTR(2)... .OOOOOOOE+OOEND
ICODE •••O LRU NO.4
KFDN ••• 1FPTR(1) •••• 1000000E+02FPTR(2) •••• OOOOOOOE+OOEND
KRPN ••• ORPTR(1)... .OOOOOOOE+OORPTR(2)... .OOOOOOOE+OOE~D
ICODE •••O LRU NO.5
KFDN ••• 2FPTR(1) •••• 6000000E+01FPTR(2)., •• 1500000f~01ENO
KRDN ••• ORPTR(1)... .OOOOOOOE+QORPTR(2)... .OOOOOOOE+OOEND
ICODE •••O lRU N~.6
KFDN ••• 1FPTR(1)... .8400000E+01FPTR(2)... .OOOOOOOE+ODEND
KRDH ••• ORPTR(1) •••• OOOOOOOE+OORPTR(2) •••• OOOOOOOE~OOEND
iCOOE •••O LRU NOo7
KFDN ••• 1FPTR(1)... .75QOOOOE+01FPTR(2)... .OOODOOOE+OCEND
KRDN. •• ORPTR (1) • .. •OJI31"1000E+OORPTR(2) •.. .OOOOOOOE+OOEND
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1.0 EIlD
SUBROUTINE SYST - CONFIG 5
(ONLY THE RELEVANT SECfION OF THE PROGRAM IS SHOWN)
e
c .**********************************************~*************
C * EHTER THE SYSTEM FUUCT10N HERE *
C * *C .,.ISYSUP • SYSTEM STATUS. MAY BE LARGER THAN ONE ."
C * KST(I) • COMPONENT STATUS, 0 OR 1 *
C III'**III'**"'III'**III'III'*****III'***'l**,,*III'**"'*****III'***"'III'III'***III'*III'*III'lIiIII'III'********
C
ISYSUP~KST(1)*KSr(2)*KST(3)*KST(4)*KSr(5)*KST(6)*KST{7)
c
IF (ISYSUP.EQ.O) THEN
J=J+1
TEMP2(J) ::TEMP1
EIIDIF
c
20 CONTINUE
C
C ***~******************** ...**"'********#:'"*******
C ." FIND SMALLEST SYSTEM TIME TO FAILURE SYSF *
C ***************"****-It"'*****************1***~*
C
\1
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R.At\.10UT - CONFIG 5
RUN HO. 5
INPUT Bl-OCK
TYPE OF RUN (O,~.OR 2)•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
REQUIRED NUMBER OF SiMULAT~O SYSTEM FAIlURES ••••,••
NUMBER Of COMPONENTS IN THE SYSTEM •••••••••••••••••
REPAIR SPECiFICATION (1,2 OR 3)••••••••••••••.•••••
NUMBER OF CLASS INTERVALS FOR RELIABILITY C,'lC•••••
CLASS HITERVAL WIOTH .
o
5000
7
1
7
1.00
COMP NO. 1 ICOOE ••3'
KFDN •• 2 t'PTR(1)•• .6000000E+01 FPTR(2} •• .1500000E+01
KRDN .. 0 RPTR(1) •• •OOOOOOOE+OO RPTR(2) •• .OOOOOOOE+OO
COMP NO.2 ICOOE ••31
KFON •• 1 FPTR(1) .. .10000001'::+02FPTR(2) •• .0000000£+00
KRON .. 0 RPTR(1) •• .OOOOOOOE+OO RPTR(2) .. .0000000';:-00
COMP NO.3 ICODE•• 0
XFDH .. 1 - FPTR(1) •• .8400000E+01 fPTR(2) .. .OQOOOOOE+OO
KRON •• 0 RPTR(n •• .OOOOOOOE+OO RPTR(2} •• .0000000£+00
COMP NO.4 lCooE •• 0
KFON •• 1 FPTR(1) •• .1000000£+02 fPTR{2) ••
KRON •• 0 RPTR(1) .. .OOOOOOOE+OO R~TR(2)."
COMP NO. 5 ICOD~ •• 0
KFD~•• 2 FPTR(1) •• .6000000E+01 FPTR(2) ..
KRON .. 0 RPTR(1} •• .OOOOOOOE+OO RPTR(2) ..
COMP NO.6 ICOVE•• 0
KfON •• 1 fPTR(1) ., •8400000E+01 FPIR(2) ••
KROM •• 0 RPTR(1) •• .0OOOOOeE+QO RPTR(2) ••
COMP NO.7 IGODE •• 0
KfON •• 1 FPTR(1) •• •7500000E+01 FPTR(2) ..
KRON .. 0 RPT':(1)•• .OOOOOCOE+OO RPTR(2) ••
.0000000::+00
.CDOOOOOE+OO·
•1500000E+01
.OOOOOOOE+OO
.OOOOOOOE+OG
.OOCOODOE",OO
.OOOOOOOE+OO
.OOC1l000E+(i0
OUTPUT BLOCK
RELIABILITY BLOCK
MEAN LIFE............... •.• 1.95SIGMA..................... 1.66
RELIABILITY DISTRIBUTION
TIME FREOUENCY R95L
1.00 1869 .615
2.00 1143 .386
3.03 821 .224
4.00 4~1 .129
5.00 365 .058
~.OO 199 .021
7.00 93 .004
OVERFLOW 29
RMlE
.626
.398
.233
.137
.064
.024
.006
.000
NUMBER OF CLASS INTERVALS..... 7
CLASS INTERVAL WIDTH.......... 1.00
IIAXIMi.lMSYSTEM FAILURE TIME... 8.25
MINIMUM SYSTEri FAILURE TIME... .00
fAILURE BLOCK
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CIJIoIPOliENT NO.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
NUMBER OF fAILURES
66
79
')169
946
~~20
1155
1265
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RAMIN - CONFIG 6
NTYPE, ••O~TIME •••'OOQN ••• 7KfJX ••• 1IPROB ••• 61SZE •.• 1FI •••
!COOE•••-3 lRU NO.1
KfON ••• 2FPTR(1) •••• 60GOOOOE+01FPTR(2) •••• 1500000E+01EHD
KRaH ••• ORPT~(1)... .OOOCOOOE+OORPTR(2)... .O~COOOOE+OOEND
'CODE •••-3 lRU NO.2
KFOIl... 1I'PTR(1)... .1000000E+02FPTR(2)... .OOOOr.lOOE+OOEND
KRON ••• ORPiR(1)... .OOOOOOOE+OGRPTR(2)... .OOOOOOOE+OOENO
reODE •••O lRU NO.3
KFON... 1FPTR(1)... .8400(l1;l"J:C·41 FPTR(2). •• .OOCOOOO:+OOEND
KRON ••• ORPTIH7>... .OOCCO(', jORP'jR(2)... ,COOOOOOE+OOEliD
ICODE •••O lRU NO.4 '
KroON... 1FPTR(1). •• •10CIOOOOE+02FPTR(2). •• .OOOOOOOE+OOEND
KRON ••• ORPTR(1)... .0300000E+OORPTR(2)... .ODOOCOOE+OOENO
IeODE•••O lRU NO.5
KFDN ••• 2FPTR(1} •••• 6000000E+01FPTR(2) •••• 1500000E+01EHD
KRDN. •• ORPTR(1)... •OOOOOOOE+OORi)TR(2). •• •OOOOOOOE+OOE~O
rOODE•••O lRU NO.6
KfDN ••• 1FPTR(1)... .8400000E+01fPiR{2~... .OOOOOOOE+OOENO
KRDN ••• ORPTR(1)... .OOOOOODE+OORPTR(7.)... .OOOOOOOE+QOEND
ICODE•••O LRU NO.7
KFD~ ••• 1FPTR(1) •••• 7S00000E+01FPTR(2) •••• OOOOOOOE+OOEND
!(RDN••• ORPTR(J)... •OOI)OOCOE+OORPTrI(2)... .OOOOOOOE+OOf,IlD
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SUBROUTINE SYST ~ CONFIG 6
)
(ONLY THE RELEVANT SECTION OF THE PROGRAM IS SHO\VN)
c
C "'**********************'I\*****~ ********** ~********************
C '"EMTER THE SYSTEM FUNCTION HERE '"
C '" *C '"ISV$UP - SYSTEM STATUS. ~~Y BE LARGER THAN ONE *
C'" KST(Ij - COMPONENT STATUS. 0 OR 1 ,.
C iIt**********"'**************"-**************"'***1;***************
C
rSYSUP=KST(1)*KST(2)"'KST(3)*KST(4)*KST(5)"'KST(6)*KST(7!
If (ISYSUP .:::Q.O) THE::
J=J+1
TEMF2(J) = TEj.~!'1
ENO{F
c
20 COHTINUE
C
C "'*********************~**********************
C '"FINO SMALLEST SYSTEM TIME TO FAILURE SYSF '"
C ******"'*************"'**********"'*************
C
,;
I',!
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RAMOUT - CONFIG 6
RUN NO. 6
INPur BLOCK
TYPE OF RUM (OI'.OR 2)••••••••••••••••••••••••••••,
RE~JJRED NUMBER Of SIMULATED SYSTEM fAILURES •••••••
NUMBER UF Cl~POH~NTS IN THE ~YSTEM •••••••••••••••••
REPAIR SPECIFICATIOII (1,2 OR 3) .
HUMBER OF CLASS INTERVALS FOR RELIABILITY CftlC •••••
CLASS INTERVAL IIIOT!!.••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
o
5000
7
1
7
1.00
Ca.!P !lOG 1 ICODE ••-3
KFDN •• 2 I'P7R(1)•• .6000000E+01 FPTR(2) •• •150lJOOOE+01
KRDN •• 0 RPTR(1) •• .OOOOOOOE+OO RPT!!(2}•• .OOOOODOE+uO
COMP NO.2 ICOOE ••-3
'KFDN•• 1 FPTR(1) •• •1000000E+0? FPTR(2) •• .00000001:+00
KROIol•• 0 RPTR(1) •• •OOOOOOOE+OO RPTR(2) •• .oOOOOOnE+OO
COMP NO.3 ICOOE •• 0
PI'-'.,.tz) ••KfDN •• 1 FPTR(1) •• .8400000E+01 •OOOOOUU~
kRON •• 0 RPTP(1) •• •OOOOC()OE+OO RPTR(2) •• .ODOOOOOE+OO
COMP NO.4 ICODE •• 0
KFON •• 1 FPTR(n •• .10000001:+02 FPTR{2) •• .OOOOOOOE+OO
KRON •• 0 RPTR(1) •• •OOOOOOO~+OO RPiR(2) •. , .O[)OOOOOE+OO
COM? NO.5 ICODE•• 0
KFl)N•• 2 FPTR(1) •• .6000000E+01 l'PTR!2). •1501)000E+01
KRON •• 0 RPTRO) •• .OOOOOOOE-t-DO RP1R(2) •• .OOOOOOOE+OO
CoMP NO. 6 ICOOF... Q
KFON •• 1 fPTR(1) .. .8400000E+01 fPTR(2) •• .OOOOOOOE+OO
i'
KRON •• 0 RPTR(1) •• •OOOOOOOE+OO ~·TR(2) •• .OOOOUOOE+OO
\'C~~p NO.7 ICOOE •• 0
l::FDU •• 1 FPiR(1) •• .7S000!)OE+01 FPTR(2) •• .OOOOOOOE+OO
KR;)N•• 0 RPT~O) •• .OC!'OOOOE+OO RPTR(2) •• .OOOOOOOE+OO
OU'fPUT BLOCK
RELIABILITY SLOCK
MEAN LlfE................. 1.98
SIGHA.................... 1.72
RELIABILITY DISTRIBUTION
TIME FREQUENCY R95L
1.00 1868 .615
2.00 1138 .387
3.00 803 .228
4.00 484 .133
5.00 356 .064
6.00 192 .028
7.00 106 .008
OVERFLOII 53
RMLE
.626
.399
.238
.141
.070
.032
.011
.000
NUMBeR OF CLASS INTF.RVALS..... 7
CLASS HlTERVAL IIIDTH.......... 1.00
MAXIMUM SYSTEM FAllURE TIME... 9.80
MINIMUM s ·,TEM FAILURE TIME... .00
FAILURE BLOCK
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COMI'JNENT HO.
1
2
3,.
5
6
7
',I
NUMBER OF fAJLURES
o
14
1182
963
387
1173
1281
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RAMIN - CONFIG 7
\ \,
NTVPE •••ONTIME •••suOOH••• 4KFIX••• 1IPR08,•• lI~E ••• 8Fi... 1.0 END
IC~E •••42 L~U HO.1
KFDH ••• 1F?TR(1)... .100000Qg+02FPTR(2)... .OOOOOQOE+OOEHD
KRON. •• ORHR (1) •• , •OOOOOOOE+OORPTR(2);;•• .OOOOOOOE+OOEHO
ICODE •••42 lRtiNO.2
"FON... 2FPTR(1>... .6000000E+OHPTR(2). •• .1500000E+01END
KRDN ••• ORPTR(1)... .OOOOOOOE+01RPTR(2)... .OOOOOOOE+OGEND
ICODE •••O lRU NO.3
KFPN, •• 1FPTR(1)... .3400000E+01FPTR(2)... .OOOOOOOE+OOEND
KRDH ••• ORPTR(1)... .OOOOOOOE+OORPTR(2)... .OOOOOOOE+OOENO
iCODE .... 0 LRU NO.4
KFDH ••• 1FPTR(1) ••~ .7500COOE+01FPiR{2) •••• OOOOOOQE+QOEHO
.KRDN.•• ORPTR(1).•• .OOOOOOOE';·OORPTRt:2)••• .OOOOOOG:'i.l"vEHD
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SUBR01JTINE SYST - CONFIG 7
(ONLY TIlE RELEVANT SECTION OF THE PROGRAM IS SHOWN)
c
C *"'**************************************<Jr****Ir"'***********"'**
C * ENTER THE SYSTEM fU~CTION HER~ '"
C* *
C'" ISYSUP - SYSTE~SrATUSt MAY BE LARGER THAN ONE *
C * KST(I) - COMPONENT S~ATUS. 0 OR 1 *
!: **"'************"********************"'***********1:*****"'******
t
C
ISYSUP = K5T(1)*KST(2)*KST(3)*KST(4)
IF (ISYSU~.EQ.D) THEN
J=J+1
TEMF2(J) = TEfo,IP1
EIIDIF
c
20 CONTINUE ' ,
C ;;,
C **************lIM*************~' ,~"J********
C * FIND SHALf..EST SYSTEM TIME TQ"('J',,'" ~(.~ SYSF *
C ********."Ir*"""***************"<f._It**f' ,<,********
C
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RUN N". 7
INPUT SLOCK
TYPE Of RUN (O,f,OR 2)•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
REWIRED HUMBER Of SUIULHEO SYSTEM FAILURFS •••••••
NUMBER Of COMPONENTS HI TilE SYSTEM .
REPA~R SPECtFICkTION (1,2 OR 3) ••••••••••••••••••••
"lJ4iiE!11OF CI.ASS INTERVALS FOR REUABIlHr CAlC .....
~tASSINTERVAL WIOTH ••,•••••••••.•••••••••••••••••
o
5000
4
1
8
1.00
COMP WOo 1 ItPOE •• 42
Y.FDN •• 1 l'PTR(1 )~~ .1GOOOOOE+Oi! FPTR(2) •• •OOOOOOOE~O~
KRDN •• a i(PTR(1)•• .:lOOOOOOC+OO RPTR(2) •• .OOOOooOE+OO
COMP 110. 2 JtOOF •• 42
.1Sl..JQ(lc"'01kFOII •• 2 FPTR(1) •• .,:'i)O!lOOOE+01FPTR(2) ••
KRON •• a !1PTR(1) •• ~t'OOOOOOE+OO RPTR(2) •• .OOOODCOI;+OO
'"
COMP NO. 3 ICOiiE•• 0
KfDN.(, 1 FPTR(1) •• •84L'.:.;"OOE+01fi>TR(2)•• .OOOOOOOE+OO
KRON .. 0 RPrRC1} •• .OOC'OiJOE+OO RPTR(Z) •• .OOOClOOOE+OO
CCiI? NO.4 ICOC~~. 0
.~:?~OE+01KFD!f;'.1 r?'!'R(1)•• !'PTR(2)•• .COOOOOOE+on
KROll•• a RprR~1) •• .0000(.100E+00 RPTR(2) •• .OOOOOOOE+OO
OUTPUT BLOCK
RELIABILITY BLOCK \_
MEAN LIFE •••••••••••••••••
SIGHA •••••••••••••••••••••
RELIABILITY DISTRIBUTION
2.95
2.13
TlME FREOOSNCY R95L
1.UO 11n .756
2.00 899 .575
3.00 761 .422
4.00 617 .300
5.00 464 .'-08
6.00 492 .112
7.00 445 .026
8.00 128 .003
OVE:RflOW 23
RMLE
.766
.586
.434
.310
.218
.119
.030
.005
.000
NUMBER OF CLASS IH1ERVALS..... 8
C~ASS INTERVAL UIDTH.......... 1.00
MAXIMUM SYSTEM FAILURE TIM~... 9.07
MINIMUM SYSTEM FAILURE TIME... .'IM
FAILURE BLOCK
COMPONENT NO.
1
2
3
4
470.
733
1794
2003
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B 747 ELECTRICAL SYSTEM RELIABILITY SIMULATION
RAMIN - B747 ELEC~TRICAL SYSTEM
HTVPE ••• OUTtME ••• 5000N ••• 15KFIX ••• 1IPROB ••• 1!SZE ••• 12fI ••• 1000.00 END
lCOOE ..~.O LRU NO.1
I(!'DH ••• , 1FPTR( 1)... •1920000E+04FPTR(Z) ••• .OOOOOOOf+OOENJ)
KROll••• ORPTR( T)... .OCOOCOOE+OORPTiU2).,.. .0000000E+00::kO
Ir'1l:lE, "l) uto 1:0.2
J(fDN..,. 1FPTR(1)... • 1920000E+04FPTR(Z)... .OOODOOOE+OOEND
KI{ON... ORPTRfl)... .0000000E+OORPTR(2).. • .OOOOOOOE+OOENO
ICODE •••O LRU NO.3
KfDN... 1FPTR(1).. • • 1921JOOOE+04fPTR(Z)... .000(lOOOE+00I:NO
KRDN... ORPTR( 1) .. • •000IlOCm:+OORPTlH2). • • .OOOOOOO.:,·OOEI:O
ICOOE •••O LRU t:O.4
KFON••• 1FPTR(1) •••• 1920000E+04fPTR(2) •••• OOOOOOOE+OOENO
,) KRDN. •• CRPTR( 1 ) • • • •OOOOOOOE+OORPlR(2) • • • .00000001:+00ENO
ICOOE ••• O LRU NO.5
KFON... 1FPTR( 1). .. .2000000E+Q6FPTR(Z). • • • :lOOOOOOE+OOENO
KRDN... ORPTR( 1)... .OOOOOOOE+OORPTR(i:).. • .00000:)01:+00ENO
ICOOE ••• Q LRU NO.6
KFON••• 1FPTR(1) •••• 2000000E+06FPTR(2) •••• OOOOOOOE+OOEND
KRON••• ORPTR(1)... .OOOOQOOE+OORPTR(2)... .OOOOOOOE+QOENO
ICOOE •••O LRU NO.7
KFDN••• 1FPTR(1)... .2000000E+06FPTR(2)... .OCOOOOOE+OOENO
KRON••• ORPT~~1)... .OOOOOOOE+OOP.PTR(Z)... .OOOOOOOE+OOENO
IC¢)OE ••• O i.RU NO.a
KFDN... 1FPTR(1)." .1111110E+06FPTR(2)... .OQOOOOOE+OOEND
KRON••• DRPTR(1) •••• 00OOOOOE~JnRPTR(2) •••• 00000005+00ENO
lCOOE •.• O lRU NO.9
KFOIl ••• 'fPTP.(1) •••• 1250000E+06FPTR(Z) •••• OOOOOOOE+OOEIIO
KPDN... ORPTR(1)... "OOOOOOOE-I00RPTR(2)... .OOOOOOOE+OOEHO
ICODE •••O LP.U NO.10
KFON ••• 1FPTR(1)... .2500000E+06FPTR(2)... .OOOOOOOE+OOENO
KRON." ORPTR( 1) • .. •OOOOOOOE+OORPTR(Z) .. • .0000000E+OOt!':)
ICODE 0 isu NO.11
!<FOM 1fPTR( 1)... .2500000E+:l6FPTR(2).. • .OOOOOO(\E+OC]
KROll." ORPTR(1)... .OOOOOOOE+OORPTR(2).. • .OOOOOUOE+OOENO
lCOOE"".O LRIJ NO.12
KFON••• 1F?TR(1)... .2S00000E+06FPTR~2)... .OOOOOOOE+OOENU
KROll ••• ORPTR(1)... .000n~OOE+OORPTR(2)... .OOOOOOOE+OOENO
ICOOE, •• O l.RU NO.13 ._.
K¢ON••• 1FPTR( 1)... .~ \ 1000E+06FPTR(2i... .OOOOOOOE+OOENO
KRON••• ORPTR(1)... .OP~OUOuE+00RPTR(2)... .OOOOOOOE+OOEND
ICOGE •••O LRU NO.14
KFON••• 1FPTR(1) •• , .5000000E+06FPTR(2)... .OOOOOOOE+OOENO
KRDM••• ORPTR(1) •••• OOOOOOOE+OORPTR(2) •••• OOOOOOOE+OOEND
ICOOE ... O LRU NO.IS
KFDN. •• 1FPTR ( 1) .. • •Soooooor +06FP iR(2). • • .OOOOOOOE+OOENO
KRDN••• ORPTR(1)... .OOOOOOOE+00RPTR(2)... .OOOOOOOE+OOENO
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SUBROUTINE SY~T - B747 ELECfRICAL SYS1EM
(ONLY THE RELEYANT SEC'nON OF WE PROGRAM IS SHOWN)
c
c ..*********.****** ..,***************** ..****~,**************"'*'*'***
C; '" ENTER THE SYSTEM fUIiCTION HERE ..
C" 1>
C .. ISYWP '.SYSTEM STATUS, MAY BE LARGER THAN ONE *
C * ~~T(l) - COMPONENT STATU~, 0 OR 1 '"
C *********.****************, ,*****************************11***
C
K1 = KST~3)*KST(7)*KST(9)*KST(13)*KST{15)+
QKST(2)*KST(6)*K~;{8)*KST(9)*KST(13)*KST(15)?
~ST(1)*KST(5)*KST(S}*KST{9)*KST(13)*KST(15i
c
1(2 = l{t.T(4)*KS'f(13)*K~H15)+
QKST(1)*KST{10)*ICST(15)'"
QKST(2)*KST01)*KST(14)+
QKST(3)*KST(12)*KST(14)
c
ISYSUP = 1('o+K2
c
If (1SYSUP.EQ.O) TH~N
J=J+1
TEMP2(J) = TEMP1
I:HDlf
C
20 CONTiNUE
C
C ""*********~****1>**********************~**k**
C '" fIND SMALLEST SYSTEM TIME TO fAILURe SYSF '"
C *"'*****************************************~'"
C
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RAMOUT ~ B747 ELECTRICAL SYSTEM
RUli NO. 1
INPUl BLOCK
1"1'PEOf RUN (0,1,00 2) •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
REQUIRED NUMBER OF SIMULATED SYSTEM FAILURES •••••••
NUMBER OF COMPONENTS IN THE SYSTEM"', •••••• .,••••••
REPA~R SPECIFICATION (1,2 OR 3)••••••••••••••••••••
NUMBER OF CLASS INTERVALS FOR RELIA8ILITY tALC •••••
CLASS INTERVA:L WIDTH ••••••••••••••••••••••••• c •••••
e
5000
15
1
12
1(100.00
COMP NO. " IC1XlE•• 0
KFDN •• 1 f?TR(1) •• •1920000E+04 FPTRn) •• .00000011E+00
KRDN •• i) RPTIH(1)•• •00()OOOOE+{lO RPTR(2) •• .0OOO()Ol'E+OO
COMP NO. 2 ICCOE •• o
KFON •• 1 FPTR(1) •• •1920000E+04 fPTR(2) •• •OOQQOOO~+tl0
KRDIII•• 0 RPTR(1) •• •OOOOOOOE+OO Rl'TR(2}•• .0000000£+00
COHP NO.3 !COOE •• 0
KFOW. , 1 !'PTR(1)•• •1920000E+04 rpm(2) •• .OOOOOOOE+')O
KRDN •• 0 RPTR(1) •• •~::aOOOOOE+OO RPTR(2) •• .OOOOOOQEi{\G
COMP NO.4 ICOCE •• 0
KFOII•• 1 FPTR(1) •• •1920000E+04 FP!R(i'.)•• .OOOOOOOE+OO
KROll.. 0 RPTR(1) •• .OOOOOODE+OO RPTR(2) •• .00000001;+00
COMP NO.5 ICODE •• 0
.iOOOOOOE+06KrON •• 1 FPTR(1) •• FPTR(2) •• "OOOOOOOE+OO
KPOIl•• 0 RPTR(1) •• .OOOOOOOE+OO RPTR'C2)•• .OOOOOOOE.OG
COMP NO.6 ICOOE •• 0
KFON •• 1 FPTR(1) •• .20000ooE+06 FPTR(2) •• .00000001:+00
KRON •• 0 I~PTR<.1j•• .00(100001"-;000RPlT1i2)•• .OOOOOOOE+OO
COMP NO.7 ICODE •• 0
KFOII•• 1 FI'TR('()•• •2000000E+06 FPTR(2) •• .OOOOOOOE+OO
KROll.. 0 RPTR( 1)•• .0000000E+00 RPTR(2) •• .OOOOOOOE"'OO
COMP NO.8 ICOOE •• 0
KFON •• 1 FPTk(1) •• .1111110E+06 FPTI't(2)•• .OOOOOOOE+OO
KRON •• 0 RPTR(1) •• .00000001:+00 RPTR(2) •• .OOOOOOOE+OO
COMP NO.9 {CODE •• 0
KFD!.! •• ! FPTR(1) •• •1250000E+06 FPTR(2) •• ,OOOOOOOE+OO
KRON •• 0 RPTR(1) •• .OOOOOOOE+OO RPTI«2) •• .;)OOOOOOE+OO
C~p NO.10 tCODE •• 0
KFON •• 1 FPTR(1) •• •2500000E+1)6 FPTR(2) •• .nOOOOOOE+OO
KRON •• 0 RPTR(1) .. •OOOOOOOE;·OO RPTR(2) •• ,OOOOOOOE+OO
COMP NO.11 leOCE •• 0
KfOIl•• 1 FPTR(1) •• •2500000E+06 FPTR(2) •• ,OOOOOOOE+OO
KRON •• 0 RPTR( 1) •• .O()OOOOOE+OO RPTR(2) •• .OOOOOOOE+OO
COM? NO.12 ICODE'.• 0
KFDII •• 1 FPTR(1) •• .2500000E+06 F~TR(2) •• •OOOOOOOE+ 00,
"RON •• 0 RPTR(1) •• •OOOOOOOE+OO RPTR(2) •• .OOOOOOOE+O(',
COMP N6.1S ICOOE .. 0
KFOtl•• 1 FPTR{l) •• •250000() J(.l FPTR<2J •• .OOOOOOOE+OO
KRI)N.. 0 RPTR(1) •• .00000002.;.00 RPTR(2) •• .OOOOOOOE+OO
C0!4PflO.14 ICoPE .. 0
KFON •• 1 FPT!!(1)•• •5000000E+06 FPTR(2) •• .00t)000OE+OO
KRON •• 0 RPTRO) •• •OOOOOOOE+OO RPTR(2) •• .OOOOOOOE+OO
CC*P NO 15 ICOOi!•• 0
KroN •• 1 FPTR(, 1)•• .SOOOOOOE-I06 FPTR(2) .. .OOOOOOOE+OO
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KRDN •• 0 RPTR(1).. .000'1000E+00 RPTR(2!.. .OOOOOOOE+OO
OOTPUT BLOCK
RELIABILITY SLOCK
ME~N Url:................. 3959.30
SIGHA -;;" 2254.ltl
RELiABI!.l1Y DISiRIBUTION
TIME FR~QUENCV R95L RII1LE
1000.00 1:16 .'Jf9 .'1'73
2000'.00 750 .tl14ii .8:~3
3000.00 1088 .594 .605
4000.00 m .394 .405
5000.1'0 m .241 .251
6000.£.10 460 .150 .1SSI
7000.0n 309 .090 .0.97
8000.0U 190 .054 .059
9000.00. 115 .032 .Q36
10000.00 80 .C17 .020
11000.00 39 .010 .!J12
12000.00 30 .005 .006
C'VERFLOW 32 .000
Nl~6ER OF CLASS INTERVALS..... 12
CLASS INTERVAL IUDTH.......... 1000.00
MAXIMUM SYSTEM FAILURE TIME... 18123.66 =
MINIMUM SYSTEM FAILURE TIME... 228.46
~'AlLURE BLOCK
Ca.tPONENT twO.
1
2
;)
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
NUl'lBEROF FAILURES
4989
4991
4997
4972
93
113
100
206
170
71
83
79
81
1+2
42
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AMIR· S'MULATI()N ._ IB747 ELECTRICAL SYSTEM
IRBl - B7ti7 ELECfRlCAL SYSTEM
(* TITLE CAKO *)
1 874i" ELECTRWAL SYSTEM
(* SYSTEM N.MIE TMAX # OF COMPo # OF TYPE NAMES *)
1tWAC 2.000000E+04 15 (;.
(* ATT.'CHMEICTOF COMPo TO THE TYPE NA:1ES "')
, 1 1 1 2 2· 2 3 4 5 5 5
5 (;. 6
C* TYFE NAMES *~
A
D
(* FAILURE RATES BY TYPE NAMES *)
5.208000E*04 S.OOOOOOE-06 9.000000E-06 8.000000F.-06 4.0000DOE-06
2.QOOOOOE-il6
(* ~EPAIR 'oS BY TYP£:: NAMES *)
1.OOtlOOOE(. 1.000000::+00 1.000000E+OO 1.0011000E+OO 1.000000E ~OD
1.OOOUOOEi·OD
(* FLAG OF PASS.F.R. AND ~ATES IF FLAG=1 *)
o
(* PASSIVE STAtiO BY PER COHPOtIENT *j
o 0 0 0 0 COO 0 0
o -0 0 0 0
(k !I)lI"! ARRAY *)
o
o
I)
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
(*RDUM ARRAY *)
.OOODOE+OO .OOODOE+OO .OOOODE+OO .OOOOOE+OO
.OOODOE+OO .CJODOOE+OO .OOOOOE+OO .OOOOOE+O()
.OOOOOE+OO .OOOOOE+OO .OOOOOE+OO .OOOOOE+OO
.OOuOOE+(JO .00000[;+00 •DOOOOE+OO ,OQDODE+OD
.OOOOOE+OO .OODOOE+OO •DOOOOE+OO .OOOOOE+OO
.OOOOOE+OO .OOOOOE+OO .OOOOOE+(lO .OOOOOE+OO
.OOOOOE+OO .OOOOOE+OO .OOOOOE+OO .OOOOOE+OO
.OOOOOE+OO .OOOOOE+OO .OOOOOE+OO .OOOOOE+OO
.OOOOOE-tOO .OOOOOE+OO .OOOI')OE+OO .OOOOOE+OO
.OOOOOET~n .COOOOE+GO .OOOOOE+OO .OOOOOE+OO
(*NO. or Lt~ICAL STAND BY ~NITS *)
o
(* HO. OF LOAD CONNECTIONS CROUPS *)
o
(*NO. OF IND~r.E FAILURES *)
o
(* REPAIR TEAMS FLAG ;
o
liPS
5000
FCB FCNUH
I) 1.000000E+OO
TRB HTI B~TA *)
o 1000 O.OOCOOOE+OO
(* NO. OF SENSITIVITY GROUPS *)
o
(* ROFLAG NO. OF TIME POINTS & FLAG INDI~ATES THAT POINTS WERe ENTtRED *)
1 20 0
(* iRB2 INPUT AND REPAIR MOOE FLAGS *)
(*
(*
(*
f)
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
B
E
C
F
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
D
o
.OO:JOOE+OO
.000001.:+00
.OOOOOE+OO
•OOOOOEof00
.OOOOOE+OO
.OOOOOE+OO
.OOQOOE+OO
•QOOOOE+OO
.OOOOOE+Dn
.OIJOOOE+OO
I!C. OF TEAMS ; WISER/FIFO POLICY *)
o 0
(I,J JSTOP) NDUMP PRS~ *)
1 1000 1.000000E+01
*)
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LBOUT - B747 ELECTRICAL SYSTEM
FUNCTION NSYSCM()
C Ent~r th~ nuriberof c~nents for NS~SCM
NSYSCM:: 15
return
END
SUBROUTINE SYSUP(i>"iS, T ,M(1)
C PARAMETER 50 IS VALID FOR PC VERSION
COMMON/SYST/ B(50)
C for user programing delete the next two linee:
C WRITE(2,'(A)')'SYSTEM FUNCTIQN1S MISSI~G! ABORTED.'
C stOP
C 1JI'lCl' the above two Lines were deleted start programing
C the system function below this ltneC =~~=~=~==================================~=~=====~
C
r.
K1 = B(3)*8(7)*B(9)*5(13)*6(15)+
QB(2)*B(6)*B(8)"B(9),*S(13)*S(15)+
~(1)*B(5i*B(8)*B(9)*B(13j*B(15)
K2 ::8(4)*B(13)*B(15)+
aB(1)*B(10)*B(15)+
QB(2)*B(11)*QC14)+
QB(3)*B('I2)*B(14)
c
K3 ,~ K1+K2
IF CK3.~T.O) THENSYS=1
ELSE
SYS=O
EHDIF
c
RETURN
END
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LBOUT - B747 ELECTRICAL SYSTEM
fUNCTiON HSYSCHO
C F.nter the number of components for NSYSCM
NSYSCM:: 15
retur-n
END
SUBROUTINg SYSUP(SYS,T,MI1)
;:; PARAMETER 50 IS Vl\110 FOR PC VERSION
COMMOH/SYSTI B(50}
C for user programing delete the next two lines:
C WRITE(2;'(A)')' SYSTEM FUNcrtON IS ~ISSIN~1 ABORTED.'
C STOP
C once the above two lines were deleted star-t progrllllling
C the system function below this tiM
C ===~================================~============
C
c
K1 = 8(3)*B(7)*B(9)*B(13)*B(15)+
~(2)*B(6}*B(8)*B(9)*B(13)*B(15)+
iB(1)*B(5)*B(B)*B(9)*B(13)*B(15)
K2 = B(4)*B{13)*B(15)+
~(1)*B(10}*B(15)+
QB(2)*B(11)*S(14)+
Q8(3)*B(12)*B(14)
K3 ..,K1+K2
iF (K3,,,GT.0) THEN
SYS=1
ElSe
SYs=t\
ENDIF
RETURN
EtlD
c
\_;
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OUTRl - B747 ELECfRICAL SYSTEM
" M 1 R
**"'***********************"'**~*****
* 1 N PUT BLOCK*************"'*********************
VER. 1.2
,.
{* TITL~,CARD *) Ii
1 &747 ELECTRICAL SYSTEM
(* $YSTEM NAME TMAX # OF COMPo # OF TYPE NAMES *)
115VAC 2.000000E+04 15 6
(* ATTACHMENT OF C(J.!P.ro THE TYPE NAMES *)
1 1 1 1 2 2 234 555
566
(* TYPE NAMES *)
A
J)
(* FAILURE RATES BY TYPE NAMES *)
5.208000E-04 5_OOOOOOE-06 9.000000E-06 8.000000E-06 4.000000E-06
2.000000E-06 ~
(* REPAIR RATES BY TYPE N~fS *)
1.000000E+0(1 1.000000E+00 1.000000E+00 1.000000E+(10 1.oaoaoae'''oo
1.0000001:+00
(* FLAG OF PASS.F.R. A~D RATES IF FlAG=1 *)
(i
(* PASSIVE STAND BY PER COMPONENT *)a 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
il 0 000
(* IDUM ARRAY *)
o
o
o
(I
o
o
o
o
o
o
(* ROUM ARRAY *)
.OOOCOE+OO .000001:+00 .0QOOOI:+00 .OOOOO~+OO
.001}00E+00 .OOOOOE+OO .OOOOOE+OO .OOOOOE+OO
.00000Ei·00 .000I)QE+QO .nOOOOE+OO .000001:+00
.OOOOOE+OO .00000E+00 .OOOOOE+OO .000001:+00
.OOOOOE+OO .OOOOOE+OO .OOOOOE+OO .OOOOOE+OO
.OOOOOE+OO .OOOOOE+QO .OOOOOE+OO .OOOOO~+OO
.OOOOOE+OO .OOOOOE+OQ .OOOOOE+OO .OOOOOE+OO
.OOOOOE+OO .OOOOOZ~OO .0000010+00 .OOOOOE+OO
.OOOOOE+OO .OOOOOE+OO .OOOOOE+OO .OOOOOt+OO
.OGOOOE+OO .OOOOOE+OO .OOOOOE+OO .OOOOOE+OO
(* NO. OF LOGICAL STAIIDBY UNITS *)
o
(* NO. OF lOAI)CONNE'CnONS ~ROUPS *}
o
(* Nv. OF INDUCE FAILURES *)
o
(* REPAiR TEAMS fLAG ;
o
liPS
5000
FCB FCNUM
o 1.000000~+OO
TRS HYI BETA *)
o 1000 O.OOOOOOE+OO
C* NO. OF SENSITIVITY GROUPS *)
o
(* ROFLAG NO. OF TIME POINTS & FLAG INDICATES THAT POINTS Y£RE ENTERED *)
1 20 0
{*
(*
(*
e
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
B
E
(I
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
c
o
o
o
o
o
o
oo
o
o
.0000!lE+00
.OOOOOE+OO
.OCOOOE+OO
.OOOOOE+OO
.OOOOOE+O!")
.OOOOOE+OO
.OOOOOE+OO
.OOOOOE+OO
.OOOOOE+OO
.OOOOOE+OO
NO. OF TEAMS ; ~ISER/FlfO POlle\ *)
o 0
(I,J JSTOF) NDUMP PRSD *)
1 1000 1.000000E+01
*)
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('If ~B2 INPuT AIiDREPAIR 1400E FLAGS *)o 1 /)
B747 ELECTRICAL SYSTEM
RESULTS f(R ~= 5000 == CASE HISTORiES
AVERAGE MO. OF COLLI~IOkS PER HISTORY= 2.2741E+01
**'****************'1(*********"'***********'" TIME ~EPENDENT *
* FAILURE PROBABILITY (DEMAND MODE) '"
*************"'********'1('*****************
TIME FAILURE PROS. P.R.S.D.
1.0000E+03
2.0000E+i)3
3.0000E+03
4.00(l!)E+03
5.0000E+03
6.0000E+03
7.0000E+03
8.0000E+03
9.00001'+03
1.0000E+04
1.1000E+04
1.2000E+04
1.3000E+04
1.4000E+04
1.50ooE+04
1.6GOOE+04
1.7000E+C4
1.8000E+04
1.9000E+04
2.0000E+04
2.9600E-02
1.8540E-01
4.0380E-01
6.0420E-01
7.5380E-01
8.4540E-Oi
9.0320E-01
9.4120E-01
9.60BOE-01
9.7'S60E-01
9.8460E-01
9.9040E-01
9.9420E-01
9.9720E-01
9.98201:-;)1
9.9900E-Oi
9.9940E-01
9.99801:-01
1.0000E+00
1.0000E+00
8.0974E+00
2.9644E+00
1.7184E+00
1,i446E+00
8.0822E-01
6.047lE-O'Y
4.6298E-01
3.5348E-il1
2.8565E-01
2.2365E-01
1.1687E-01
1.3923E-01
1.0802E-01
7.4938E-02
6.0054E-02
4.4743E·02
3.46511:-02
2.0001E-02o.ooooe+oo
O.OOOOE+OO
CONDITII)NALMTTF OF THE SYSTEM ~ 3.93462E+03
THE CONDIHONAL ioiHF IS THE REGULAR IUlF ONLY IF
THE U~~~LIABILITY AT TMAX IS 1.0
======~:.:========~========~==~=======~=~======~====:==~========
*******~********************************** SEN SIT I V I T Y SLOCK *
*****************************************
COM P 0 NEW T SENSITIVITY TASLE
COOPOllENTDEPENDENT UNRELIABILITY
1) 4.95E+03 2) 4.99E~03 3) 4.99E+03
6) 1.00E+00 7) 1.00E~OO 8) 2.00E+00
1'1)4.00E...00 12) 5.00E+00 13) 2.90E+01
4) 4.88E+03
9) 6.00E+00
14) 3.00E+OO
5) O.OOE+OO
10) 2.00E+OO
15} 2.50E+01
NUMBER OF COMPONENT DEPENDENT FAIl.URES
1) 4948 2) 4987 3) 4986 4) 4881 5) 0
6) 1 7) 1 8~ 2 9) 6 10) 2
11) 4 12) 5 13) 29 14) 3 15) 25
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NORMALIZED COMPONENT DEPENDENT UNRELIABILITY
1) 9.92E·01
6) 2.0U:-04
11) ~.02E-04
3) 1.00E+00
8) 4.01E-04
13) 5.82E-03
2) 1.OOE+OO
7) 2.011:-04
12) 1.00E-03
********~**********~***********~**********
* SPARE PARTS AND REPAIR 3 f. C C K **********,t********************************
REPAIRS IN TIME SURFACES ~~R COHPONE~T
1) O.GOE+OO
6) [,OOE+OI1
11) O.OOE+OO
2) O.COE+OI)
7) O.OOE+OO
12) O.OOE+OO
3) O.OOE+OO
8) O.OOE+OO
13) O.OOE+OO
4) 9.791:-01
9) 1.20E-03
14) 6cl'l2E-0l.
4) O.OOE+(iO
9) O.OOE+OO
14) O.OOE+OO
REPAIRS iN TIME SURFACES PER TYPE
A) O.OOE+OO
C) O.UOF.+OO
E) O.OOE+OO
REPAIRS IN CONTiNUOUS PRQr,ESS PER COMPONENT
1) 2.36E+00
6) 1.20E-03
11) 7.2IJE-03
3) 2.27E+OO
8) 3.40E-03
13) 2.24E-02
2) 2.4se+00
7) 6.00E-04
12j 3.BOE-03
4) 2.26E+00
9) 5.4QE-03
14) S.20e·03
5) O.OOE+OO
10) '••01E-04
15) 5.01E-03
!.') O.OOE+OO
10) O.OOE+OO
15) O.OOE+Q()
B) O.OOE+OO
D) O.OOE+OO
F 0.001:+00
5) 6.00E-04
10) 4.6OE-\)3
15) 1.96E-02
REP~IRS IN CONTINUOUS PROCESS PER TYPE
A) 9.34E+00
C) 3.40E-03
E) 3.BOE-02
MAX. WEIGHT SCORED IN THIS RUN: 1.0000E+00
MIN. WEIGHT SCORED IN THIS RUN: 1.0000E+00
B) 2.40E-03
D) 5.40E-03
i') 2.48E-02
~==================~====:========:==~===~~=:======~===~=====~==
w****************************************
* D 1 A G NOS TIC BLOCK 4-
*****************************************
===== FIRST SCORE SPEG1RUM IN STEPS "~===
o o 7 1,151 761 76o 5
if
il
;:;==== FIRST DETECTOR !)PECTRIJMBY STEPS ====;:;
O.OOOOE+OO O.OOOOE+OO O.ODOOE+OO 7.0000E+00 4.1510E+03
7.6100~+02 7.6000E+01 5.0000E+00
NO. OF SCORES :
148.QO 927.00
4227.00 4516.00
4923.00 4952.00
4995.00 4997.00
2019.00
4706.00
4971.00
4999.00
3021.0!J
4804.00
4986.00
5000.00
3769.00
4876.00
4991.00
SIlGO.OO
1) 1.001:+00 2) 1.00E+00 3) 1.00e+oo
AVERAclE WEIGHT OF COMPONENT DEPENDENT UNRElIA9ILIT\,
4) 1.00E+OO
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5) O.OOE+OO
6} 1.t10E+OO
11) 1.001':.+00
7) 1.00E+OO
12) 1.00E+OO
NORMALIZED AVERAGE ~~IGHT
1) 1.00E+OO
6) 1.00E+OO
11) 1.001:+00
2) 1.00E+Ou
7) 1.00E+OO
12) 1.00E+OO
8) 1.00£+00
13) '.OOEi()(l
3) 1.0DE+OO
8) 1.00E"OO
13) 1.GOI:+00
9) UlOE+()O
14) 1.00E+Q!J
4) 1.0DE+G!J
9) 1.\JQE+OO
14) 1.aOe+Oo
******************~~***********w*********
... COMMENTS BLOCK'"
*****************************************
1193.00 SECONDS EXECUTION TIME.
Ii
I',I
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'iilj 1 QIlE·rOO
~5) 1~1lIJE+OO
5) O.OOE+OO
10) 1.00E+OO
15> 1.00E+OO
APPEtlDIX F
l/
SINGLE COMPONENT REL5,,:~BILITYAt~D AVA~LABILITY
IfSIMUlATION
RAMIN - EXPONENTIAL FAILURE DENSITY & EXPONL~TIAt
REPAIR 1?ENSITY "
\\ J ~".
NHPt= ••• 1I1TIMa ••• 500GN ••• n:r _:lIPROB •••. 1iSZE ••• H.lFl ••• 100.0 END
ICOOE ••• O tRU NO..1 ::-- .r-
KFON••• 1FPTR(1 ).... :'fllOOOOOE+O?-fPTR(2)... .0OOOOOOE+QOEUl>
KRON"". 1RPT~( H;j. •1t100000.E+02RPTR(2). •• .0000000E+O(l';:NO
'_I
145
SUBROUTINE SYST
(ONLY THE RELEVANT SECTION OF THE PROGRAM IS SHOWN)
c
c **"'*********************"'*****************"'******************
C * ENTER THE SYSTEM FUNCHOH HERE *
C'" '"C '" ISYSUP ..SYSTEM STATUS, HAY BE lARGER THAN ONE '"
C * KST(n .' COMPONENT STATUS" {)OR 1 *
C ",********j,***********"***w,, '~************'k**"**********"'**"'*'"
C
ISYSUF· = KST(H
11' (lS¥SUf'.FQ.O) THEN
J::;J+1
TEMP2(J) ::;TEMP1
E~IOIF
C
20 CONTIHUE
C
C *********~,***********",***********************
C * FlNO SMALL~ST SYSTEM TIME TO FAiLURE SYSF '"
C ********'k~"''''''''''*******************************
C
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RAMOUT r EXPONENTIAL FAILURE DENSITY & EXPONENTIAL
REPAIR DENSITY
RUN NO. 1
INPUT SLQCK
TYPE OF RUN (O,1,OR 2) •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
REQUIREO NOODER OF SIMULATED SYSTEM \eAILURES•••••••
NUJoIBEROF COI,Wf."JL'IITS IN THE SYST':4I••li ••••••••••••••
REPAIR speclI': ATlON (1,2 OR 3) ••••• L .
NUMBER Of CLASS INTERVALS fOR RELI~~ILITY CALC •••••
CLASS INTERVAL WIDTH "."•••••••••••••••
1
5000,
1
25
10.00
COMP NO.3 ICOOE•• 0
KFON •• 1 fPTR(1).. .10000001:+03 FPTR(2).. .OOOOOl.lOE~'OO
KRDN •• 1 RPTR(1).. .100000QE+02 RPTR(2).. .OOCOOOOE+OO
OOTPUT BLOCK
AVAILABILITY BLOC~
AVERAGE UP ;[lE•••
AVERAGE DtlLl):: •••
98.70
9.78
SIGMA .
SlGMA .
SIGMA ..AVERAGE AVAILABiLITY.. .91
THE 90 PERCENT CONFIDENCE LEVEL... .91
THE 95 PERCENT ,CONFIDENCE LEVEL... .91
RELIABILITY BLOCK
MEAN L!FE ••••••••••••••••• 98.70
SIGMA ..................... 98.39
RELIABILITY DISTRIBUTION
TIME FREQUENCY R95L RMLE
10.00 1.49 .904 .910
20.00 466 .808 .817
30.00 369 .733 .743
40.00 359 .660 .611
50.00 332 .594 .605
60.01) 314 .531 .542
70.00 259 .479 .490
80.00 240 .431 .442
90.00 209 .389 .401
100.00 190 .351 .363
110.00 158 .320 .331
120.00 168 .287 .297
130.00 163 .255 .265
140.00 129 .229 .239
150.00 115 .206 .21616(.),00 106 .185 .194
170.00 90 .168 .116
180.CO 75 .153 .161
190.00 88 .136 .144
200.00 60 .1(4 .132
210.00 59 .112 .120
220.00 51 .103 .110
230.00 54 .092 .099
240.00 49 .083 .089
250.00 49 .073 .079
OVERFLOIJ 397 .000
N~BER OF CLASS INTERVALS ••••• 25
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98.39
9.62
.00
CI.ASS nlTERVAI. \O/lDTH.\ ••••••••
MAXIMUM SYSTEM FAILURE liME •••
MINIMUM SYSTEM FAILURE TIME •••
FAlWRE BLOCK
COMPONENT NO.
1
NUMEltR O~ FAILURES
5001}
10.00
781.65
.02
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RAMOUT - NORMAL FAILURE DENSITY & EXPONENTIALREPA1R
DENSITY
IMI NO. 2
INPUT BLOCK
TYPE OF RUN (0,1,OK 2) .
RE~IIRED NUMBER OF SiMULATED SYSTEM FAIlURES •••••••
NUMBER OF COMPONE~TS IN THE SYSTEM •••••••••••••••••
REPAIR SPECIFICATiON (1,2 OR 3) ••••••••••••••••••••
NUMBER OF CLASS INTERVALS fOR RELIABILITY CALC •.,•••
CLASS INTERVAl. WlLtTH•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
1
501)(\
1
1
20
10.00
COMP ~O. 1 lCOCE •• 0
KFDN.. 2 FPTR( 'I). • .1000000E+03 FPTR(2).. .3000000E+02
KRON •• 1 RPTR(1) ••• 1000000E+02 RPTR(2) ••• OOOOOOOE+OO
OUTPUT BLOCK
AVAILABILITY BLOCK
AVERAGE UPTIME •••
AVERAGE DNTIME •••
98.90
10.02
SIGMA ••••••
SlattA.;••••
29.68
9.70
.00 .AVERA.GE AVAILABIliTY.. .91 SIGMA ••••••
THE 90 PERCENT CONFIOENCE LEVEL... .91
THE 95 PERCENT CONFIDENCE LEVEL... .91
REU/iSIlITY BLOCK
MEAN LlFE .................. 98.90
SIGMA ••••••••••• '••••••••• 29.68
RELIABILITY DISTRIBUTION
TIME ~REQiJENCY ~95l RMLE
10.00 5 .993 .m
20.00 8 .996 .997
30.00 19 .992 .994
40.00 85 .973 .977
50.00 ~27 .946 .951
60.00 258 .893 .900
70.00 347 .821 .830
80.00 458 .728 .739
90.00 631 .61)1 .612
100.00 641 .473 .484
110.00 644 .344 .355
120.00 577 .230 .240
130.00 452 .141 .150
140.00 327 .078 .084
150.00 206 .038 .043
160.00 113 .ow .020
170.00 58 .007 .009
180.00 27 .002 .003
190.00 14 .000 .001
200.00 2 .000 .000
OVERFLOW ,< .000
If .
NUMBER OF CLASS tNr~~VAlS ••••• 20
CLASS iNTERVAL Wllin~ ......... 10.00
MAXIMUM SYSTEM FAlLIRE TIME ••• 210.16
HlHlHUM SYSTEM FAILt E TIME ••• .00
\\
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FAlLURF. BLOCK
COMPOIIEn NO. NUMBER OF FAILURES
5000
150
II
If
RAMOUT - \VEIBULL FAILURE DENSITY (DECREASING FAILURE
RATE) & EXPONENTIAL REPAIR DENSITY
RUN NO. 3
INPUT BLOCK
TYPE OF RUN (O,1,OR 2) •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
REQUiRED NUMBER OF SIMUlATEC' SYSTEM FAILURES •••••••
NUMBER OF COMPCNENTS IN THE SYSTEM •••••••••••••••••
REPAIR SPECIfICATION (1,2 OR 3) ••••••••••••••••••••
NUMBER OF CLASS INTERVALS FOR RELIABILITY CALC •••:.
CLASS INTERVAL WIDTH'•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
1
5000
1
1
25
10.,00
COMP NO.1 lCODE •• 0
KFDN •• 3 fPTR(1).. .1QOOOOOE+03 fPTR(2).. .5000000E+OD
KRDN •• 1 RPTR(1).. .1000000£+02 RPTR(2);. .OOOOOOOE+OO
OUTPUT BLOCK
AVAILABIlJTY BLOCK
AVERAGE UPT1ME... 194.21
AVERAGE DNTIHE... 9.78
AVERAGE AVAILABILIT~.. .95
SIGMA...... 424.12
SIGHA...... 9.62
SIGMA •••••• .01
THE 90 PERCENT CONFIDENCE LEVEL... .95
THE 95 PERCENT CONFIDENCE LEVEL... .95
RELIABILITY BLOCK
MEAN LIFE. "••••••••••••••• '194.21
SlGHA ••••••••••••••••••••• 424.12
RELIABILITY DISTRIBUTION
TIME FREQUENCY 1(95L RMLE
10.00 1355 .719 .729
20.00 458 .626 .637
30.00 32/. .561 .573
40.00 223 ,516 .528
50.00 210 .474 .486
60.00 162 .442 .454
70.00 137 .415 .426
80.00 122 .390 .402
90.00 98 .371 .382
100.00 98 .351 .363
110.00 92 .333 .344
120.00 55 .322 .333
'130.00 67 .309 .320
140.00 78 .293 .304
150.00 79 .278 .288
160.00 72 .264 .274
170.00 52 .253 .264
180.00 52 .243 .253
190.00 39 .235 .245
200.00 58 .224 .234
210.00 34 .21r .227
220.00 30 .211 .221
230.00 40 .203 .213
240.00 40 .196 .205
25D.OO 32 .189 .199
OVERFLOW 993 .000
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HUMBER OF CLASS INTeRVA~~ •••••
CLASS INTERVAl.. WIOTH ••• !'I••••••
MAXIMUM SYSTEM FAILURE TIME ....
MINIMUM SYSTEM FAILURE TIME •••
FAILURE BLOCK
COMPONENT NO. NUMBER Or FAILURES
5000
25
10.00
6109.70
.00
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RAMOUT - WEIBULL FAILURE DENSITY (INCREASING FAILURE
RATE) & EXPON1BNTIAL REPAIR DENSITY
RUN 110. 4
INPUT BLOCK
TYPE OF ~UN (O,1,OR 2) •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
RE~IIREO NUMBER OF SIMULATED SYSTE~ FAILURES •••••••
NUMBER OF COMPONENTS HI THE SYS:-,1I••••••• .,••••••••
REPAIR SPECIFiCATION (1,2 OR 3) ••••••••• " .
NUMBER OF ClASS INTERVALS FOR RELIABILITY i:ALC•••••
CLASS I1HERVAl WIOTH ••••••••••••••••••••••••• "'••••
1
5000
1
1
25
10.00
COM? NO, 1 ICOJE •• 0
KFON s; 3 FPTR(1).. .1000oo0E+03 FPTR(2).. .200000010+01
KRDN •• 1 RPTR(1i.. .1000000E+02 ~PTR(2).. .0000000E+Otl
OUTPUT BLOCK
AVAiLABILITY BLOCK
AVERAGE UPTIME ••• 88.17 S!GMA •••••• 45.78
AVERAGE ONTINE ••• 9.78 SIGMA •••••• 9.62
AVERAGE AVA.lABILITY •• .90 SIGMA •••••• .00
THE 90 PERCENT CONFIDENCE LEVEL ••, .90
THE 95 PERCENT CONFIDENCE LEVEL ••• .90.
RELIABILIrY BLOCK
MEAN LIFE ••••••••••••••••• 88.17
SIGMA ••••••••••••••••••••• 45.78
REl.IABILITY DISTRIBUTION
TIME FREQUENCY R95L RfoILE
10,,:;:) 46 .989 .991
20.00 139 .959 .963
30.00 219 .913 .919
40.00 324 .846 .854
50.00 383 .768 .n8
60.00 399 .687 .698
70.00 438 .599 .610
80.00 430 .513 .524
90.00 430 .427 .438
100.00 379 .351 .363
110.00 344 .283 .294
120.00 327 .219 .228
130.00 2(,8 .170 .17Cf
140.00 212 .128 .136
150.00 156 .098 .105
160.00 161 .067 .073
170.00 106 olJ47i.· .052
180.00 72 .033 .037
190.00 58 .022 .026
200.00 41 .015 .018
210.00 29 .009 .012
220.00 It;l .006 .008
230.00. 13 .004 .005
240.00 12 .002 .003
250.00 6 .001 .002
OVERFLOW 9 .000
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NUMBER Of CLASS INTERVALS •••••
CLASS INTERVAL WIDTH ••••••••••
H~XlMUM SYSTEM FAILURE TIME •••
MINIMUM SYSTEM FAILURE TlME •••
25
10.QO
279.531.36
FAILURE S:'OCK
COMI'OtJENT NO. HUMaER OF FAILURES
5000
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APPENDIX G
PRODUCTION LINE RELIABILIlY IAVAILABILl1Y SIMULATION
RAMIN - COMPONENTS SWITCHED OFF DURING SYSTEM REPAIR
WlTII THE SYSTEM REPAIR TIME EQUAL TO THE SUM OF
COMPONENT REPAIR rflMES
NTVPE •••1HfIME •••5000N •••19KFIX ••• 11PROB ••• 1iSZe •••15FI... 10.0 ENO
ICOOE •••O lRU NO.1
KFON ••• 3FPTR(1) ••o .114~63CE+04FPTR(2) •••• 9000000E+00ENO
KRDIt... 2RPTR{ 1)... .2920000F.+01RPTlH2}... .5000000E+O)ENO
leODE •••O lRU NO.2
KFON ••• 1FPTR(1) •••• 1520960E+04FPTR(2)... .OOOOOOOE+OOENO
KRON ••• 2RPTR(1) •••• 2920000E+01RPTR(2)... .5000000~+OOENO
ICOOE •••O !.RU NO.3
KFDN ••• lFPTR(1),.. .1522100E+03FPTR(2)... .0090000E+00END
KRDN ••• i:RPTR(1)... •1205000E+02RPTR(2) ••• .2P.OOOOOE+OfEND
ICODE •••O lRU NO.4
KFOU ••• 1fPTR(1) •••• 1522100E+03FPTR(2) •••• OOOOOOOE+OOENO
KRON ••• 2RPT~{1) •••• 1205000E+02RPTR(2) •••• 2000000E+01ENO
leODE •••O lRU NO.5
KFON ••• 1FPTR(1}... .j522100E+03FPTR(2)... .ODOOOOOE+OOEHD
KRON ••• 2RPTR(1) •••• 1205000E+02RPTR(2) •••• 2000000E+01END
ICODE •••O lRU No.6
KFDN ••• 1FPTR(1)... .4555000E+02FPTR(2)... .OOOOOOOE+OOENO
KP~N ••• 2RPTR(1)... .2409000E+02RPTR(2)... .4000000E+01ENO
ICODE •••O lRU NO.7
KFDN ••• 1fPTR(1)... .4555000E+02FPTR(2)... .OOOOOOOE+OOENO
KRON ••• 2~PTR(1)... .2409000E+02RPTP.(2)... .4000000E+01EIIO
ICODE •••O LRU NO.8
KFON ••• 1FPTR(1)... .4555000E+02FPTR(2)... .OOOOOOOE+OOENO
KROll••• 2R~TR(1/" .2409000E+02RPTR(2)... .4000000E+01END
ICOOE •••O lRU NO.9
KFDIL •• 1FPTR(1)... .455S()()OE+02FP!R(2)... .OOOOOOOE+OOENO
KROll••• 2RPHl(1)... .2409(J~'JE+02RI'TR(2)..• .4000000~,t01ENO
ICOOE •••O lRU NO.1Q
KFDN ••• 1fP'iR(1)... .455S000E+02FPTR(2)... .OOOOOOOE+OOENO
KROll.•• 2J:.?TR(1)•.. •2409000E+02RPTR(2). •• .4000000EtOl EIIO
ICODE •••O lRU NO.11
KFDN ••• 1FPTR(1)... .4555000E+02FPTR(2)... .OOOOOOOE+OOEND
KRON ••• 2RPTR(1)... .2409000E+02RPTR(2)... .4000000E+01END
ICOOE •••O l.RU110.12
KFOII••• 3FPTR(1) •••• 1014700E+03fPTR(2) •••• 1100000E+01END
KROll... 2RPTR( 1)... .120?DDOE+02RPTlH2~... ·.200!ElDOE'}01END
ICODE •••O lRU HO.13 f
KFON ••• 3FPTR(1) •••• 1~14700E+03FPTR(Z) •••• 1100000E+01ENO
KRON... 2RPTR(1)... •re05000E+02RPTRC2). •• .2000000E+01ElID
ICODE •••O lRU lIo.14jl
KFON ••• 3FPTR(1)... .~014700E+O~FP1R(2)... .1100000E+01EIIO
KROll ••• 2RPTR(1) •••• 1205000E+02RPTR(2) •••• 2000000E+01ENO
ICOOE •••O lRU 110.15
KFON ••• 1FPTR(1) •••• 20258COE+03FPTR(2) •••• OOOOOOOE+OOENO
KRDlI••• 2RPTR(1) •••• 1205000E+02RPTR(2) •••• 2000000E+01ENO
lCODE •••O LRU NO.16
KFON. •• 1FPTR(1). .. .2025800E+03FPTR(2)... <OOOOO(lOE+OOEtlll
KRON ....2RPTR( 1)... .1205000E+02RPTR(2)... .2000000E+01END
ICODE •••Q LRU NO.17
KFDN ••• 1FPTR(1)... .2025800E+03fPTR(2)... .OOOOOOOE+OOENO
KRDN ••• 2RPTR(1)... .1205000E+02RPTR(2)... .2000000c+01EIID
lCODE •••O lRU NO.18
'tON, •• 1FPTR(1) •••• 1825000E+03FPTR(2) •••• 0000000E+00EIi0
KRDN. •• 2RPTR (J) •.. .4020000E+0 1RPTR(2) ••• .6700000E+00EIIO
ICOO1:...0 lRu NO,19
KFOII••• 1FPTR(1) •••• 182saOOE+03FPTR(2) •••• 0oooorOE+00END
KRON •., iR"~-R~:·~... .4020000E+01 RPTR(2). .. .6700000E+OOENO
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SUBROUTINE SYST
(ONLY THE RELEV .,A~iTSECl10N OF 1HE PROGRAM IS SHOWN)
c
C '1<***********************"'..,***********************************
C .. ENTER THE S'1STC:MFUNCTION HERE *
C* *
C .. lSYSUP .. - SYSTE~ STATUS, HAY BE LARGER THAN M *
C * KSlen - CCIM?OHF-fa STATUS, 0 OR 1 *
C *********1.***** ..**"'*************************1<****************
C
11 =. KST(i)*KST(2)"KST(3)*KST(6)"KST(12)*KST(15i*KST(18)+
QKST(1)*KST(2)"KST(3)*KST(6)*KSr(12)*KST(16)*KST(18)+
QKST(1)*KST(2)*KST(3)*KST(6)*KST(12)*KST(11)*KST(18}+
iKST(1)*KST(2)*KST(3)*KSt(6)*KST(12)*KST(15)*KST(19)+
QKST(1)*KST(2)~KST(3)*KST(6)*KST(12)*KST(16)*KST(19)+
QKST(1)*KST{2)*KST(3)*KST(6)*KST(12)*KST(11)*KST(19)
rz ~ KST(1~*KST(2}*KST(3)*KST(7)*KST(12)*KST(15)*KST(18)+
QKST(1r'KST(2)*KST(3)*KST(7)*KSi{12)*KST(16)*KSTC18)+
iKST(1)*KST(2)*KST(3)*K~T(1)*KST{12)*KST(11)*KST{18)+
QKST(1)*KST(2)*KST(3}*KST(1)*KST(12)*KST(15)*KST(19)+
QKST(1)~KgT(2)*KST{3)*KST(1)*KST(12}*KST(16>*KST(19)+
~ST(1)*KST(2)*KST(3)*KST(7)*KST(12)*KST(17)*KST(19)
, \
)
c
c
13 ~ KST(1)*KST(2)*KST(4)*KST(8}*KST(13)*KST(15)*KST(18)+
~ST(1 )*KST(2)*KST (4)*K'.)1(8)*KST( 13 i*KST (16)*KST (18)-1>
QKST(1)*KST(2)*KST(4)*KST(8)*KST('3}~KST(17}*KST(18)+
~ST {1)*KS1(2)*I(ST(4)*K'ST(8)*KST (13)*KST(15 )*"Sf( 19)+
QKST(1)*KST(2)*l(Sl(4)'4KST(8)"'KST(13)*KST(16)*KST(19)+
;ilKST(1)*KSl(2)*KST (4)*K5T (8)*KST( 13)*KST (17)*KST(19)
14 = KST(1)'4KST(2)*KST(4)*KST(9)*KST(13)*KST(15)*KST(18)+
aKST(1)*KST(2)*KST(4)*KST(9)*KST(~3)*KSr(16)*KST(18)+
;KST(1)*KST{2)*KST(4)*KST(9)*KST(13)*KST(17)*KST(18}+
@KST(1)*KST(2)*KS!(4)*KST(9)*KST(13)*KST(15)*KST(19)+
QKST(1)*KST(2)*KST(4)*KST(9)*KST(13)*KST(16)*KST(19)+
QKST(1)*KST(2)*KST{4)*KST(9)*KST(13)*KST(17)*KST(19)
15 = KST(1)*KST(2)*KST(5)*KST(10)*KST(14)*KST(15)*KST(18)+
iilKST(1 >*KST(2)*KST (5)*KST (10'*KST( 14)*KST(16)*KST( 18)+
QKST{11t*KST(2)*KST(5)*KST{10)*KST(14)*KST{17)*KST(18)+
GlKST(1iJ*KST(2)*KST(5)*KST{10)*KST(14)*KST(15)*KST(19)+
~Sj(1)*KST(2)*KST(5)*KST(10)*KSTC14)*~ST(16)*KST(19)+
ii;KST(1)*KSH2)*KST(5 )*KST( 10)*KST (14)"KST (17}*KST (19)
16 ~ KST(1)*KST(2)*KST(5)*KST(11)*KST{14)*KST(15)~KSr(18)+
iilKST(l)*KST(2)*I\'ST(5)*KST(11 )"KST (14)*KST(16)*K~H18"
QKST (1)"KST(2)*KST(S )*KSf( 11 )*KST(14 )*KST( 11)*KST{ 18)4
iilKST(1)*KST(2)*KST(5)*KSTC11>"Ksrl14)*KST(15)*KST!19)~
QKST(1)*KST(2)*KST(5)*KST(11)*KST(14)*KST(16>*KSTz~9)~
QKS'l'(1)*KS'f(2)*KST(5)*KST(11 )*KSr(14)*KSY{11)*KST. ~9)
C
c
I SYSUP:: I 1+12+I3+ I 4+1 5~' I 6
C
IF (ISYEUP.EQ.O) THEN
J:::J+1
TEMP2(J) ~ TEMF1
ENDIF
c
20 CONTINUE
c
C *********************************************
C .. FIND SMALLEST SYSTEM TIME TO FAILURE SYSF *
C ********1.************************************
C
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P~OUT - COMPONENTS SWITCHED OFF DURING SYSTEM
REPAIR WITH THE SYSTEM REPAIR TIME EQUAL TOTHE SUM OF
COMPONEI\Vf REPAIR TIMES (10 HISTORIES)
RUN NO. '!
INPUT BLOCK
TVPE OF RUN (0,1,DK 2) ••••••••••••• ,............... 1
REQUIRED NUMB~R OF SIWJLATEO SYSTEM FAILURES....... 10
NUMBER OF C(JoIPONENTSIIITHE SYSTEM................. 19
REPAIR SPECIF1CATION <1.2 O~ 3).................... 1
NUMBER OF CLASS INTERVALS. FOR RELIABILITY CALC ••". 15
CLASS INTERVAL WIOTH............................... 10.00
CaoIPNO. 1 ~COOE•• 0
KrOlL. 3 FPTR(1) •• .1140630E+04 FPTR(2) •• .(JOOOODOE+OO
KRDN •• 2 RPTR(1) •• •2920000E+01 RPTR(2) •• .5000000E+OO
Cct!PNO, 2 ICooE.. 0
KFDN •• 1 FP·rRO) •• •1520960E"'04 FPTR(?) •• .OOOOOOOE+OO
KRDN •• 2 RPTR(1) •• ,,29201)00E+01 RPTR(2) •• .5000000E+00
COMP NO.3 ICooE•• 0
KFON •• 1 FPTR(1) •• •1522100E+03 FPTR(2) •• .0000000£+00
KROll•• 2 RPTR(1) •• •1205000E+1)2 RPTR(2) •• .2000000E+01
COM? 110.4 lCooE•• 0
KFDN •• 1 FPTR(1) •• •15221001:+03 FPTR(2) •• .O(IOOOOOE+OO
KRON .. 2 RPTR(1).•• •1205000E+02 RPTR(2) .. .2000000E+01
COMP NO.5 ICooE •• 0
KFON" 1 FPTR(1) .. •'15221GOE+Q3 FPTR(21 •• .OOOOOOOE+(lO
KRuN .. 2 RPTR(1) •• .12D5000E+02 RPTR(2) •• .2000000E+01
\
COMP'NO.6 lCooE". 0
KfON•• 1 fPTR(1) •• •4555000E ..02 FPTR(Z} •• .OODOOOOE+OO
KRON •• 2 RPTR(1) .. •2409000E+02 RPTR(2) •• AOOOOOOE+01
COMP NO.1 lCODE •• 0
l<FOU•• 1 "'YTR(1).. •4555000E+02 FPTR(Z) .. .OOOOOOOE+OO
KRON •• 2 RPTR(1) .. .2409000E+02 RPTR(2) •• .4000000E+01
COIoIPNO.8 ICODE•• \.I
KFON •• 1 FPTRO>" .4555000E+02 fPTR(2) •• .OOOOQOOE+OO
KROll•• 2 RPTR(1 h. •2409000E+02 RPTR(2) •• .4000000E+0'1
COMP NO.9 ICODE•• 0
KFON •• 1 FPTR(1) .. .4555000E ...02 FPTR(Z) •• .OOQOOO()E+OO
KRON •• 2 RPTR{1,)•• .2409000E+02 RPTR(2) •• .4000000E+01
COMP NO.10 ICODE•• 0
KFIlN.. 1 FPTR(1) •• •4555000E+02 FPTR(2) •• .00OOOOOE+110
KRON •• 2 RPTR(1) •• .Z4090(lOf+02 RPTR(2) •• .400000IJE+01
COMP NO.11 ICODE•• 0
KfDN •• 1 FPTR(1) .. •4555000E+02 FPTR(2) •• .OOOtJOOOE+OO
KRON .. 2 RPTR(1) •• .2409000E+02 RI>TR(2)•• .4000000E+01
~OMP 110.12 ICODE•• V
KFDN •• 3 FPTR(1) .. .1014700E+03 FPTR(2} .. .1100000E+01
KRON •• 2 RPTR(1) •• .•1205GOOE+02 RPTR(2) •• .2000000E+01
COMP NO.13 ICooE•• 0
KFDII•• 3 FPTR(1) •• •1014700E+03 FPTR(2) •• •1100000E+01
KRDN •• 2 RPTR(1) •• .1?05000E+tl2 RPTR(2) •• .200l)000E+01
COMP NO.14 feOOE•• 0
Y.FON.. 3 FPTR(1) .. .1014700E+03 FPTR(2) .. .1'IMOOOE+Ol
KRON •• 2 RPTR(1) •• •'205000E+02 RPTR(2) .. .2000000E+01
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CQ4P NO.'S IeDOE ••. O
KrDN •• 1 FPTR(1) •• .202580CE+03 FPTR(Z) •• .OOOOOOOE+OO
t:RD!l •• 2 RPTR(1) •• •1205000E+02 RPTR(2) •• .2000000E+01
COM? ~O.16 ICODE •• 0
KFCN •• 1 FPTR(D •• .2025800E+C3 F?TR(2) •• .OOOO()OCE+OO
~~nDN.-. 2 ~PTR(1) •• .12050000+02 RPTR(2) •• .200t}'100E+01
COMP NO.1; ICODE •• 0
"filM •• 1 FPTR(1).•• .2025800E+03 FPTR(2) •• .OOOOOOOE+OO
KRON •• 2 RPTR(i) •• •1205000E+02 RPTR(2) •• .20COOOOE+01
tOMP NO.1!) {CODE •• o I
KfuN •• 1 F?TRCU •• •1825000E+03 F~TR(2),. .00000001:+00
KRDII •• 2 RPTR(1) •• .4020000E+:J1 RPTR(2) •• .6700000E+OO
COMP NO.19 lCOOE •• 0
YFDN •• 1 FPTR(1) •• .1825000E+03 FPTR(2) •• .c':<U:GOE+QO
KRDtl •• 2 RPTR(1) •• .4020000E+O~ R~lR(2) •• •.XOOi>:;!lE+OG
OUTPUT BLOCK
AVAILABILIty BLOCK
A\lERAGI;UPTlML ••
AVERAGE ONTIME •••
41.50
145.09
SIGMA ••••••
SIGMA ......
15.69
40.16
AVERAGE AVAIlABlLlTY.. .22.. SIGMA..... .041'
THE 90 PERCENT CONFI.llENCELEVEl... c 19
THE 95 PER~ENT COHFt~EHCE L€VEl... .1&
RELIABILITY BLOCK
MEAN LIFE ••••••••••••••••• 41.50
SICMA •••••• •••••••• ..".~. 15.69
REVABILlll DISTRIBUTION
TIME fREClUENCY R95L RMLE
10.00 0 .741 1.000
20.00 1 .700 .900
30.130 i .370 .soo
40,u' 4 .()82 .400
5, ·.f." 1 .035 .300
60.,'0 2 .coo .100
70.M ° .000 .10080.00 1 .000 .000
90.00 0 .000 .000
100.00 0 .000 .000
110.00 0 .000 .000
120.0() 0 .000 .oon
130.00 0 .000 .000
140.00 0 .000 .~OO
150.00 a .000 .000
OVERFLOW 0 .000
NUMBER OF CLASS INTERVALS ••••• 15
CLASS INTERVAL WIDTH •••••••••• 10.00
MAXIMUM SYSTEM FAILURE TIME ••• 71.90
MtNlMUH SYSTEM FAILURE TIME ••• 19.74
FAILURE BLOCK
COMPONENT NO. NUMg~R OF FAILURES
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1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11. I
12'"
13
~4
15
16
17
18
19
o
o
3
3
1
5
6
9
a
8
8
6
2
It
2
3
3
4
6
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Rft..MOUT - COMPONENTS SWfi'CHED OFF DURING SYSTEM
REP .AJRWITH THE SYS1EM REPAIR TIME EQUAL TO THE SUM OF
COMPONENT REPAIR TIMES (50 HISTORIES)
RUN NO. t
INPUT SLOCK
'("(PEOF RUIICO,l,OR 2)., ••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 1
REQUIRED N~~BEn OF SIMULATED SYSTEM FAllURES ••••••• 50
NUMBER OF COMPONENTS IN THE SYSTF.M••••••••••••••••• 19
REPAIR SPECIF!CATION (1.2 OR 3) •••••••••••••••••••• ,
NUMBER OF CLASS lNTERVALS FO~ RELIABILITY CALC ••• . 15
CLASS INTERVAL W1DTH •••••••••••••••.••••••••••••••• 10.00
COMP NO. 1 ICOOE •• 0
KFDN •• 3 I'PTR(1)•• •1140630E+04 FPTR(2, •• .9000000E+OO
KilDH•• 2 RPTR(h .. •2920000F.+01 RPTR(2) •• .5('OOOQOE+O<)
COMP NO.2 ICOOE •• 0
KFOII •• 1 FPTR(1) •• •1520960E+04 FPflH2) •• ~nOOOOOOE+OO
KRON •.:2 RPTR(1) ." .'29<.uOOOE+01 RPTR(2) •• .5000000E+OO
COfIP 110.3 rCO!)!:..0
KFDN •• 1 FPTR(1) •• •152l100E+03 FPTR(2) •• .O()OOOOIlE+OO
KRDN •• 2 RPTi1(1'•• •nOS()OOE+02 RPTR(2) •• .2000coaE+01
COM? NO.4 leODE •• 0
KFON., 1 FPTi-",.)•• •1522100E+03 FP'TR(2)•• .OOOOOOOE+OO
KROll•• 2 RrTR(1) •• •1205000E+02 RPTR(2) •• •<'1100000E+01
COMP NO.5 leaDS •• 0
KFON •• 1 FPTR(1) .. •1522100E+03 FPTR(2) •• .OOOOOOOE+OO
KROll•• 2 RPTR(1) •• •120S000E+02 RPiR(2) •• .C!000000E+01
COMP HO. 6 leOOE •• 0
KFDN •• 1 FPTR(1) •• .4555000E+02 FPTR(2) •• .OOOOOOOE+OO
KI1PN•• 2 Ri'TR(1).. •240900CE+02 RPTR(2) .. .4000000E+01
COHP NO.7 ICODE •• 0
KrDN •• 1 fPTR(1, • •4555000E+02 FPTR(2l .. .OOOOOOOE+OO
KRDN •• 2 RPTR(1) •• •2409000E+02 RPTR(2) .. .4000000E+07
COMP NO.8 ICODE •• 0
KfDN •• 1 FPTR(1) •• •4555000E+02 FPTR(2) •• .OOOOOOOE+OO
KRDN .. 2 RPTRO) •• •2409000E+02 RPTR(2) •• .4raOOOOE+01
COMP NO.9 ICODE •• 0
KFON •• 1 FPTR(1) •• •4555000E+02 FPTR(2) •• .OOOOOOOE+QO
KRDN •• 2 RPTR(1) .. •2409000E+02 RPTR(2) •• .4000000E+01
COMP 110.10 ICODE •• 0
KFDII •• 1 I'PTR(1)•• .455S000E+02 FPTR(2) •• .OOOOOOOE+OQ
KRON •• 2 RPTR( 1).... •2409000E+02 RPTR(2) .. .40000001.:+01
COMP NO.11 leaDE •• 0
KFDIl•• , FPTR(1) •• .4555000E+02 FPTR(2) •• .OOOOOOOE+OO
KRDIl•• 2 RPTR(1) .. •2409000E+02 RPTR(2) •• .4000000E+01
COMP 110.12 IC()(IE•• 0
KFON .. 3 FPTR(1) •• •1014700E+03 FPTR(2) •• .11000001:+01
KRDII •• <! RPTR(1) .. •1205000E+02 RPTR(2) •• .2000000E+01
CQMP NO.13 JCOOE •• 0
KrnN .. 3 FPTR(1) •• •1014700E+03 FPTR(2) •• .1100000£+0·1
KRDN •• 2 RPTR(1) .. •1205000E+CJ2 R?TR(2) .. .2000000E+01
COMP 110.14 ICODE •• 0
KfDN .. 3 FPTR(1) .. .10147001:+03 FPTR(2) •• .1100000E+01
KRDN •• 2 RPTR(1) •• •1205000E+02 RPTR(2) •• .2000000E ...01
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COHP NO.15 lCODE •• 0
KFDN •• 1 FPTR(1) •• .2025800£+03 FPTR(2) •• .OOOOOOOE+OO
KRON •• 2 RPTR(1) •• •12050001:+02 RPTR(2) •• .2000000E+01
COMP NO.16 ICODE •• 0
KFDN •• 1 FPifH1) •• .2025800E+03 FPTR(2) •• .OOOOOOOE+OO
KRON •• 2 RPTR(1) .. .1205000£+02 RPTR(2) •• .20000DOE+01
COHP UO.17 ICCOE •• 0
;:FIlM•• 1 FPTR(1) •• .2025800f+03 FPTR(2) •• .0030000E+00
KRON •• 2 RPTR(1) •• •1205000E+02 RPTR(2) •• .2000()OOE+01
COHP NO.'8 ICODE •• 0
KFDk •• 1 fPTR(l, •• .18250001:+03 fPTR(Z) •• .OOOOOOOE+OO
KRON... 2 RPTR(1) •• .4020000E+01 R!'TR(2) •• .6700000E.00
COMP kO.19 ICODE •• 0
KFDN •• 1 FPTR(1) •• .1825000E+03 FPTR(2) •• .OOOOOOOE+OO
KRON ••.i! RPTR(1) •• .4020000E+01 RPTR(2) •• •6100000E+00
OUTPUT S!.OCK
AVAI~ABI!.ITY BLOCK
AVERAGE I.' ~ lME •••
AVERAGE ",f rIME•••
50.40
133.75
SIGMA ••••••
SIGMA ••••••
AVERAGE AVAIlA81lITV.. .27 SIGMA ••••••
~6.99
38.54
.02
THE 90 PERCENT COI,IFIDENCE!.EVEl... .25
THE 9S PERCENt CONFIDENCE LEVEL... .25
RElIAB!tIT',.'BLOCK
MEAN LlfE ••••••••••••••••• 50.40
SIGMA .......... ., , " •••••• 26.99
RELIABILITY DISTRISU'flON
TIME FREQUENCY R95L RMlE
10.00 3 .874 .940
20.00 2 .830 .900
30.00 4 .731 .820
40.00 8 .550 .660
50.00 11 .325 .440
60.00 9 .158 .260
70.00 5 .075 .160
80.00 2 .039 .120
90.00 4 .001 .040
100.00 0 .001 .040
110.00 0 .b01 .040
120.00 0 .001 .040
130.00 1 .000 .020
140.00 0 .000 .020
150.00 0 .OCO .O~O
OVERFLOW .cec
NUHIlER CF CLASS .lNTl:RVAlS••••• 1~
CLASS !IlTF.RVALWIDTH ..... ,.... 10,00
MAXIMUM SYSTEM FAILURE TIME ••• 154.62
MINIMUM SYSTEM FAilURE lIME ••• 8.49
I),
FAItURE BLOCK
COMPONENT NO. NUMBER OF FAILURES
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)[ ,
1 1
2 1
3 12
4 16
5 9
6 29
7 26
8 40
9 34
11) 37
11 35
12 26
13 18
14 18
15 12
16 ~1
17 13
1t 12
19 18
0,~J
,\
Ii
il
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RAMOUT - COMPONENTS SWITCHED OFF DURING SYSTEM
REPAIR WrIH THE SYSTEM REPAIR TIME EQUAL TO TI1E SUM OF
COMPONENT REPAIR TIMES (100 H~STORIES)
RUN NO. t
INPUT BLOCK
TYPE OF RUN (0,1,OR 2} ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• ,
ReOUrR~O NUMBER OF SIMULATF.D SYSTEM FAILURES ••••••• 100
NUMBER OF COMPONENTS IN THE SYSTEH ••••••••••••••••• 19
REPAIR SPEC1FICATION (1,2 OR 3)•••••••••••.••••••••1
NUMBER OF CLASS INTERVALS fOR RELIABtLITY CALC ••••• 15
CLAS~ INTERVAL WlDTH ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 10.00
r;OMP NO. 1 lCOOE •• 0
KFON •• 3 I'PTR(1).. .1140630E+04 FPTR(2)". .9000000E+00
KRON .. 2 RPTR(1} •• •2920000E+O 1 RPTR(2) ... .5000000E+OO
CQMP NO.2 ICODE •• 0
KFO~. 1 FPTR(1) •• .15209601:+04 FPTIH2) •• .OOOOOODE+DO
KRD ~ 2 RPTR(1) •• .2920000E+01 RPTR(2) •• .5000000E+00
COHP NO.3 ICODEll 0KFf.'IN":,.1 FPTR( 1)•• .1522100E+03 FPTR(2). • .00000001::+00
KRON •• 2 RPTR(1) •• •1205000E+02 RPTR(2) .. .2000000E+01
COMP NO.4 ICODE •• 0
KfOH •• 1 FPTR(1) •• •15221001:+03 FPTR(2;'•• .OOOOOOOE+OO
KROlL. 2 RPTR(1) •• •1205000E+02 RPTR(2:I•• .200QOOOE+01
COMP NO. 5 I CODE •• 0
KFDN •• 1 fPTR(1) .. •1522100E+03 FPTR(2:!•• •QOOOOOOE+OO
KRON •• 2 RPTR(1) .. •1205000E+02 RPTR(t;)., •;!OOOOCOH01
I
C,J!.IPNO.6 ICOOE •• 0
KfPN •• 1 FPTR(1) •• •4555000E+02 FPTR(2) •• .OOOOOOOE+OO
KRON •• 2 RPTR(1) .. •2409COOE+02 RPTR(2) •• .4000000E+01
COMP NO.7 ICODE •• 0
KFDN •• 1 FPTR(1) •• .455500DE+02 FPTR(2) •• .00OOOdOE+OO
KRDN .. 2 RPT~(1) .. .2409000Ei02 RP"fR(2)•• .4000000E+01
COMP NO.8 ICODE •• 0
KFDN .. 1 FPTR(1) .. •4555000E+02 :;PTR(2)•• .01)00000E+00
KRON .. 2 I<PTR(1).. •2409000E+02 RPTR(2) •• .4000000E+01
COMP NO. 9 JCOI.\E.. 0
KFOIl•• 1 FPTR(1) .. .4555000E+02 FPTR(2) •• .OOOOOOOE+OO
KROll •• 2 RPTR(1) •• •2409000E+02 RPTR(2) •• .4000000E+01
COMP NO.10 JCODa~. 0
KFDN •• 1 FPTR(1) •• •455500(jE+02 FPTR(2i •• .00I)OOOOE+OO
KRDw .. 2 RPTR(1) •• •2409000E+02 RPTR(2) .. .400001l0€+01
COM? NO.11 lCCOE •..0
KFDN •• 1 FPTR(1) ••
KRON •• ~ RPTR(1) ••
COMP NO.12 ICODE •• 0
KFDN •• 3 FPTR(1) ••
KRON •• 2 RPTR(1) ••
COMP Hr., '. lCOOE •• 0
I ~FDN .. 3 \~PTR(1)..
KRDN.. 2 l\'PTR(1) ..
COMP NO.14 ICOOE •• 0
KFDN •• 3 F~TR(1) ••
KRON., 2 RP'iR'(1}..
.455:S000E+1l2 FPTR(2) .. .OOOOOOOE"'OO
.2409000E+02 RPTR(2) •• .4QOO(\OOE+01
.1014700F.o}03 FP'fR(2).. .1100000E+01
"12()'5000E+02 l<PTR(2)•• .20000(lOE+01
.1014700E+0'3 FPTR(2) •• •11OOOOO~+o 1
•1205000E·.02 RPTR(2) .. .2000000E+01
.10147001:-03 FPTR(2) .. •11(;00001:+01
•1205000E+02 iRPTR(2) •• .2GOOOOOE+01
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COMP NO.15 ICODE •• 0
KFDN •• 1 FPTIH1) •• .2025800E+03 FPTR(2) •• .OOOOOOOS+OO
KRD!l•• 2 RPTR(1) •• •1205000E+02 RPTR(2) •• .200000QE+Ol
COMP HQ.16 {CODE •• 0
KFDN •• 1 FPTR(i) •• .2025800E+03 FPTR(Z) •• .OOOOOOOE+OI)
KRDlI•• 2 RPTR(1) •• •12050fJOE+02 RPTRr.2)•• .2000000E+01
;}'
COMP NO.\~1 ICOOE •• 0
.2025800E+03 .OOOOO(lOE+OO\\ KFOIl•• 1 FPTR(t) •• FPTR(Z) ••
\\ KROll•• 2 RPTR(l) •• •1205000E~02 RPTR(2) •• .2000000EiOl
COMP NO.1S ICOOE •• 0
KFOIl•• 1 FPTR(1) •• .1825000E+03 FPTR(2) •• .0aOOOOOE+OO
KROll•• 2 RPTR(1) •• •4020000E+0 1 RPTR(2) •• .6700000E+OO
COMIGtcO.19 lCOOE •• 0
KFON •• 1 FPTR(1) •• .18250001:+03 FPTR(2) •• .OOOOOOOE+OO
KRON •• 2 RPTR(l) •• .402QOI)OE+01 RPTR(2] •• .6700000E+00
OUTPUT BLOCK
AVAILABILITY BLOCK
AVERAGE UPTIME •••
AVERAGE DijTIME•••
50.43
134.36
SIGMA ••••••
!:IGHA••••••
24.99
42.38
.01AVERAGE AVAILABIL{TY ••• 21 SlGMA ••••••
THE 90 PERCENT CONFIOENCF. LEVEL... .26
THE 95 PERCENT CONFIDENCE LElfEL... .25
RELIABILITY BLOCK
ME~~ LIFE ••••••••• ~i...... 50.43
SIGi'-', ~~•••••• 24.99
,I
i'
:RE("IASILIlY DISTRIBUTIOiI
ifI,
// TIME FREQUENCY R95L RMLE
10.00 4 .923 .960
20.00 6 .851, .900
::;1).00 9 .145 .810
40.00 14 .593 .670
50.00 21 .378 .460
60.00 17 .215 .290
10.00 14 .091 .150
80.0(1 3 .067 .120
90.00 8 .014 .040
100.00 0 .014 .040
110.00 1 .008 .030
120.00 1 .004 .020
130.00 1 ,001 .010
140.00 0 .001 .010
~50.00 0 .001 .010
OVERFLOW .000
NUMBER OF CLASS INTERVALS ••••• 15
CLASS INTERVAL WIDTH .......... 10.00
MAXIMUM SYSTEM fAILURE TIME ••• 1~4.62
MINIMUM SYSTEM FAILURE TIME ••• 4.62
FAILURE BLOC~
COMPONENT NO. NUMBER OF FAILURES
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1 4
2 2
3 30
4 32
S 20
6 64
7 56
8 74
9 69
10 69
11 65
12 51
13 4a
14 45
15 19
16 22
17 31
18 24
19 32
()
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RAMOUT - COMPONENTS SWITCHED OFF DURING SYSTEM
REPAIR WITH THE SYSTEM REPAIR TIME EQUAL TO THE SUM OF
COMPONENT REPAIR 'flMES (5000 HISTORIES)
RUN NO. 1
INPUT BLOCK
TYPE OF RUN (D,1,OR 2) •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
REQUIRF.D NUMSE~ OF SIMULATED SYSTEM FAIlURcS •••••••
NUMBER OF COMPONENTS 1N THE SYSTEM ••••••••• '"••••••
REPAIR SPECJfICAHON (1~2 OR 3) .
i~UMBER OF CLASS INTERVALS FOR RELIABILITY CALC•••••
CLASS UITERVAL WIDTH •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
1
5000
19
1
15
10.00
COMP NO.1 ICOOI: •• 0
KFDH •• 3 FPTR(1) •• •11406301:+04 fPTR(2) •• .9000000E+OO
KRON •• 2 RPTRCU •• .2920000E+01 RPTR(2) •• .5000000E+OO
COMP NO.2 ICODE •• 0
KFON •• 1 FPTR(1) •• •1520960E+04 FPTR(2) •• .OOOOOOOET()O
KRDN •• 2 RPTR(1) •• •2920000ET01 RPTR(2) •• .50nOOOOE+OO
CeMP NO.3 lCOOE •• 0
KFDN •• 1 fPTR(1} •• ..1~22100E+03 fPri«2) •• .ODOOUOGE+OO
KRDN •• 2 RPTR(1) •• .120~g,OOET02 RPTR~J)' • .2000000E+01
COMP NO.4 [CODE •• 0
KFIlN•• 1. FPTR(1 )•• •1522100E+03 fPTR(2)" .OOOOOOOE+OO
KR,')N •• ~ RPTR(1) •• .120SI;'1I0E+02RPTR(2) •• .2000000E+01
(
COMP NO.5 lCeOE •• 0
J{Ftlli•• 1 FPTR(1) •• •1522100E+03 FPTR(2) •• .OOOOOOOE+OO
KRD~I.. 2 RPTR(i) ..• •120S0aOE+02 RPTR(2) •• .2000000::+01
COMP NO.6 ICODE •• 0
KFDN •• 1 FPTR(l) ••• 4555000E+02 FPTR(2) ••• OOOOOOOE+OO
KROll•• 2 RPTR(1).. .2409000E+02 RPTR(2).. .4000000E+01
COMP 110. 7 lCODS •• 0
KFDN •• 1 FPTR(1).. •4555000E+02 ~PTR(2).. .OOOOOOOE+OO
KRDII•• 2 RPTR(1).. •2409000E+02 RPTR(2).. .4000000E+01
COM? NO.8 ICOOE •• 0
KFON •• 1 FPTR(1).. .4S55000E+02 FPTR(2).. .OOOOOOOE+OO
KROll.. a RPTR(1).. .2409000£+02 RPTR<Z).. .4000000E+01
.:;>
COMP NO.9 ICOOE •• 0
KFDN •• 1 FPTR(1) •• .4555000E+02 FPTR(2) •• .OOOOOOOE+OO
KRDII•• 2 RI>TR(1).. •2409000E+02 RPTR(2) •• .4000000E{01
COMP 110.10 lCODE •• 0
XFDN •• 1 FPTR(1) •• .4555000E+0.2 FPTR(2) •• .00000001:+00
KRDN •• 2 RPTR(1) •• •11·09000E+02 RPTR(2) •• .4000000E+01
Coop 110.11 tCODF. . 0
KFOII.. 1 FPY:·~1) •• •4555000E~,Q2 FPTR(2) •• .0OOOOOllE+OO
KROll•• 2 RP"ii<(1).. .2~09000E+02 RPTR(2) •• .4000000E+01
COMP NO.12 ICOOE., 0
KFOH •• 3 FPTR(1).. .1014700£+03 FPTR(2).. •11DOOOOE+01
KRDN •• 2 RPTR(1).. .1205000E+02 RPTR(2).. .2000000E+01
COMP NO.13 I~CCE •• 0
KFDN •• 3 FPTR(1) ••• 1014700E+03 fPTR(2) ••• 1100000E+01
KROll•• 2 RPTR(1).. .12G5000E+02 RPTR(2).. .2000000E+01
COMP NO.14 ICODE •• 0
KFDN •• 3 FP;R(1).. .1014700£+03 FPTR(2).. •1100000E+01
KRDN •• 2 RPTR(1).. .1205000E+02 RPTR(2).. .2000000E+01
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COMP NO.15 lCOOE •• 0
KI'DN•• 1 fPTR(1),. •2025800E+03 frTR(2) •• .0000(,,'JE+OO
KROil•• 2 RPIR(1) •• •1205000E+02 RPTR(2) •• .2000000E+()1
COMr NO.16 tCODE •• 0
KFDN •• 1 fPTR(1) •• •2025800E+03 FPTR(2) •• .OOCOOOOE+OO
KRDM •• 2 RFTlt(1)•• •12C5000E+02 RPTR(2) •• .200000CE+Gt
COM? NO.17 (CODE •• 0
KFDN •• 1 FPTR(1) •• •2025800E·03 FF'TR(2)•• .O(JOOOOOE+OO
KRDN •• 2 RPTR(1} •• .1205000£+02 RPTR(2)." .2000000E+01
CI.lIP NO.18 ICOOE •• G
KFON •• 1 fPTR(1) •• .1BZSOOOE+Ol fPTR(2) •• .OOOOOOOE+(JO
KRON •• 2 RPTR'1) •• .40?'000QE+Ol RPTR(2) •• .6700000E+00
COMP NO.19 !COCE •• 0
KFON •• 1 FPTR(1) •• .18250001:+03 FPTR(2) •• .fJOOOOOOF.+OO
KRDN •• 2 RPTR(1) •• .4020000E+Ol RPTR(2) •• .67000001:+00
OUTPUT BLOCK
AVAILABILITY BLOCK
AVERAGE UPTIME •••
AVERAGE ONT1ME •••
53.67
135.4U
SIGMA ••••••
SIGMA ••••••
SIGMA ••••••
28.87
39.97
.00AVERAGE AVAILABILITY ••• 28
THE 9C PERCENT CONFIDENCE LEVEL... .28
THE 95 PERCENT CONFIDENCE LEVEL... .28
RELIABILITY BLOCK
MEAN lIFE ••••••••••••••••• 53.61
$100 •••••.•••••.••••••••. 28.87
RELIABILITY DISTRiBUTION
TIME FREQUENCY R95L P.."!lE
10.00 109 .975 .978
20.00 328 .906 .913
30.00 571 .789 .198
40.00 714 .632 .644
50.00 811 .470 .481
60.00 649 .340 .352
70.00 55:', .7.31 .241
80.00 393 .153 .162
90.00 296 .096 .103
100.00 173 .062 .068
110.00 115 .040 .045
120.00 83 .025 .029
130.00 48 .016 .019
140.00 41 .008 .011
150.00 21 .005 .007
OVERFLOW 33 .000
NUMBER OF CLASS INTERVALS ••••• 15
CLASS INTERVAL WIDTH •••••••••• 10.GO
MAXIMUM SYSTEM fAILURE TIME ••• 217.58
MiNHiUM SYSTEM FAILURE TIME ••• .03
FAILURE BLOCK
COMPOOENT NO. NUMBER OF FAILURES
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1 199
2 180 :.~,j,
3 1444
4 1532
5 1533
6 3453
7 3466
8 3377
9 3384
10 3384
11 3309
12 2197
13 2169
14 2142
15 1168
16 1115
11 1220
18 1312
19 1322
168
n1'--·,
RAMOUT - COMPONENTS SWITCHED OFF DURING SYS1EM
REPAIR WITH THE SYSTEM REPAIR TIME EQUAL TO THE
MAXIMUM COMPONENT REPAIR TIME
RUW NO. 2
INPUT BLOCK
TYPE OF RUN ~(l,1,OR 2) ••••••••••••• ,.•••_•••••••••• 1
REQUIRED N~BER OF flMUlATEO SYSTEM FAtlURES ••••••• 5000
NUMBER OF COMPDHENTS IN THE 5YSTEM ••••••••••••••••• 19
REPAIR SPEClr-ICATIOH (i,2 OR 3) •••••••••••••••••••• 2
NUMBER OF ~~ASS INTERVALS FOR RElIAalllTY CAlC ••••• 15
CLASS iNTERVAL W1Ol'H••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 10.00
COMP NO. 1 lCOOE •• 0
1(1"01(•• 3 FPTR(1) •• .11406301:+04 FPTR(2) •• .9000000E+00
KRDII•• 2 RPTR(1) •• •2920000E+01 RPTR(2) •• .5000000E+00
COMP NO.2 ICODE •• 0
KJON •• 1 FPTR(1) •• •1520960E+04 FPTR(2) •• .0000000E+01)
"RON •• 2 RPTR(1) •• •292ooooE+01 RPTR(2) •• .50DOOOOE+00
CQHP NO.3 lCOOE •• 0
KFDN •• 1 FPH(1) " •1522100E+03 FPTR(2) •• .OOOOOOOE+OO
KRDN .. 2 RPTR(1) •• •1205000E+07- RPTR(2) •• .2000000E+1)1
COMP NO.4 ICODE •• 0
KFON •• 1 ;:PTR(1)•• •F ;'lOGE+03 FPTR(2) •• .OOOOOOOE+OO
KROll•• 2 RPTR(1) •• •~2u3000E+02 RP'PW!) •• .2000000E+Ot
COMP NO.5 iCODE,. 0
KFON •• 1 FPTR(1) •• •1522100E+03 I:plR(2)•• .OOOOOOOE+OO
KROH.. 2 RPTR(1) •• •1205000E+02 ~PTR(2) •• .2000000E+01
COMP NO.6 ICOOE •• 0 '.1
KFON •• 1 !'PTR(1).. •4555000E+02 FPTR(2) •• .OQ"9000E+GO
KROll•• 2. RPTR(l) .. •2409000E+02 RPTR(2) •• .400UOOOI;+01
COMP NO.7 ICODE •• 0
KFOII•• 1 FPTR(1) •• .4555000E+02 fPTR(2) •• .OOOOOOOE+OO
KRDN •• 2 RPTR(1) •• .2409()00E+02 RPTR(2) •• .4000000E+01
COMP NO. 8 ICODE •• 0
KFON •• 1 FPTR(1) •• •4555 000E+02 FPTR(2), • .OOOOOOOE+OO
,"RDN •• 2 RPTR(1) .. •2409000E+02 RPTR(2) •• .400oo00E+01
COMP NO.9 ICODE•• 0
KFON •• 1 FPTR(1 )•• .I,555000E+02 FPTR(?) •• .0000000£+00
KRON •• 2 RPTR(1) .. •2409000E+02 RPTR(i::)•• .4000000E+01
COHP 110.10 reODE •• 0
Ii
KrilN .. 1 FPTR(1} .. •4555000E+02 FPTR(2: •• .OOOOOOOE+OO
KRON •• 2 RPTR(1) •• .2409000E+02 RPTR(7.)•• .4000000E....01
COMP 110.11 ICOOE •• {.}
KFOII•• 1 FPTR(1} •• .455S0001:+0? FPTR(2) •• .OOOOGOOE+OO
KI<!.JN•• 2 RPTR(1) •• •2409000E+02 RPTR(2) •• .4000000E+01
CQMP 110.12 ICOOE •• 0
KFDN •• 3 FPTR(1) •• .1014700E+03 FPTIH2) •• •11000(iOE+01
KROll•• 2 RPTRO) •• •1205000E+02 RPTR(2) •• .2000000E+01
COMP 110.13 ICOOE •• 0
KFOII•• 3 FPTf!(1)•• .1014700E+03 FPTR(2) •• •1100000E+01
KRON •• 2 RPTR(1) •• .1205000E+02 RPTR(2) •• .200ftOI\OF:t01
COMP NO.14 lCODE•• 0
KFDN •• 3 FPTR(1) •• .1014700E+03 FPTR(Z) •• .1100000E+01
KRON •• 2 RPTR(1) •• .1205000t:+02 RPTR(2) •• .20000tlQf;+01
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..OM? ~O.15, leOOE_. 0 \_;
KFOII •• 1 FPTR( 1)•• .20258(!OE+03 FPTR(2) •• .OOOOOOOE+OO
K1(£'N •• 2 RPT~(1)•• •1205000E+02 RPTP.(2)•• .2000000E+01
CaMP 110.16 leOOE •• 0
KFDN •• 1 FPTR(1l.. .2025800E+03 FPTR(2l •• •QOOOOOClE+OO
KRON •• 2 RPTR(1) •• •1205000£+02 RPTR(2) •• .2000000E+01
COMP NG.17 leOOE •• 0
KFDN •• 1 FPtR(1) •• •2025800Et03 FPTR(2) •• .OOOOOOO~+OO
"RON •• 2 RPTR!1) •• .1205000£+02 RPTR(2) •• .2000000E+01
COM!> 110.18 [COOE •• 0
KFON •• 1 fPTR(1) •• •1825QOOE+03 fPTR(2) •• .OOOOOOOE+I)O
KilliN •• 2. R.'TR(1)•• •4020000£+01 RPTI«2) •• .67000001:,"015
CCI'~ HO.19 ICOOE •• 0
KFON •• 1 FPTR(1) •• •1825000E+03 FPTR(2) •• .000000'38:+00
KROlL. 2 P.PTR(1)•• .4021J00OE;+01 RPTR(2) •• •6700000E+OO
OUTPUT BLOC--)
._"
(-'(
AVAILABILITY Bl~CK
AVERAGE UPTIME •••
AVERAGE ONTIME •••
53.67
27.68
SIGMA), ••••
SIGMA~ ••',,'
28.87
4.01
AVERAGE AVAilABIliTY.. .66 SIGMA •••••• .00
THE 90 PERCENT CONFIDENCE LEVEL... .66
THE 95 PERCEHT CONFIDENCE LEVEL... .66
REllABIlITY BLOCK
MEAN LIFE ••••••• ,••••••••• 53.67
SIGMA •••••••••••••••••• ~•• 28.87
RELIABILITY DISTRIBUTION
molE F~EQI.)ENCY R951. RMLE
10.0U 109 .975 .978
20.00 328 .906 .913
30.00 571 .789 .798
40._QO 774 .632 .644
5Q~b\l 811 .470 .481
60.00, 649 .340 .352
70.00 555 .231 .241
80.00 393 .153 .162
90.00 296 .096 .103
100.00 173 .062 .068
110.00 ri~... .040 .045
120.00 0) .025 .029
'130.00 48 .016 .019
140.00 41 •.008 .011
150.00 21 .005 .007
G'J~RflOW 33- .ocn
NUMBER OF CLASS tNTERVALS ••••• 15
CLASS INTERVAl. WIOTH •••••••••• 10.00
~iAXlMUM SYSTEM FAILURE TIME ••• 217.~8
MINIMUM SYSTEM FAIlU?E TIME ••• .i:J3
FAILURE BLOCK
COMPONENT NO. NUMBER OF FAilU~F.S
(I
17()
~i
1 199." 180t.;
3 1444
4 () 1'S"S2
5 1.'~33
.6 :Yt53
/, 7 ~460
8 3377
9 3384
10 3384
11 33n9 /,
12 ~'97 I!
13 21:69 II14 2142
15 1168
16 1115
17 1220
18 1312
19 1322
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R.~><MOUT- COMPONENTS LEFr ON DURiNG SYSTEM REPAIR
WITH TIlE SYSTEM REPAIR TIME EQUAL TO THE SUM OF
COMPONENT REPAIR TIMES I:
RUN 110. 3
INPUT BLOCK
T~PE OF RUN (u,1.OR Z, .
REQUIR~D NUMP':;::OF SIMULATED SYSTEM FAILURES •••••••
HUItlaF.R OF COMPONENTS HI THE SYSTEM .
REI)AIR SPECiFICATION (1,2 OR 3) .
ilU"!6cR (ir i:i.i\;jS lNTERVALS FOR RElU"BI',[TV rALe ..
CLASS INTERVAL ~IOTH••••••••••••••••••••••.••••••••
2,
5000
19
1
15
10.00
COMP NO.1 ICOOE•• 0
KFPN •• 3 FPTR( 1) •• .114Of3~4 FPTR(2) •• .9000000E+OO
KRON •• 2 RnR(1) •• •2929!l1l0E+01 RPTR(2) •• .5000000E+00
CCHP'NO. 2 tCODE., 0
KFOI-I •• . FPTR(1 ).. •1$20960£:+04 fPTP.(t!)•• .OOOOOOOE+OOI
KIiD'II •• 2 RPTR(1) •• .Z92000IJE+01 RPTR(2) •• .5000000E+OO
COMP NO.3 lCooE •• 0
KFDN •., 1 fPTR(1) •• •1522100E+03 fPTR(2~ •• .OOGOOOOE+OO
KRON •• 2 RPTR(1) •• .1205000(;+02 RPTR(Z) •• .2000000E+01
COMP NO. ~ {CODE •• 0
KFDN •• 1 FPTR(1) •• •1522100E+03 FPTR(2) •• .00001100E+00
KROfl•• 2 RPTR(1} •• •1Z0500tJE+02 RPTR(2) •• .2000000Ei01
COMP NO.5 ICOOE •• 0
KFDN •• 1 FPTR(1) •• •15221'b0E;+0:iFPTR(2) •• .0001)000E+00
KRON •• 2 RPTR(1) •• .lZ050!lOE+02 RPTR(2) •• .2000000E+01
COMP NO.6 ICOOE •• 0
Kl'DN•• 1 FPTR(1) .. •4555000E+02 FPTR(2) •• .OOOOOOOE+()O
KRDN •• 2 RPTR(1) •• .24090001:+02 RPTR(2) .. .40000!lOE+01
COM? ~O. 7 lCODt •• 0
KF')N•• 1 FPTR('I).. .45550001:+02 FPTR(2) •• .0000900E+OO
KRDN .. 2 RPTR(1),. •2409000E+02 I\PTR(2)•• .4000000E+01
COMP NO. 8 ICIOOE•• 0
KF!Jf.I•• 1 FflTR(1);'~ •45550(10E+02 FP'TR(2)•• .OOOOOOOE+OO
K:r.DtJ .. ~<,2 RPTR('I).. •2409000E+02 RPTR(2) .. .40(100001:+01
(j
COMP NO.9 ICODE •• 0
KFPN •• 1 FPTR( 1>•• .4.5550001:+02 t'PTR':2)•• .OOOOOOOE+OO
KReN •• 2 RPTR(1) •• •:!409000E+02 RPTR(2) •• .4000000E+01
COMP NO.10 lCODE •• 0
KFON •• 1 FPTR(1 ).. •jl!j550DOE+02 FPTR{Z) •• •(J(},~OO(jOE+OO
KRON •• 2 RPTR(1) •• .:1409000E+02 RPTR(2) .. .4000000E+01
CCMP NO.11 tCOO~•• 0
KFON •• 1 FP1R(1) •• ,1,5S5(iOOE+02 FPTRCZ} .. .OOOOOOOE+OC
KRDN •• 2 RPTR(1) .. •;!409000E+02 RF'TR(?) •• .40000bOE+01
COMP NO.12 IC(l'Jt:~.0
KFO,. .. 3 FPTR(1 ).. .1011,700E+03 FPTR(2)., .1100GOOE+01
KRi)~.. 2 RPTR(1) •• •120S000E+()2 RPTR(2) •• .2000000E+01
COMP 110.13 ICOOE •• 0
KFDN •• 3 FPTR(1) .. .1(J14700E{03 FP!R(2) •• •~100aOOE':"d
KRDN •• 2 RPTR(1) •• •1205000E+02 RPTR(2) •• .2000000E+01
COHP NO.14 !CODE •• 0
KFDN •• 3 FPTR(1) •• .10147001:+03 FPTR(Z) •• .1100000E+01
KRON •• 2 RPTR(1) •• .1205000[:+02 RPTR(2) .. .20oo000E+01
1'72
COf<:?NO.15 [COOE •• 0
KFON •• 1 FPTR(1) .. .2025800E+03 "PTiH/!)" .OOOOOOOE+QO
KRON •• 2 RPTR(1) •• •1205000E+02 RPTR(2) .. .2000000E+0\
COMP 110.16 lCOOE •• 0
.2025800E~03KFDiI•• 1 FPTR(1)., FPTR(2) •• .0000O'\lOE+00
KRON •• 2 RPTR(1) •• .120S000e+~2 RPTR(2) •• .2000000E+01
'0
"\
,COMP NO.17 rcooe •• 0 ~
KFDiI •• 1 FPTR(1) •• .2025800E+03 fPTR(2)•• .00000001:+00
KRD.... 2 RPTR(1) •• •1205000E+02 RPTR(2) •• .20COOOOE+O~
C:'\')MP 1l0 •.18 [CooE •• 0 ~
Kr-O!i•• 1 FPTR(1) .. •1825000E+1l3 FPTR(2) •• .OOOOOOOE+OO
KRON •• 2 RPTR(1) •• .4020000E+01 RPTR(2) •• •6700000E+OO
CC~IP 11;).19[CODE •• 0
KFPM •• 1 FPiR(1) •• •1825000E+03 FPTR(2) •• .OOOOOOOE+OO
KRON •• 2 RP'R(1) •• .402000QE+01 RPTR(2) •• .fI700000E+00
OUTPUT BLOCK
AVAI~ABILITY BLOCK
AVERMe UPTIME •••
AVERAtlE DNUME •••
13.06
123.92
SIGMA ......
SIGMA ••••••
SIGMA ••••••
22.52
38.43
,1)1AIJEF.AG'~ AVAlLABlLlTY.. .10
THE 90 'PF.Rf:i:NT'CONFIDENCE LE'Ji::.L... .10
1 HE 95 \)P INT CONF IDEI-lCELEVEL... .10
RELIABl\ITY GLOCK
MEAN lIlltt ••••••••• " •••••• 13.86
SIGMA. " •••••••••••••••••• 22.52
RElIABILlry tllSTRIBUTION
TIME' FREQUENCY R9SL RMLE
10.0~\ 3184 .352 .363
20.01') 509 .251 .261
30.01l, 410 ,170 .1'l'9
40.0Cr 280 .116 .1l3
5&.00 220 .073 .079
60.00 136 .047 .052
70.00 90 .030 .034
80.00 69 .017 .020
90.00 41 .010 .01(,
100.00 20 .006 .008
110.0(1 16 .003 .005
120.00 a .002 .003130.00 5 .001 .e02
140.00 2 .001 .002
150.00 1 .001 .002
OVERFLOW 9 .000
NUMBER OF CLASS INTERVAlS ••• o, 15
CLASS INTERVAL' WIDTH .......... 10.00
IoIAXII<:UHSYSTEM fAILURE TIME ••• 204.74
MINIMUM SYSTEM FAILURE TIME ••• .00
FAILURE BLOCK
COMPONENT NO. NUMBER OF FAILUReS
173
512
438
_)I)3 1991
.) 1992 ,~I
5 1968
6 2657
7 2666
8 2655
9 2656
10 2675
11 2673
12 2357
13 2325
1i. 2336
15 1666
16 1712
17 1692
18 1868
19 1828
I
J
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RAMOlJT - COMPONI2NTS LEFf ON DURING SYSTEM REPAIR
WITH THE SYSTEM REPAIR TIME EQUAL TO ,THE MAXIMUM
COMPONENT REPAIR TIME
RUN NO. 4
INPUT BLOCK
TYPE OF RUN (0,1,OR 2) ••••••••••••••••••••••••••• ~. 2
REQUIRED NUMBER OF SIMULATE!,)SYSTEM FAIlURES ••••••• 5000
HUMBER OF COMPONENTS IN THE SYST~M ••••••••••••••••• 19
REPAIR SPECIFICATION (1,2 OR 3) •••••••••••••••••••• 2
MUMBER OF CLASS IHT~RVALS FOR RELIABILITY CALC ••••• 15
CLASS INTERVAL WIDTH ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 10.1)0
Ca.lP NO. 1 lCOOE .. (}
KFDH •• 3 fPTR(1) •• •1140630E+04 fPTR{2) •• .90000001:+00
KRON •• 2 RPTR(n •• •29200001:+01 RPTR(2) •• .5000000E+OO
COMP NO.2 ICODE •• 0
KfDII•• , FPTR( 1).. "$20960E+04 FPTR(2) •• .000OOOOEi'OO
KRO~ •• 2 RP'fR(1)•• .2' 2(1000E+01 RPTR(2) •• .5000000E+OO
Cot<1P'.J. 3 lC~ •• 0
KFD»·.~ FPTRO) .. .1522100E+03 FPTR(2) •• .OOOOOOOE+OO
KROll•• 2 RPiR(1) .. •1205000E+02 RPTR(2) .. .20000001;+01
COMP NO.4 lCCDE •• 0
KFDN •• 1 fPTR'.l).. •1522100E+03 FPTR(2) •• .OOOOOOOE+QO
KRON •• 2 RPTR(1) •• •120S0Q(lE+02 QPTR(2) .. .2000000E"01
COMP NO.5 ICOOE •• 0
KFON •• 1 FPTR(1) •• .1522100E+0;5 FPTR(2) •• .OOOOOOOE+On
KRDN .. 2 RPTR(1) .. •120S0DOE+02 RPTR(2) •• .2000000E+01
COMP NO.6 lCOOE •• 0
KFON •• 1 FPTR(1} •• •4555000E+02 FPTR(2) •• .OOOOO(JOE+OO
KRON •• 2 RPTR(1) •• •2409000E+02 RPTR(2) .. .4000000E+01
CaMP No.7 lCOOE •• 0
KFOII•• 1 FPTR(1) •• .4555000E+02 FPTR(2) •• .OOOOOOOE+OO
KRON •• 2 RPTR(1) .. •24090(lOE+02 R?TR(2) •• .400000!lE+01 1/
COMP NO.8 ICOOE •• 0
KFON •• 1 FPTR(1) •• ,4555000E+02 FPTR(2) •• .OOOOOOOE+OO
KRON .. 2 RPTR(1) .. •,2409000E+02 RPTR(2) •• .4000000E+01
COMP NO.9 ICODE •• 0
KFON •• 1 fPTR(1) •• .1\55S000E+(i2 FPTR(2) .. ..OOOOOOOE+QO
KROll•• 2 RPTR(1 ),.• •(\409000E+02 RPTR(2) •• .4000000E+O' ';/
COMP NO.10 ICOOE •• 0
KFON .. 1 FPTR(1) .. .4\~55000e+02 FPTR(2) •• .OOOOOOOE+OO
KROH •• 2 RPTR(1) •• •24:09000E+02 r.?TR(2).. .4000000F.+01
COMP NO.11 ICOOE •• 0
KFDN •• 1 FPTR(1) .. .45~;5000E+02 FPTR(.2).. .00000001:+00
KROll•• 2 RPTR(1) •• .2409000E+02 RPTR(2) •• .4000000E+01
COMP 110.12 ICODE •• 0
KFDN .. 3 FPTR(1) .. •1014700E+03 FPTR(2) .. •1100000E+01
KRD'N. H 2 RP'{it(1)•• •120S000E+02 RPTR(2) •• .200(JOOOE+01
COMP NO.13 ICOOE •• 0
l<FON.. 3 FF>TR(1)•• •10141'001:<+03FF'TR(2)•• •11000aOE+01
KRON .. 2 RPTR(1) •• .1205000£+02 RPTRt2).•• .200000tlf.+01
COMP NO.14 ICOOE •• 0
KFNI •• :~ FPTR(1) .. .10147COE+03 FPTR(2)o. •1100000E+01
KRON •• 2 RPTR(1) •• •120'5000E+02 RPTR(2) •• .2000000E+01
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~OMP NO.15 ICOOE •• 0
KFON •• 1 FPTR(1) •• .2025800E+03 FPTR(2) •• .OOOOOOOE+CO 0
1(>1014 •• 2 RPTR(1) •• •120SCOOE-t02 RPTR(l) •• .200QOOOE+01
COMP HO.16 ICOOE •• 0
KfDH •• 1 fPTR(1) •• .2025SOOE+03 FPTR(2) •• •QOOOOOf)E+OO
KRDII.. 2 RPTR(1} •• •120500DE+02 RPTl«2) •• .2000000E+01
COMP 110.17 lCOCE,. a
KFO!; •• 1 FPTR(1) •• .2025800E+03 FPTR(2) •• .OOOOOOOE+OO
KROll•• 2 RPTR(1} •• •120SGOOE+02 RPTR(2) •• .2000000E+01
COMP 110.18 ICOOE •• 0
KFOII•• 1 FPTR(1) •• •1825000E+03 FPTR(2) .. .OOOClOOOE+OO
KRON •• 2 RPTR(1) •• .402ClOOOE+01 RPTR(2) •• .6700000E+OO
COMP 110.19 lCOCE •• 0
KFON •• 1 FPTR(1) •• •187.5000E+03 FPTRt;2)•• .OOOOOOOE+OO
KROll•• 2 RPTR{1) •• •4020000E+01 RPTR(2) •• •67(lOOQOE+OO
OUTPUT BLOCK
AVAILABILITY BLOCK
~VERAGE UPTIME •••
AVERAGE ONTIME •••
40.12
27.05
SIGMA ••••••
SIGMA ••••••
30.07
4.71,
AVERAGE AVAILABILITY.. .60 SIoo •••••• .00
THE 90 PERCENT COII~IOENCE LEVEL... .59
THE 95 PERCEllT CONFIDENCE lEVEL... .59
RELIABILITY SLOCK
MEAN LIFE ••••••••••••••••• 40.12
SIGMA ..................... 30.07
RELIABILITY DISTRIBU1IOH
TIME fREQUfllCY R95L RMLE
10.00 759 .840 .848
20.00 614 .715 .725
30.00 740 .566 .5774;).f]0 693 .427 .439
50.00 633 .301 .312
60.00 475 .208 .217
70.00 339 .141 .149
80.00 245 .093 .100
90.00 163 ,062 .068
100.00 11Z .041 .045
110.00 78 .026 .030
120.00 63 .014 .017
130.00 35 .(lns .C10
140.00 23 .004 .006
150.00 9 .002 .004
OVERFLOW 19 .000
NUMBER OF CLASS INTERVALS ••••• 15
CLASS INTERVAL WIOTH •••••••••• 10.(1)
MAXIMUM SYSTEM FAILURE TIME ••• 2S9.1:Z'
MINIMUM SYSTEM fAILURE TIME ••• .(10
fAILURE BLOCK
COMPONEIU NO. NUMBER OF FAILURES
176
1 297
2 23i!
3 1599
4 16,~1
5 1618
(;; 3~18
7 3133
8 3126
9 3139
10 3087 <:~
11 3151
12 2169
13 2195
14 2200
15 1302
16 1224
17 1249
18 138~
19 1382
\1
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RAMOUT - PURE RELIABILITY SIMULATION
f RUN HO. 5
II
1/
Ii INPUT BLOCK
TYPE ~F 'RUN (0,1,00 ;:) •••••••••••••••••• 00 •••••••••
REQUIRED NUMBER OF SINULItTEO SYSTEM FAIl.e!ES •••••••
NUMBER OF CGlPOHEN1S IN THE SYSTEM •••••••••••••••••
RF.PAIR SPECIFIC~TION (1,2 O~ 3)•••••••••••••.••••••
NUMBER OF cuss INTERVALS r'OR REI.IABIl!TY CAlC •••••
CLASS INTERVAL YIDTH •••••••••••••••••••••• "... c•••••
o
5000
19
1
1S
10.00
COMP NO.1 leooe•• 0
KFDN •• 3 ;PTR(1).. .1140630E+04 FPTR(2).. .90GOOOOE+UO
KRDH •• 2 RPTR(1).. •2920000E+01 RPTR(?).. .5000000E+OG
CaMP NO.2 ICUOE •• 0
~FDH •• 1 FPTR(1) ••• 1520960f+04 FPTR(2) ••• OOODOOOE+OO
I~RDN•• 2 RPTR(1).. •2920000E+01 RPTR(.?·).. .5000000E+OQ
COMP NO.3 leODS •• 0
KrDN •• 1 FFtR(1).. .1522100E+03 FPtR\........OOOGOOOE+OO
KROH .. 2 RPT:'C(1).. ,,1205000E+02 RPTR(2).. .2000000E+01
COMP NO.4 ICODE •• 0
KFDN •• 1 FPTRO) •• .lS22100E::'03 FPTR(2) •• .OOOOOOOE+OO
KRDN •• 2 RPTR(1) •• .1205000E+02 RPTR(2) •• .2000000E+01
COMP NO.5 ICODE •• 0
KFDN •• 1 FPTR(1) •• •1522100E+03 fPTR(2) •• .OOOOOOOE+OO
KRON •• 2 RPTR(1) •• •12050aOE+02 RPTR(2) •• .20()DO(lOE+01
COMP NO.6 ICODE •• 0
KFDN •• 1 FPTR(1) •• .4555000£;+02 FPT .OOOOOOOE+OO
KRDN •• 2 RPTR(1) •• •2409000E+02 RHB' .4000000E+01
CO"IP NO.7 ICODE •• 0
KFDN •• 1 FPTR(1) •• .4555000E+02 fP1'R(Z)•• .OOOOOOOE+OO
KRON •• 2 RPTR(1) .. •2409000E+02 1I.:>tR(2)•• .4000000E+01
COM? NO. a lCODE •• 0
K~J)tl•• 1 f-PTR(1)•• .455500DE+02 FPTR(2) •• .00000001;+00
KRDN .. 2 RPTR(1} •• .24D9000E+02 RPTlt(2).. .4000000E+01
~OMP NO.9 ICODE•• 0
I), KFDN •• 1 FPTR(1) •• .4555000E+02 FP-;'R(2) •• .00000001:+00
KRON •• 2 RPTR(1) •• •2409000E+02 RPTR(2) .. .4000000E+01
COMP NO.10 leODE •• 0
KfOIi•• 1 f?TRCI) •• .455500IlE+02 fPTR(2) •• .OG"OOOOOE+OO
KRON •• 2 RPTR(1) •• •2409000f;+02 RPTR(2) •• .40000COE+01
COMP NO. (1 ICOOE •• 0
KFON .. 1 FPTR(1) •• •4555000E+02 fPTR(2) •• oOOI'lOOOOE+OO
KRDN .. 2 RPTR(1) •• •2409aOOE+02 R?'fR(2)•• .4000000E+01
COMP N~12 [CCCIE•• 0
KF1lIJ•• 3 FPTR(1) .. •1o14700E",03 FPTR{2} •• •1100000E+01
KRDIt•• 2 RPTR(1) •• ,120S000E+02 RPTR(2) •• .2000000E+01
C~P No.13 ICODE •• 0
KrOll .. 3 fPTR( 1h. .1014700E+03 FPTR(2) •• •t~000uOE+01
'(RON•• 2 ~~TR(1) •• •120S000E+02 RP1'R{2)•• .20000001:'+01
COMP ~O.14 ICCOE •• 0
KFON •• 3 FPTR(1) •• .1014TOOE+03 FPTR(2) •• •1100()OOE+01
KRDN •• 2 RPTR(1) •• .12050001;+02 RPTR(2L. .2000000E+(11
CaMP NO.15 lCODa •• 0
HON •• 1 FPTR(1). , 2(12St~:;~::;~:J! ~'7"1C2)." •OOOOQ,nOE+00
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o';:
KROPl •• 2 RPTR(1) •• .1zn5000E+02 RPfR(2) •• .2000000E+01
COMP 1010.16{CODE •• 0
"fOil •• 1 FPTR(1) •• .2025800E+03 FPTR(2) •• .OOOOOOOE+OO
KROll•• 2 RPTR(1) •• •1205000E+02 RPTR(2) •• .2000000E+(J1
COMP NO.17 lCOOE •• 0
KFON •• 1 FPTR(1) •• •20258001;+03 FPTR(Z} •• .OOOOOQOE+OO
KRON •• 2 RPTR(1) •• •1205000E+02 RPTR(Z) •• .2\lOOOOOE+Q1
COMP 1010.18ICOOE •• 0
KFON .• 1 !'PTR(1)•• .1825000F.+03 FPTR(2) •• .OOOOOOOE+30
KRON •• :! RPTR(1, •• .4020000E+Oi RMR(2} •• .6700000E+OO
~:~'
COMP 1010.19ICOOE •• 0
KFON •• 1 FPTI\(1)•• •18250ooE+03 fPTR(2) •• .0OOOOOOE+OO
KROH •• 2 RPTR(1) •• .402DOOOE+01 RPTR(2) •• .67GDOOOE+OO
OUTi>UT BLOCK
RELIABILITY BLOCK
1/
MEAN lIFE ••••••••••••••••• 54.38
SIGMA ..................... 29.74
RELIABILITY DISTRIBUTION
TIME FREQUENCY R95l RMI.E
10.00 139 .968 .972
20.00 322 .901 .908
30.00 530 .793 .8J)2
40.00 738 .643 .654
50.00 .796 .483 .1.95
60.00 6')0 .346 .357
70.00 52f, .242 .252
80.00 ~98 .164 .173
90.00 2a5 .108 .116
100.00 200 .069 .076
110.00 128 .045 .050
120.00 91 .C28 .032
130.00 56 .017 .021
140.00 29 .012 .015
1!.'0.00 25 .008 .01C
OVERFLOW 49 .000
NUMBER OF CLASS INTEKVALS •••••
CLASS INTERVAL WIDTH ••.•••••••
MAXIMUM SYSTEM FAilURE TIME ••• ,
KIHHIUM SYSTEH FArLURI; TIME ••• /1
. 1/
!I
"NUMBER OF J~HU!1J:S
15
10,00
220.40
.1)8
\
FAILURE .;l.OCK
COMPONENT NO.
1 336
2 177
3 1492
4 1535
5 t496
6 3404
7 3396
8 3435
9 3'362
10 3412
11 3437
12 1980
179
13 2080
14 1995
15 1167
16 1125
11 1168
18 1294
19 1288
((
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APPENDIX H
SPAR" SIMULATION RESULTS - PRODUCTiON ,LINE
STIN - PRODUCTION LINE
RECORD-1.1 TITLE
',PRODUCTION LINE EXAMPLE
DEFAULr - COMPONENTS ACTIVE DURING SYSTEM REPAIR
DEFAUI.T - SYSTEM REPAIR TIME IS EQUAL TO MAl( CC»4PONENT REPAIR TIME
SYSTEM CHECKuP lEVEL - COMPONEtlTS REPAIRED !'CLL~IN3 SYSTEM FAILltRE
CONTI~UOUS CHECKUP MODE - SYSTEM CHECKED AI EACH STOCHASTIC EVENT
RECORD-1.2 HOOE OF RUN
2
RECORD-1.3 HPS
500
RECORD-1.4 FLAG OF NOH-EXPO~ENTIAl FIELD OISTRISUTIONS
1
RECORD-2.1
100(10
SEIMtr~. TIME
-It
RECORD-2.2 HUHBER OF DIFFERENT PROfILE STATES
1 "
RECORD-2.3 .tHE POINTS OF MISSION PROFILE flIPS
RECORD-2.4 PROFILE STATES IN PROFILE DEFINITION
RECORD"2.5 NUMBER OF SYSTEMS AT T=O
1
RECORD-2.6 NUMBER OF TIME POINTS FOR SYSTEMS ACQUISITION
RECORe-2.7 TIME POINTS OF SYSTEMS ACQUISITION
RECORD-a.S NUI<!Gi!ROF SYSTE~fS ADDED AT EACH TIME POINT
RECORD-3.1 SYSTEM RELIABIliTY MODEL
a
RECORD-3.2 NUMBER OF LRU'S IN SYSTEM
19
RECORD-S,3 NUMBER OF OIFFERENT lRU TYPES
7
P.ECij~D·3.4 lRU TYPF IDENTIFICATION
1 A
2 B
3 C
4 [l
5 E
6 F
7 G
RECORD-3.S SYSTEM COMPOSITION OF LRU'S
123 334 4 4 4 445 S S 6 ? 6 7 7
~ECORD-4.1 LRU TYPE MEAN REPLACEMENT TIME (AT LEVEL Ai
RECORD-4.2 LRiJA TO B SHIPMENT TIME !lISTR. (C,E,N)
CCC CCC C
RECORD-4.3 LRU A TO B SHIPMENT TIME
1.E~06
\1
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~.
1.E-06
1.E-06
1.E-06
1.E-il6
1.e-06
1.E-U6
RECORD-4.4 I.RUS PASSIV!: FAILURE RATES FLAG
RECOR[!-4.5 fAII.URE RATES
RECOP.!'l-4.6I.RUREPAIR (AT lEVEl. S) TIME DISTRIBUTION
1 C 1.E-06
2 c 1.F.-06
3 C 1.E-06
4 C i.E-06
5 C 'I.E-06
6 C 1.1:-06
7 C 1,E·06
RECORIl'4.7 TYPE NUMBERS OF LRUS REPAIRED AT LEVEL A
1 234 5 6 7
!tECORO·4.8 MAXIMUM NUMBER ~IlRU REPAIR CYCLES
R::CORO-4.9 PRCBI\BILITY TO fIND A FAILED GPARE AT LEVEL,A
'\, I
RECORD-5.l tllJMBEROF n~E POINTS FOR LRU'S ACQUISITIoN .:.
RECOR[)-5.2 \\pME POINTS Of LRU'S ACQUISITION
\ ,
RECORD-5.l LRU STORAGE
toOo
1000
1000
1000
1000
1000
1000
RECORD-5.4 FLAG OF LRU PRICE CONSIDERATIONS
RECORD-5.S PRICES PER LRU TYPE AT ACQUISITION TIME
RECORD-5.6 CURRENCY
RECORD-6.1 CHECK-UP LeVEL AND MODE
S
C
RECORD-6.4 TEST EFfICIENCY VALU~S FOR EACH LRU TYPE
RECORD-7.1 NUMBER OF TIME POINTS fOR AVAILABILITY CALCULATION
1
RECORD-6.2 CHECK-UP CYCLES SPECIfICATION
RECORD-6.3 TEST COVERAGE VALUES FOR EACH LRU Typg
II.
RECORD-7.2 TJME POINTS FOR AVAILABILITY CALCULATION
10000
RECORO~7.3 RISK FU~CTION
RECORC-7.4 FROBABILlTY OF K SYSTEMS UP - VALUES OF K ARE:
REl'lACE~lENTTJME DISTRIBUTIONSRECORD-B. 1
PS 1
1 N
2 N
3 N
2.92 0.50
2.92 0.50
12.05 2.00
182
4 N 24.094.00
5 N 12.052.00
6 N 12.052.00
7 N 4.02 0.67
RECORO-8.2 FAILURE TiME DISTRIBUTIONS Of LRUS IN ACrlVE STATE
es 1 )
1 W 1.772e-03 0.9
2 W 657.5E-06 1
3 ~ 6.57e-03 1
4 \i 21.95E-03 1
5 W 6.209E-03 1.1
6 ~ 4.936E-03 1
7 W 5.479E-03 f
RECORD-S.3 FAILURE TIME DISTRIBUTltllS OF LRUS hi PASSIVE ST;'I.TE
183
IJ
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LBOUT - PRODUCfION LINE
fU~CiION NsYSCM()
NSYSCM '" 19 'I (,I"RETU'l'!!l I!
END i[
FUNCTION ISYSUP(J,K)
DI~ENSIOH H(19),1(1)
lSYSUP=O
ISYSUP= K(J+1)*K(J+2)*K(J+3)*K(J+6)*K(J+f2)*K{J+15)
1 *K(J+18}
IF(ISYSUP,GT.O.)RETURN
ISYSUP:::K(J+1)*K(J+2)*K(J+3)*K(J+7)*K(J+12)*K(J+15)
1 *K( .1+18) ,
IF(ISYSUP.G7.0.)~ETURN
[SYSUP", K(J+~}*K(J+2)*K!J+4}*K(J+8)*K(J+13)*r.(J+15), *K(J+18),
IF(ISYSl!P.GT.0. )".,TURN
ISYSUP:::K(J+1)*KtJ+2)*K(J+4)*K(J+9}~K(J+13)*K(J+15)
1 *K(J+18)
IHISYSUP.GT.O.)P.ETURN ' ,
ISYSUP= K(,t+l)*K(J+2jlrK(J+5)*K(J+1G)*K(J.-•..i)*K(J+15)
1 *K(J+18) .
If(ISYSUP.GT.O.)RETURN
,SYSUP: K(J+l)1<K(Ji2)*K(J+5)*KfJ+l1)*K{J+14)*K(J+15)
1 *K(,1+18)
IF(tSYSUP.GT.D.)RETURN
ISYSUP= K(J+1)*K(~+2)*K(J+3)*K(J+6)*K(J+12)1<K(J+15)
1 "'1(J"19)
IF{ISYSdP.Gl.0.)RETURN
ISYSl.!P=K(J+1 )*K{J+2)*K( J+3)*K(J+7)*K(,_!+12)*K(J+15)
1 *K(J+19)
If(ISYSUP.GT .o. )RHURN
ISYSUP." K(J+1)*K(J+2)*K(J+4)"K(J+8)*1«J+13)*KC.>+15)
1 *K(.J+19)
IF(lSYSUP.GT .O.)P.ETURN
ISYSUP= K(J+1 )*K(J+2:1~'K(J+4 )*K(J+9)*K( J+13)*K(J+15)
1 *K(J+19>
IF(lSYSUf'.GT.D.)RETURN
ISYSUP", KeJ+1)*K(J+2)*K(J+5)*K(J+10)*K{J+ :4)·~K(J+t'j".
1 *K(J+19) ,
I F(lSYSUP .GT.O. )RElURN "
ISYSUP== K(0I+1)*K(J+2)*K(J+5)*K( J"'11 )*K(J+14 )'tK(J+15)
1 *K<~+19)
IF(lSYSUP .GT .0. )RETIJRN
ISYSUP'" K(J+l)*K(J+2)*K(J+3)*K(J+6)*K(J+12}*KCJ+16;
1 *K(J+18)
If(ISY5UP.GT.O.)RcTURN
ISYSUP= K(J+1)*K(J+2)*K(J+3)*Kf,J+1)*K(J+12)~K(J+16)
1 *K(J+18)
IF(ISYSUP.GT.O.)REfURN
ISYSUP'" K(J+l)*K(J+2)*K(J+4)*K{J+8)*K(J+13)*K(J+16)
1 *K(J+18)
IF(ISYSUP.GT.Q.)RETU~N
ISY~UP= K(J+1)*K(J+2)*K(J+4)*K(J+9)*K(J+13)~K(J+'6)
1 *K(J+18}
IF([SYSUP.GT.O.)RETURN
:SYSup." K(J"'1)*K(J+2)*K(J+5)*K(J+10)*K( J+14)*K( ,1+16)
1 *K(J+18)
IF(iSYS~P.GT.D.)RETURN
ISYSUP~'K(J+1)*K(J+2)*KCJ+5)*K(J+l1)*K(J+14)*X(J+16)
1 *K(J+18)
IF(ISYSur.GT"O.)RE1~RN
IS\,SUP= K(J+1 )*K(J+2)*K(J+3)*K(J+6~"'''(J+12)*K(J+1,?}
1 *K(J+19) ,
IF(ISYSUP.GT.O.)RETURN
ISYSUP= K(J+1)*K(J+2)*K(J+3)*K(J+7)*K(J+12)*K(J+16)
1 *K(J+19)
IF(ISYSUP.GT.O.)RETURN
I"lYSUP= KCJ+1 )*K(J+2)*K(J+4)*K(J }8)*K(J+13)1l.\('(J+16)
I *K(J+19) ,
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IF(lSYSU!'>"GT.O.)P.EiURN
lSYSUP= K(J+1)*K{J+2'*K\J+4)*K(J+9)~K(J+13)*K(J+16)
1 '~K{J+19}
IF(ISY$UP .UT.O. )RETURN
ISYSUP= K(J+1)*K(,J+2)*KCJ+5)*K{J+10)*K(J+14)*K(J+16)
J *1«.1+19)
IF(ISY$UP.GT.O.)RETURN
IS\'!i(JP:: K(J+1)*K(J+2)*K(J+'.i)*!(J+1~)*K(J+14)*KCJ+16)
1 *K(J+19)
IF(IS\'SU~.GT.O.)RETURN
!S1SUP= K(J+1)*K{J+2)*r.(J+3}*~(J+6)*K(J+12)*K(J+17)
1 *K(J+18}
If(ISYSUP.GT.O.)RETURN
ISY'3UP" I«J+1 }*K{J+2)*KtJ+3)*lC(J+7)*K(J+12)*K(,'i'17j
1 *Kf,J+1S)
If(ISrSUP.Gf.O.)RETURN
ISYSUP" K(J+1 )*K(J+~i"l<"(J1q*K(J+8)*K(J+13)*K(J+17)
1 *K{J+1E:1)
IF(ISYSUP.GT.O.)RETU~N
ISYSUP= K(J+1)*K(J+2)*K(J+4)*K(J+9)"'K(J+13)*K(J+11)
1 *1((.1+18)
IF(I~YSU?GT.O.)REiURN
JSYSUP= K( J+1 )*K(J';'2)*K( .1+5)*1(J+10)*K{J+14 )*K(J+17)
1 *1(J+18)
IF(ISYSUP.Gl.O.)RETURN
ISYSUP= KCJ+1 )*K(J+2)"'K(J+S)*K(J+11 )*K(J+14)*K(J+11>
1 *K(J+18) "
IF(ISYSUP.GT.O.)RETURN
ISYSUP= K(J+1)"'K(J+2)*K(J+3)*K(J+6)*K(J+12)*K(J+17)
1 *K{J+19)
IF(ISYSUP.GT.O.)RETURN
I$YSUP= I{(J+1 )*K{J+2)*K(J+3)*K(J+i')*K(J+12}*!«J+17)
1 *K(J+19)
IF(ISYSUP.GT.O.)RETURN
TSYSUP= I(J+1 )*K(J+<:)*l(( J+4)*K\J+~I)*K( J+1~\~*K(J+17)
1 *K(J+19) }, '. '\
I F{ISYSUP .GT. O. )RE'rl.lIilf
/ l<;YSUP= K(J+1 )"KCJ+2)~;(,(J+4)*K{J+9)*K(J+13)*K(J+1j')
, ) *K(J+19) i ! \
If(IS1SUP.GT.O.)RETllRN I'.
tSYSlJP= K(J+1)*K(J+2)*K(J+5)*K(J+10)*K(J+14'*K(J+17)
" 1 *K(J':o19, S'
If{ISYSUP,GT,C.)REWRN ' , , '\
lS,{SUf'~K(J+1 ;'~K(J+2)*K(J+!i}*K(J+m*Jl.h '14)*i«J+11)1 *K(J+19) " ,, ;,
RETURN
ENfi
!.
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STOUT." F·>ODUCI'ION LINE
PR~;':m~ UNE EXAMPLE
D!;fAlf.i~ )' t;'!Ao!J<')il;NTS ACHVE DUR!NG SYSTEM REI'>AIR
tlEFI4'<.lL:-r - -lit &tik "~PAIR TIME IS EQUAL TO MAX ta4PONENT REPAIR TIME
SYSll:!ol tIlE!',{UP i r:,tt. • COMPONENTS REPAIRED FOW~IING SYSTEM FAILURE
CC~Tml.KX1~, CHi:\'j~t;? !fOOE • SYSTEM CHECKED AT EACH STOCHASTIC EVENT
"'**'l'*******~********"'*****"*
~. I N PUT BLOCK '"
*****"'**********************
CONTROL RECORD3
HOOE OF RlJN C1-STORAGE REQutREMENUj 2-DEFItIEf) STORAGE) •••••••••••• 2
NUMBER OF HISTORIES •••••••••••••••••••••••••••• '•••••••••••••••• 500
NUMBER OF HISTORIES USED TO TALLY OISTRIBUTIONS •••••••••••••••• 500
NON-EXPONENTIAL fIELD DISTRIBUTIONS ARE IHCLUDED .
F .r E L D DES C R J ? T ION RECORDS
SERVICE TIME ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 1.0UOOE+04
HUMBER OF DIFFERENT MiSSION PJ\OFIL~iSTATES ,. 1
NUMBER OF CHANGE PROFILE TIME-POINTS: ••••••••••••••••••••••••• 0
THERE ARE NO CHANGE PROFILE TIME-POINTS
NUMBEROF STATES tN PROFILE DEFlilI1ION
PROFILE STATES ARE NOT GIVEN IN INPUT,
PROFILE STATE NO. 1 IS ASSUMED
FROM THE BEGINNING TO THE END OF LIFE
NlIMBER OF SYSTEMS HI THE FIELD fl.T T = 0 .
NUMBER OF lIME POINTS FOR SYSTEMS ACQUISITION 0
SYSTEM o ESC RIP T ION R E COR 0 S
SYSlEM RELIABILITY MODEL ('I -, ,SERIAL; 2 • NEiWORK) 2
NUMBER OF LRU"S IN SYSTEM...................................... '~9
HUMBER or DlffERENT LRU TYPES •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 7
lP.U TYPES IDENTIFICATION TABLE
LRU TYPE
NllMBER
LRU TYPE
IDENTIFICATION
NAME
1
2
3
4
5
6.,.
"B
C
o
E
f
G
SYSTEM COfoIPOSITIONOF LRIl'S
12333 4
66677
4 4 4 4 5 5 5
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L R U DES CRt P T I 0 H RECORDS
tRU TYPE REPLACEMENT TIME'DISTRISUTIOH
PROFILE STATE NO. 1
LRU TYPE IHSTRISUHOH FIRSi SECOND
NUHBE~ TYPE PARAMETER PARAMETER
1 NORMAL 2.920E+OO ~.00Oc-C1
2 NORMAL 2.920E+00 S.OOOE-a1
3 NORMAL 1.205E+01 2.000E+00
4 NORMAL 2.409E+01 4.1)00E+00
5 NORMAl. 1.205E+01 2.UOOE+OO
6 NORMAL 1.205E+0' 2.000E+O()'
7 IiORMAL 1,.0201:+00 6.700E"01
LHU A TO B SHIPMENT TIME DISTRIBUTION
I.RU TYPE DISTRiBUTION FlR~T SECOND
HUMBER TYPE PARAM~'t;;k PARAMETER
1 CONSTANT 1.000E-06
2 CONSTANT 1.000E-06
:3 CONSTANT 1.000E-06
4 Cm:STANT 1.000E-06
5 CONSTANT 1.000E-06
6 CONSTANT 1.000E-06
7 C9NSTANT 1.000E-06
WJ Y\'PE fAILURE TIME DISTRIBUTIONS IN ACnVE ST,\1E
PROFILE SUfE NO.
lRU TYPE 01 STR 1BUTI 0l0I FIRST SECOND
NUMBER TYPE. PMAMETER PARAMETER
1 Wf,HlUlL 1.172E'03 9.000E-01
2 WEiBULL ~.:;75E-04 1.000E+OO
:5 IJEIBULL 6,570E-03 1.000E+OO
4 WEIBLILL ~.195E-02 1.000E·1)0
5 w~IBULL 6.209E-03 1.100E+OO
I) WEIBULL 4.936£-03 1.000E+00
7 WEIBULL 5.4791:-03 1.000[,;-100
LRU TYPE FAILURE TIME DISTRIBUTIONS IN PASSIVE STATE ARE WOT GiVeN
LRU REPAIR (AT LEVEL S) TIME DISTRIBUTION
LRU 'fYf'E
HUMBER
REPAIR TIME
DISTRIBUTION
TYPE
FIRST
IJARAMcTER
SECOND
PARAMETER
1
2
3
4
5_ -_
b
7
CONSTANT
CONSTANT
CONSTANT
CONSTAIH
CONSTANT
CONSTANT
CONSTANT
1.000E-06
1.000l:-06
'.00~·06
1.000E-Q6
1.000E-06
1.000E-06
1.000E·06
TYPE NUMBERS OF LRUIIS REPAIREP AT LEVEL A (NO REPLACEMENT)
1 234 567
J
MAXIMUM NUMBER OF LRU P.EPAIR CYCLES
LRU TYPE MAXIMUM
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NUMBER NUMBER
OF CYCLES
UNLIMITED
2 UNLIMITED
3 UIILlMITtD
4 UNLIMITED
5 UNLIMITED
6 UNLIMITED
7 UNLIMITED
PROBABILITY '(0 FIND FAILED SPARES AT LEVEL A IS NOT GIVI;N,
IT IS ASSUMED EQUAL to ZERO FOR ALL lRU TYPES.
SfiARE PAR T S STRATEGY REC~R!)S
NUMBER OF TIME POiNTS FOR Lf<U"S ACWiJISn 1011 ••••••••••••• «........ 0
LRU STORAGE STRATEGY
( FIRST ENTRY STANDS fOR NUMBER or LRUS STOREOAT TIME:; 0 )
LRU TYPE
NUMBER
NUMBER
o F L R U S
'i
2
3
4
5
6
7
1000
1000
1000
1000
1ClUt!
10()O
10(11)
FLAG OF LRUIIS PRICES CONSIDERATION " 0
CURRENCY IS NOT SPECIFIED
M A I N TEN A N C E POL C Y RECORDS~---~-~----~.---"-------"~--------------.---.-~------.: I
C II E C K • U P
'I
POL ICY
SYSTEM LEVEL OF CHECK-UP
CONTINUOUS CHECK-UP
TAL L Y R E COR D S
~UMBER OF POINTS FOR AVAILABILITY CALCULATION •••••••••••••••••••• 1
TIME POINTS FOR AVAILABILITY ,CALCULATIaH
1.000E~04
1
******************************************
* A V A I LAB I LIT Y BLOCK *
******"'****"'*'k****************************
AVAILABILITY WITH DEFINF.D SPARE PARTS STORIICE====~========b~~==~===~====~================~
POINTS AT THE POINT
6.1200000E-01
P.R.S.D. IN l'HEINTERVAL
3.56X 6.1512023E-01
P.R.S.D.
10000.00 3.49%
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, L R IJ
TYPE
tRlfoIBER
",*",,,,,,,,,,**,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,*,,,,,,,,,*.j,.;'''''''''''''Jt''''''''''''''''''''''''*''''''''''''*
'" SPARE PARTS CHARACTERISTICS BtOCK '"
"'*"'*~*********.,**"'**"'*"'*"''''******'''*********'''
PROBABh" ::i; SP""~l'
PART "It', cCI Ihr.E ~:J
LIfE 1f.;I>TORt
AVAllABli.lTY
OF THE
SPARE PAinS
AVERAGE
WAITING TIME
........ __ ...... _"" ...... o,a. .. _ .. __ ....... "' ... .., , ........... ~. '" 4' , ..... IOr_ ... __ ... _ ... ----- ...... - ...... - ... -_ ....... _ .... - ............. _ ............
O.OODOOOOE+l)U 1.0000000E+OO O.OOOOOOOE+OO
2 O.OOOOOOOE+OO 1.0000000E+00 O.OOOOOOOE+OO
3 O.OOOOOOOE+OO 1.0000000E+OO O.OOOOOOOE+OO
4- O.ooOOOOOE+OO 1.0000000E+OO O.OOOOOOOE+OO
5 O.OOOOOOOE+OO 1.0(100000E+00 D.OOOOOOfiE+OO
6 O.C~OOOODe+OO 1.0000000E+00 O.OOO(,OOOE+OO
7 O.OOOOOOOE+OO 1.000oo00E+00 O.O(lOOOOOE+OO
..~
'"SEN SIT I V I T Y BLOCK'"******",,,,**,,,**************,,,**********~,,,*
i.R U TYPE SENSITIvITY FOR DEFINED SPARE PARTS STORAGE~=================~=======~=============~~====~===========
1205
LRU
TYPE
TOTAL NUM~ER OF SYSTEMS FAILURES
UNAVAILABILITY
SENSITIVITY
FAIlED
PER HISTORY
SYSTEMS FAILUR~$
UPON EACH TYPE
FAILURE
SENSITIVITY
1 0.16 1.C3178E-02 o~ 5.4n18E-02
2 0.11 1.53,~.(lOE·02 42 3.48548E-02
3 2.49 1.65398E-01, 220 1.82573E-01
.. 4 9.75 4.94490E-Of 466 3.86722E-01
5 3.24 2.62888E·~' 283 2.34855E-01
6 1.85 1.04144E-(l2 27 2.24066E-02
7 1.41 4.11324E-02 101 8.38174E-02
NUMBE~ OF SYSTEMS DOWN-TIMES USED TO BUILD DISTRIBUTIQ~ 500
%
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.3l.l
0.3~
0.40
0.45
0.50
0.55
0.60
0.65
0.70
0.75
0.80
0.85
0.90
0.:,15
SYSTEMS DOWN TIME
2. 147949E+OO
2,788532E+QO
3.279778E+00
3.574600E+OO
4.238621E+00
7.941780E+OO
9.580261E+'OO
1.033606E+01
1.09S369E+01
1.159746E+01
1.222325E*01
1.2I:}S759E+01
1.396498E ..01
1.582735£:+01
1.915582£:+01
2.168119E+01
9.789642E+03
9.8550041:+03
9.883146E+03
189
'~ I
~I;
0.99 9_984993E+03
********"'***************'******************* P! A G NOS TIC S B L 0 C K *
+**";*"****,"1<*******************************
AVERAGE Nv. OF COLLISIONS PER,~ISTORY
AVERAGE NO. OF SYSTEMS FAILURES PER HlSTORI
31.512
2.41n
NUMBER OF FORWARD SAMPLINGS 261482
Ml~BER Or FORWARD SAMPLING REJECTIOij~ o
464.639EXECUTION TIME IN SECONDS
1
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